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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation was to compare and contrast the origins, formulation,
course, and outcome of three major American immigration schemes to provide haven for
German Jewish and non-Aryan refugees and British children: The Intergovernmental Committee
for Political Refugees (better known as the Evian Conference), and particularly the German
Refugee Children’s Bill (also labeled as the Wagner-Rogers Bill) and the Hennings Bill. The
Evian Conference, called for by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the aftermath of the
Anschluss, the German annexation of Austria, sought to create a global solution to the problem
of forced migration. 1 The Wagner-Rogers Bill, influenced by the November 1938 nationwide
pogrom of Kristallnacht and the British Kindertransport, a project to resettle Jewish and
Christian children from the Reich into the United Kingdom, attempted, by legislative means, to
allow the entry of ten thousand children outside of the annual German and Austrian quotas in
1939 and 1940. The Henning Bill endeavored to rescue British children from the perils of aerial
warfare in 1940. This measure necessitated the amendment of the Neutrality Act of 1939, which
prohibited American shipping from entering war zones.
It has been argued that the Evian Conference was, at its core, a publicity ploy, designed
to express sympathy for persecuted German minorities, while avoiding any political cost or
acceptance of impoverished refugees. The Wagner-Rogers Bill failed as a result of the interplay

1
Bat-Ami Zucker, In Search of Refuge, (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2001), 48. Roosevelt in the aftermath of
the annexation of Austria forecast a surge of Jewish pressure to admit refugee. He discussed the possibility of
special action to assist political refugees from the Reich during a March 18, 1938 cabinet session. The President
stated that America had accepted “many fine Germans” following the failed 1848 revolutions. Therefore, provision
of sanctuary should be considered. This action was tabled due to the introduction of a plethora of anti-immigration
proposals into Congress, the refusal of the House to provide necessary funding for such a project, the number of
potential refugees, and popular opposition to any expansion of immigration.
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of multiple factors that included: lack of presidential backing; the economic throes of the Great
Depression; fear of aliens; anti-Semitism; growing isolationism and resistance to continued
immigration, and a disunited and fractious Jewish community that sought to avoid stimulation of
domestic prejudice and more restrictive immigration policies. A key component was a critical
misreading of the bill’s sponsors of public compassion for Hitler’s victims; sentiments that did
not translate into a willingness to accept Jewish refugees. The Henning Bill, which FDR
endorsed with strict qualifications, demonstrated preferences for particular ethnic groups;
specifically, British Christian children. In contrast with the Wagner-Rogers Bill, this legislation
rapidly made its way through Congress and into law. Its failure lay in the inability to acquire
guarantees of safe passage through contested waters by the warring powers.
A general review followed by a more detailed examination was made of existing official
and un-official sources, employing public records, private diaries, books, newspapers, journals,
and other periodicals for the critical period of January 1, 1938 through December 31, 1940.
Various historiographical appraisals have been made of the actions of Roosevelt, his
administration, Congress, the Jewish community, and general public, and these opinions have
generated markedly divergent opinions. Some have alleged that FDR and his administration,
particularly the Department of State, abandoned the Jews to their fate while others assert that, in
the context of the time, he did everything that was potentially achievable. Debate has also been
waged over wide-ranging accusations of inaction, apathy, prejudice, and complicity involving
official sources, the general public, and American Jewry. I argue that any assessment of
responsibility for failure to attempt rescue can be laid at the feet of many actors in this existential
drama of life and death.
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INTRODUCTION
“The world seems to be divided into two parts—those where the Jews could not live and those
where they could not enter.” 2

The Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees (IGCPR) of July 1938, better
known as the Evian Conference, was an international gathering, convened by President Franklin
D. Roosevelt. The goal was a global solution to a mass migration crisis involving German Jews
and non-Aryans that had been sparked by the Anschluss, the German annexation of Austria on
March 12, 1938.3 Its decisive failure and the inadequacy of its sole construction, the Londonbased Intergovernmental Committee, emboldened the National Socialist regime.
By 1938 the Nazi-Jewish strategy of compulsory emigration had proven ineffective, in
part due to the resistance of other nations to accept involuntary, stateless, and destitute refugees.
Consequently, enactment of a more extreme approach became necessary to resolve the Jewish
Question. Arguably, the futility of the Evian Conference and the abandonment of

2
Chaim Weizmann, Manchester Guardian, 23rd May 1936, in A.J. Sherman, Island Refuge, Britain and the
Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933-1939 (London: Elek Books Limited, 1973), 112.

“The Reich Citizenship Law” of November 1935 delineated the legal bounds of German citizenship. A member
of the German community was classified as a “subject who is of German or kindred blood” who established that “he
is both desirous and fit to serve the German people and Reich faithfully.” Jews, in the context of Nazi racial theory,
were not of Nordic or Aryan lineage. Therefore, their rights as citizens were annulled, placing them in a stateless
condition. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds. Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945 (London: Cape Publishing,
1974), 463-467. German Jews and non-Aryans were categorized as “political refugees” for the purposes of the Evian
Conference. Jack Fischel argues that this word selection was deliberately chosen by Roosevelt in order to downplay
the predominantly Jewish identity of the forced émigrés. He believes the President was motivated by concerns of
stimulating domestic anti-Semitism as heralded by such individuals as Father Charles E. Coughlin, Gerald L.K.
Smith, Gerald Winrod, William D. Pelley and the German-American Bund. Any open display of sympathy or
support for Jews, it was feared, opened Roosevelt up to charges of being the father of the “Jew Deal.” Jack R.
Fischel, The Holocaust (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 28.
3
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Czechoslovakia during the Munich Conference of September 28-29, 1938, galvanized the Nazis
to carry out the November 1938 pogrom, Kristallnacht that swept across greater Germany. Not
coincidentally, Crystal Night occurred only four months following the closure of the Evian
Conference.
Reaction to the widespread violence against German Jewry precipitated the
Kindertransport, the British governmental, religious, and public effort to rescue ten thousand
Christian and Jewish children, aged 6-14, for resettlement within the United Kingdom. This
initiative, despite its limited extent and results, led prominent Americans to adopt a similar plan
that purportedly reflected long-standing national traditions of offering sanctuary. It culminated in
the German Refugee Children’s Bill, variably known as the Wagner-Rogers Bill or the WagnerDingell-Rogers Resolutions, which represented a one-time attempt to permit the entry of 10,000
Jewish and non-Aryan children during 1939 and 1940, outside of the annual quota allowance of
27,370. The legislation, proposed in early 1939, underwent three sets of Congressional hearings,
but was withdrawn by its sponsors due to modifications that required these refugees to be
deducted from the yearly allotment.
The bankruptcy of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees was ensured
by a host of factors, including the American invitation that stated that no country was expected to
change its existing immigration laws, and finances for resettlement were to be obtained from
private sources. These conditions provided participating governments the opportunity and
rationale to avoid any meaningful responsibility in this humanitarian crisis. The sole American
contribution to what turned out to be a publicity ploy was the consolidation of the annual
German and Austrian immigration quota years. In advance, the United States and Great Britain
had secretly agreed to avoid any discussion of Palestine as a potential haven for large-scale

2

migration.4 Thus, the Evian Conference was largely a dead letter, before it even commenced; its
lack of preparedness and the insincerity of its goals were clearly evident to the attendees and to
Nazi Germany.5
Only one year later, the promoters of the Wagner-Rogers Bill crucially misread the
timidity of the American Jewish community, resistance within Washington, and sweeping public
sentiments against the persecution of minorities within the Reich in which sympathy did not
translate into action. Prominent Christian clerics had sent a petition to FDR seeking his aid for
the resettlement of German Jewish children into the United States, which became the initiating
step in the construction of the legislation. Despite ardent expressions of support for the measure,
the majority of the Gentile leadership, with few exceptions such as Samuel Mcrea Cavert of the
Federal Churches of Christ in America, addressed the House and Senate hearings as individuals
and not as spokespersons for their collective religious bodies; an approach shared by many lay
witnesses as well. Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, one of the foremost national Jewish leaders, expressed
the conundrum faced by many of his co-religionists in the United States: “American” vs.
“American Jew.” The American Federation of Labor was frequently reported to have endorsed
the bill, signifying their belief that young refugees did not threaten domestic employment; a key
point promoted by supporters of the enterprise. However, testimony of William Green, the
President of the A.F.L., and his attorney proxy, demonstrated that Green was similarly speaking
4

Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of the War 1941-1945 (Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin,
1959), 207-208. The original White House invitation was to have restricted participants to European countries, with
Germany excluded. However, the U.K., concerned that excessive focus would be placed upon its Palestinian
Mandate and its potential to serve as political refuge, pressed for the participation of non-European nations. In
addition, the British government declared that its participation was contingent upon the total exclusion of Palestine
from discussion coupled with an absolute guarantee that the U.S. government was not going to demand that the
Mandate must accept additional Jewish refugees. Alternatively, Britain assured the American authorities that it
would not call for revision of United States immigration laws.
Dennis R. Laffer, “The Jewish Trail of Tears: The Evian Conference of July 1938.” Masters Thesis, University
of South Florida, 2011.
5
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as an individual and not as the collective voice of the union’s leadership and rank and file. The
Department of State and its bureaucratic and consular apparatus also opposed the WagnerRogers Bill.
The Evian Conference and Wagner-Rogers Bills were envisioned as acts primarily
favoring German and Austrian Jews and non-Aryans. The outbreak of a new European
continental war, however, generated fears of German bombing raids on British coastal cities and
towns. Therefore, American concerns over the dangers faced by British Gentile children
spawned a fourth rescue enterprise that necessitated an amendment to the Neutrality Act of 1939,
which prohibited United States shipping from sailing into designated war zones. The 1940
“Mercy Ship” movement led to the introduction of the Hennings Bill, which empowered
American flagged vessels to enter contested waters to facilitate evacuation.
This legislation, in essence, represented an attempt to an attempt to rescue unlimited
numbers of British Christian children within and without the yearly quota (refugees not fleeing
political, racial, or religious persecution, but evacuees evading the exigencies of war). The
measure received broad public and governmental support that enabled its successful and rapid
passage through Congress and into law. The lesson of its achievement was clear: not all refugees
were equal and some were significantly more desirable than others. The inability to obtain
guarantees of safe passage from all belligerent parties, the key component of changes to the
Neutrality Act, lack of sufficient American shipping, and the U-boat sinking of a British liner
carrying child evacuees in September 1940, terminated the plan.
Collectively, these projects provide examples of the varying opinions and roles played by
Roosevelt, his administration, Congress, the Jewish community, and the American public at large
in confronting European immigration and humanitarian issues, revealing similarities,

4

contradictions, and inherent inconsistencies. Within the backdrop of the Evian Conference,
Kristallnacht, and the Kindertransport, this dissertation will explore the Wagner-Rogers and
Hennings Bills by comparing and contrasting their formulation, construction, course, and
divergent outcomes. As primary sources, governmental and other official records and
correspondences, newspapers, magazines, journals, personal documents, and books for the
January 1, 1933-December 31, 1940 period were employed. These events marked critical
milestones along a continuum that linked the fate of German Jewry and set the stage for what
was to follow. Careful juxtaposition of the evolution and terms of each bill robustly illustrates
the crucial differences between the two.
Not surprisingly, owing to the horror of what followed, diverse secondary assessments
have been made regarding the reactions of Roosevelt et al to this human calamity. Essentially,
two contradictory schools of thought have arisen over the role of the President. Critical postHolocaust writers, such as Arthur Morse, David Wyman, Henry Feingold, Saul Friedman and
Raphael Medoff, et al assert that FDR could have substantially done more to aid refugees, but
essentially abandoned them to their collective fate. They contend that the problem of German
Jews and non-Aryans was a low priority to a Chief Executive whose overriding focus was upon
domestic economic and social recovery and the strengthening of national defense in the pre- and
intra-war eras.6

6

Arthur Morse, While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy (NY: The Overlook Press, 1967); David
Wyman, Paper Walls and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1968), The
Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust 1941-1945. (NY: New Press, 1998); Henry Feingold, The
Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945 (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University
press, 1970) and Bearing Witness: How America and its Jews Responded to the Holocaust (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse
University Press, 1995); Saul Friedman, No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy Towards Jewish
Refugees, 1938-1945 (Wayne State University Press, 1973); Rafael Medoff, The Deafening Silence (NY: Shapolsky
Publishers, 1988) and Blowing the Whistle on Genocide: Josiah E. Dubois, Jr., and the Struggle for a U.S. Response
to the Holocaust (W. Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009); Richard D. Breitman and Alan M. Kraut,
American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945 (Bloomingdale, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1987).
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Other authors, including Richard D. Breitman, Alan M. Kraut, Howard M. Sachar, Hasia
R. Diner, Robert N. Rosen, and William J. vanden Heuvel, claim that given the economic, social,
and political climate and constraints of the time, the President did everything possible to provide
assistance. In either case, little political capital was to be expended upon an issue that lacked
sweeping public support coupled with limitations on American power and influence to affect a
meaningful rescue.7
Roosevelt did not keep a private diary, and it was noted by many of his close associates
that he frequently kept his own counsel and did not reveal his innermost thoughts, motivations,
and plans. He was the consummate master of the political calculus, and spoke out or remained
silent, depending upon the benefit that could be accrued from such action. He expressed a
modicum of private comments about the Wagner-Rogers Bill and offered limited public
expressions of support for the Hennings Bill. After a multiyear engagement with the history of
the Evian Conference, and a more recent involvement with the German Refugee Children’s Bill
and lesser known Mercy Ship scheme, I have come to the conclusion that FDR was a complex
and composite figure that did not completely abandon nor entirely support German Jewry. He
possessed many of the characteristics and qualities espoused by his judges and defenders, but the
President was a product of his era, worldview, and ambitions, which regarded Jews and
Christians differently within the framework of political risks and advantages. His domestic and
international priorities were frequently divorced from loftier humanitarian concerns. This, I

7
Jeffrey Gurlock, ed., “America, American Jews and the Holocaust,” American Jewish History, vol. 7 (NY:
Routledge, 1998); Leonard Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust (NY: Columbia University
Press, 1982) and Anti-Semitism in America (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994); William D. Rubinstein, The Myth
of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not have Save More Jews from the Nazis (NY: Routledge, 1977); Robert N.
Rosen, Saving the Jews: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Holocaust (NY: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2006); Howard M.
Sachar, A History of the Jews in the Modern World (NY: Vintage Books, 2005); Hasia R. Diner, The Jews of the
United States: 1654-2000 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).

6

believe, is the essential reason for the decisive failure of the Intergovernmental Committee for
Political Refugees from Germany and the German Refugee Children’s Bill.
The situation was further complicated by internecine rivalries within the Jewish
community and fears that pro-active actions or statements calling for increased immigration
would result in more restrictive quota laws as well as an exacerbation of domestic anti-Semitism.
Accordingly, significant members of the Jewish leadership remained relatively silent, seemingly
more concerned to retain their status of “Americans” than to speak and act for their beleaguered
German co-religionists. Those who sought to resettle German Jewish children underestimated the
extent of Christian, and to some degree, Jewish resistance to opening the gates. The expedited
passage of the Henning Bill clearly demonstrated the hypocrisy of its supporters and the
widespread influence of anti-Jewish prejudice reflected in its preferential acceptance of a specific
group of young Gentile refugees.
Thus, the debates over admission into the United States were impacted by a multiplicity
of factors that influenced the predilections and actions of Christians and Jews alike. The attitudes
and agency of Roosevelt served as a common thread that linked together these significant
moments in American immigration history, but other actors were involved. The Jewish and nonJewish public, Congress, and shared conflicting perceptions and assumptions with respect to the
danger of increased Jewish immigration, also significantly influenced the final outcome of these
rescue schemes.

7

CHAPTER 1:
THE ANSCHLUSS AND THE ROAD TO EVIAN

“Vienna will “become German again. The Jew must know we do not care to live with him. He
must go.”8
“Plundering, beatings, arrests and dispossession were only a forerunner of a more drastic
persecution to come.”9

The Anschluss, the German annexation of Austria into the Third Reich on March 12,
1938 marked the major turning point in the lot of Jews and non-Aryans residing within a now
greater Germany. The anti-Jewish laws and regulations that had been introduced gradually into
the country since April 1933 were enacted rapidly within the Ostmark, the new Austrian
province, over the course of two to three months. Dr. Leo Lauterbach, the London based
Director of the World Zionist Organization (WZO), reported from the former capital to its
Executive on April 29, 1938 that the new policies within Austria appeared to be fundamentally
different from those enacted within Germany. Austrian Jews were now faced with the prospect
of “complete annihilation”10 by their exclusion from the economy, seizure of financial assets,

8

Field Marshal Herman Goering, Washington Post, March 27, 1938, 1.

9

Washington Post, March 15, 1938, 4.

“The Situation of the Jews in Austria, April, 1938: Report Submitted to the Executive of the Zionist
Organization by Dr. Leo Lauterbach,” in Yitzhak Arad, Yisrael Gutman, and Abraham Margaliot, eds., Documents
of the Holocaust: Selected Sources on the Destruction of the Jews of Germany and Austria, Poland, and the Soviet
Union (Jerusalem: Ktav Publishing House, 1981), 93.
10

8

impoverishment, and ultimate starvation or forced emigration, dependent upon Jewish charity
and the whims and willingness of foreign nations to accept them. 11
The international press reported that looting, physical assaults, and imprisonments were a
harbinger of a “more drastic persecution” to come. 12 The New York Times, noting that the
Jewish suicide rate in Vienna had increased dramatically, commented that for both rich and poor
alike, death represented the “kindest gift” 13 that offered a reprieve from an Austria that had
devolved into a “vast prison” of intensifying persecution and want.” 14 Israel Cohen, another
representative of the WZO in Vienna, observed that rising levels of hopelessness had driven
Jews by the thousands to besiege the embassies and consulates of various nations in desperate
attempts to obtain entry visas. 15
The goal of the first phase of Nazi anti-Jewish policy was to purge the Reich of Jews by
the employment of forced emigration, enabled by the seizure of Jewish wealth and property, the
exclusion from the workforce, and by the application of terror. The plight of these Jews, and
fears of potential mass migrations, led to calls for an international solution to this escalating
refugee crisis. New York Post foreign correspondent Dorothy Thompson predicted that if aid
was not provided to the victims of Nazi persecution then “a catastrophe [lay] ahead for more than
the immigrants and the would-be immigrants.”16 A solution necessitated international
cooperation and the creation of an organization that possessed the proper amount of expertise,
11

Ibid.

12

Washington Post, March 15, 1938, 4.

13

New York Times, March 20, 1938, 61.

14

Ibid.

15

Israel Cohen, Travels In Jewry (NY: E.P. Dutton, 1953), 42.

16

Foreign Affairs, 16 no. 3 (April 1938): 375-387.

9

influence and finances. 17 The European refugee situation, she warned, posed a potential
entrapment for the United States and the Western European nations. Any failure to act could
make them accessories to Hitler’s anti-Jewish policies, discredit them in the eyes of their
citizens, or precipitate ineffectual policies that divided popular opinion at home. 18 Therefore, on
March 25, 1938, the U.S. State Department issued a press release announcing that the American
government had recognized the urgency of the humanitarian situation and sought to establish a
select committee of European and Western Hemisphere nations [including New Zealand and
Australia], the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, that would assemble in
Evian, France19 with the goal of enabling the orderly departure of “political refugees” 20 from
Austria and Germany. The two major and inherently self-defeating provisions of the American
invitation to thirty-two countries specified that the cost of resettlement must be borne by nongovernmental organizations and no nation was obligated to accept refugees in excess of the
numbers embodied in their respective immigration laws.21
President Roosevelt, on the same day as the State Department announcement, declared
that the primary American contribution to the immigration dilemma was the consolidation of the
annual German and Austrian quotas (open to both Christians and Jews) without any changes in
existing immigration laws.22 FDR knew that his administration faced political risk in promoting

17

Ibid.

18

Conrad Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom (NY: Public Affairs, 2003), 87.

19

This meeting, commonly known as the Evian Conference met over July 6-15, 1938 and needed to end prior to
the visit of the King and Queen of England to France.
20

Department of State, Press Releases, XVIII, March 26, 1938.

21

Ibid.

22

Press Conferences of FDR, Vol. 11-12, 1938 (NY: De Capa Press, 1972), #445.
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Jewish immigration into the US. Gallup polls from June 1936 to January 1938 demonstrated that
approximately 65 percent of Americans were against his seeking a third term. 23 An opinion poll
taken in March 1938, at the time of the Anschluss, revealed that 41 percent of Americans
believed that “Jews have too much power” 24 in the United States; i.e. control of finance,
commerce, the press, and entertainment. Twenty-five percent of respondents desired the
exclusion of Jews from “government and politics” 25 and 20 percent favored the expulsion of
Jews from the United States. Nineteen percent were supportive of a domestic anti-Semitic
campaign.26 A June 1938 Fortune magazine poll demonstrated that 67.4 percent of Americans
believed that current economic conditions mandated a complete ban on immigration but 18.2
percent replied that some refugees should be admitted within the bounds of the quota system.
Only 4.9 percent advocated an increase in the annual allotment. The remainder was undecided. 27
A Gallup poll conducted during the same month revealed that 72 percent of Americans opposed
an increase in the number of German Jews granted entry visas and 51 percent were against the
provision of funds to resettle “Jewish and Catholic exiles…in other lands.” 28 The polling data
enabled Roosevelt to argue that he was assuming an international “humanitarian role…at least

23

Time, April 11, 1938, 11.

24

Charles H. Stembler, Jews in the Mind of America (NY: Basis Books, 1966), 121-131.

25

Ibid.

26

Ibid.

27
Ronald Sanders, Shores of Refuge: A Hundred Years of Jewish Emigration (Henry Holt and Company: NY,
1988), 438.
28

Robert Edwin Herzstein, Roosevelt and Hitler: Prelude to War NY: Paragon House, 1989), 256. The sampling
techniques varied between Gallup and Fortune. When considering issues of national import, the Gallup Poll
surveyed “all eligible U.S. voters” whereas the magazine defined his cohort as anyone over the age of 21 years. S.S.
Wilks, “Representative Sampling and Poll Reliability,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, 4, no 2 (June 1940): 261-262.
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symbolically”29 while simultaneously minimizing potential political repercussions from
restrictionist members of Congress and the public at large. 30
The U.S. immigration laws, revised in 1921 and 1924 under Presidents Warren Harding
and Calvin Coolidge, established specific national quotas for foreign countries. The largest
percentage was allocated to Europeans of the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon race due to the belief that
these specific groups were inherently biologically superior to Eastern and Southern Europeans.
For example, the eugenicist Madison Grant, a contributor to the writing of the National Origins
Act of 1924, perceived Jews as an internal threat to America because of their “dwarf stature,
peculiar mentality and ruthless concentration on self-interest”31 that threatened the superior
“stock of the nation.” 32 Similarly, Wilbur J. Carr, Director of the Consular Service from 19091924 and Assistant Secretary of State, 1924-1937, claimed that Jewish immigrants were “filthy,
most un-American…often dangerous… [and] mentally deficient.” 33 Under the terms of the
National Origins Act of 1924 (Johnson-Reed Act), 153,774 immigrants per year were allowed
entrance into the United States with each allotment limited to 2 percent of the various
nationalities residing in America in 1890. 34
President Herbert Hoover in 1930 directed that any alien who had a high probability of
becoming dependent upon tax payer charity was to be denied admission. However, he decided
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that American consuls abroad retained exclusionary power to determine whether a potential
immigrant satisfied the Likely to become Public Charge or LPC clause. 35 As a result, the
decision to grant an entry visa was often based upon subjective opinions made independently of
objective facts, framed by personal interpretations of immigration laws and requirements. Thus,
the consul assumed the mantle of “gate-keeper, the one who held the keys to safety for the many
who sought refuge.”36 State Department Visa officer John Farr Simmons advised Pierrepont
Moffat, Chief of Western European Affairs that enforcement of this provision had led to “an
immediate and considerable reduction in immigration” 37 preventing entry of approximately
seven million immigrants over the previous seven years who were potential competitors for
American jobs or additional sources of unemployed workers.
The announcement of the Evian Conference generated varying degrees of public and
private support and opposition. The “Question of the Week” of the United States News asked
prominent lay and clerical citizens for their opinions regarding the maintenance, restriction, or
liberalization of the current immigration system. 38 A wide range of responses, crossing religious
and political lines, were elicited, and while many agreed with the premise of the conference,
viewpoints were markedly divided; arguments that later resonated through the course of the
Wagner-Rogers Bill debate.
Dr. William E. Gilroy, editor of the Congregationist The Advance, believed that
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United States immigration policy must be guided by even-handedness and charity.
Elias Rex, editor of The Jewish Review, called upon Congress to expand the limits of the quota in
order to receive a greater number of persecuted German minorities. Dr. Guy Emery Shipler,
editor of the Episcopalian magazine The Churchman, viewed the proposed conclave as a symbol
of the traditional and time honored American democratic values. However, he was resistant to
any revision of immigration law due to the high level of domestic unemployment. Reform Rabbi
Dr. Stephen S. Wise, president of the American Jewish Congress and purported Roosevelt
confidante, did not believe that it was likely that Washington was amenable to or even should
modify the existing quotas. Dr. Cyrus Adler, president of the conservative American Jewish
Committee, opposed changes in existing legislation as he deemed it improbable that the numbers
of Jewish refugees could exceed the annual German and Austrian quotas. The Reverend Francis
Talbot, editor of the Catholic weekly America, declared that it was absurd to admit aliens
harboring foreign ideologies whose assimilation into American society necessitated “grave
economic, political and social readjustments.” 39 Dr. Hiram Wesley Evans, Imperial Wizard,
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan argued that the primary responsibility of the nation was to provide
for its own needy citizens and not those of other lands. William Green, President of the
American Federation of Labor (AFL) praised the Evian plan for its humanitarianism, but insisted
that economic conditions prevented the acceptance of German and Austrian refugees above the
limit set by law.40
Representative Samuel Dickstein (Democrat, NY), the Jewish Chairman of the House
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, criticized the nation for repeatedly “preach[ing]
39
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about [America’s role as] asylum for the oppressed” 41 while being unwilling to “carry that
reputation to realization.”42 Nevertheless, he stated that any derangement of the existing
immigration system was ill-advised in view of the current economic conditions. 43 Congressman
Noah M. Mason (Rep., IL) supported the provision of American funding for resettlement of
refugees in Palestine or other locations, but remained adamantly opposed to any temporary or
permanent increase in the annual quota allotments. Senator Robert Wagner (Dem., NY),
Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, endorsed the international meeting but argued
that admittance of refugees had to be in compliance with existing limitations; sentiments shared
by other Senators. 44
Other objections were raised against the Evian Conference that were employed during the
hearings on the Wagner-Rogers Bill: fears of entanglement in foreign affairs and conflicts;
inundation by victimized and jobless European refugees; opening gambit to erode immigration
protections; introduction of dangerous ideologies; other nations would offer little or no
cooperation in resettlement projects; primary duty of the Federal Government was to provide aid
and assistance to needy Americans; competition for employment. 45
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Various motives have been offered to explain Roosevelt’s decision to convene the
Intergovernmental Committee. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who had promoted the
idea of the forum to the President and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, envisaged the meeting as
an opportunity “to get out in front” 46 of liberal opinion, particularly the views of such influential
columnists as Dorothy Thompson and “certain Congressmen [presumably Jewish] with
metropolitan constituencies.” 47 It also provided an opening to blunt forces that sought to increase
Jewish immigration by altering immigration law, and to preemptively divert responsibility for
the refugees away from the United States and towards the thirty-two national attendees.48
Action to curtail forced expulsion and migration, and the limitation of the conference to
consideration of only German and Austrian refugees would, it was hoped, prevent the ejection of
unwanted Jews from Rumania, Poland and Hungary; countries that were formulating their own
solutions to the Jewish Question. 49 Therefore, refugees under consideration were
euphemistically categorized as “political refugees from Germany and Austria” and not as Jews. 50
The global gathering could also serve as a means of converting isolationist sentiments
within the American public to “active opposition [to] international gangsters.” 51 However, if the
conference successfully created a mechanism that facilitated an orderly exodus of Jews from
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Germany then, it was hoped, Nazi aggressiveness might be curtailed. 52 A Jewish advisor to
FDR, Isador Lubin, believed that the President’s decision was the result of pressure applied by
Rabbi Wise “for whom [Roosevelt] had a great deal of affection.” 53 Frances Perkins, U.S.
Secretary of Labor, thought that FDR had been influenced by the opinion of social activist, Jane
Addams who argued immigration created future consumers that strengthened the national
economy.54 Jewish Presidential advisor Ben Cohen assumed that if the conference ended in
failure, Nazi Germany could be blamed for creating and facilitating the international refugee
problem.55
Overall, the Evian Conference failed to generate any meaningful results. Elsewhere I
have argued that the summit was constructed to serve as a “politically expedient means of
avoiding action to assist the Jews” that was set up to fail.56 The refusal of the United Kingdom
and the United States to alter their immigration laws led “interested and disinterested spectators
alike”57 to interpret the conference as an “exercise in Anglo-American collaborative
hypocrisy.”58 This realization emboldened lesser nations to resist accepting Jewish migrants.

59

Italian Fascist editor Virginio Gayda, writing for the Giornale d’Italia, concluded that the Evian
52

“America Proposes Sanctuaries for Victims of Nazis,” Tampa Tribune, March 25, 1938,1, 9.

53

Letter from Lubin to Feingold in Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, 23.

54

Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (NY: Viking Press, 1946), 92.

55

See Herbert Pell to Moffat, September 10, 1938, Houghton Library, and Harvard, cited in American Refugee
Policy, 61.
Dennis R. Laffer, “Evian Conference,” History in Dispute, The Holocaust 1933-1945, 11 (Farmington Hills,
MI: St. James Press, 2003), 56.
56

57

Ronnie S. Landau, The Nazi Holocaust, (London: Ivan R. Dees, 1994), 138.

58

Ibid.

“No One Wants to Have Them,” Voelkischer Beobachter, July 13, 1938 in Shoah Center, Yad Vashem,
http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203347.pdf; Internet; accessed June 25, 2008.
59

17

Conference had been unable to produce any concrete results and despite the soaring oratory and
many declarations of good will, the reality remained that the Jews of Central Europe were simply
unwanted. Each country preferred that some other nation accept the brunt of the human load.
Gayda criticized the American President for never missing an opportunity to present the “world
with some resounding verbal gesture” 60 of little substance. Consequently, “the merry game of
passing responsibility along continue[d] uninterruptedly.” 61
FDR selected Myron C. Taylor, a Quaker and a retired Chairman of U.S. Steel, to head
the American delegation. Despite his grand title of Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, the appointment of a non-diplomat implied lack of seriousness about the
conference and its potential work. 62 Taylor and his British counterparts agreed in advance that
Palestine was to be excluded from consideration. 63 The Roosevelt administration, despite its call
for a refugee conference, did not attempt to garner public or political support for accepting a
larger number of refugees. The Great Depression, unemployment, fear of aliens, isolationism,
and anti-Semitism were significant factors that promoted anti-immigrant attitudes.64 Jewish
groups were unable to agree on a unified policy towards immigration and failed to dispatch high-
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level representation. 65 The meeting avoided any direct criticism of Nazi anti-Semitic policies
and its humanitarian depredations. 66 Lord Winteron, the head of the British delegation, alleged
that vilification of the Reich jeopardized chances of German cooperation and noted that the
British had successfully blocked an American attempt to formulate a “clause of a denunciatory
character” against the Reich government. 67 CBS correspondent William Shirer observed that the
American, British and French delegations appeared “anxious not to do anything to offend
Hitler”; the individual who was the genesis of their dilemma. 68
Representatives to the conference manipulated the Intergovernmental Committee’s
proceedings as a means of protecting their national interests by diverting humanitarian pressure
away from their respective countries. The delegations engaged in lofty and laudable elocution,
bereft of any practicable solutions to the refugee situation. 69 Country after country espoused
“platonic sympathies”70 for the plight of the expelled minority but presented a variety of
explanations as to why they could not offer any meaningful asylum.71 The session’s nine days
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resembled, to one observer, the “unexciting table water” for which Evian was renowned. 72 One
paper editorialized that “if this is coming to the help of refugees, then what would the nations do
if they meant to desert them?” 73 Sumner Welles himself noted, following World War II, that the
Evian Conference might have resulted in exemplary humanitarian accomplishments had not the
American government allowed the committee to descend into insignificance. 74
Finally, the sole accomplishment of the Conference, the creation of the London based
Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees, failed in its goal to persuade nations to
offer realistic opportunities for resettlement or to convince the German government to allow
refugees to retain sufficient financial assets to reestablish themselves in a new life. In 1933
emigrants from Germany preserved 75 percent of the value of their possessions. This percentage
was later reduced to 15 percent and by 1938 it had declined to 5 percent. 75 German Foreign
Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop warned that the refugee dilemma was a non-negotiable
domestic German issue and declared the Reich would not release greater amounts of Jewish
funds nor would it cooperate with the Evian conferees. 76
The German government and press fully recognized the futility and hypocrisy of the
Evian Conference. Hitler remarked that he expected and hoped that the democracies that held
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“such deep sympathy for these criminals” 77 would be willing to transform their compassion into
workable solutions.78 He criticized the West for accusing Germany of engaging in limitless
brutality in the enactment of its anti-Jewish policies while the democracies refused to accept
displaced Jews. Instead, these nations declared with “icy coldness” 79 that they were unable to
open their borders. “So no help is given, but morality is saved.”80 Moreover, the German press
highlighted the inherent hypocrisy in an American immigration system based upon a racial quota
system. 81 The papers also noted the expression of benevolence for the German Jewish situation
and its use as a form of incitement against the Nazi state. However, despite such appeals to
humanity no nation was willing to accept a few thousand Jews when the opportunity arose. The
hollow words of charity, the press argued, validated German anti-Semitism, and the
establishment of a permanent committee to continue the work of the Evian Conference
demonstrated that the outcomes of this meeting were insubstantial at best. 82 Violent events
played out on the streets of Germany and Austria in the aftermath of the July Intergovernmental
Committee meeting had generated an impetus to conduct rescue attempts, but on an extremely
constricted scale.
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CHAPTER 2:
KRISTALLNACHT AND THE FREEDOM PATH TO THE UNITED KINGDOM
“No doubt Jews aren’t a loveable people; I don’t care about them myself; – but that is not
sufficient to explain the Pogrom.”83
“As soon as we found out [about the Kindertransport], my mother went to where the committee
was and put my name down. She wouldn’t put my brother down because, she said, ‘I don’t want
to lose both my sons on one day.”84

A brief overview of Jewish history within the United Kingdom is required to understand
the genesis of the Kindertransport or Children’s Transport, the British public and governmental
project to rescue a small percentage of Central European Jewish and non-Aryan children from
escalating Nazi persecution and violence. The significance of the scheme, although extremely
limited in scope, lay not only in the saving of innocent lives, but also in its influence upon
American citizens and politicians who sought to replicate its efforts in the context of a one-time
amendment to immigration law; the German Refugee Children’s Bill.
Jewish settlement within the British Isles may have dated back to the Roman era, but they
were clearly present during the eleventh-century reign of William the Conqueror. Although King
Edward I ordered their mass expulsion on All Saint’s Day in 1290, some Jews hid their religious
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identity until unofficial immigration resumed in 1656.85 The failed Continental revolutions of
1848 precipitated an influx of German Jews who attained educational, financial and material
success by the 1880s, a period marked by rising assimilation, voting rights, membership in
Parliament, titles, and inter-marriage into the dominant Christian British culture and society. The
1881-1882 pogroms conducted within the Czarist Pale of Settlement 86 led to a second major
wave of Jewish immigration. Many Jews regarded Great Britain as a transit point on their road to
the United States. Greater than 120,000 Eastern European Orthodox Jews resided within the
island nation by the onset of the Great War in 1914, but frequently suffered from poverty and
overcrowded slums. Although these more recent arrivals had introduced Yiddish language and
literature, new cultural elements, and a resurgence of Judaic religious observance, they were
viewed with disdain and trepidation by many in the longer established and more assimilated
British Jewish community. While providing social services, shelters, and funding for potential
re-emigration to America, Anglo-Jewry feared that their innate foreignness and proclivity to
congregate within major cities threatened a resurgence of domestic anti-Semitism. Therefore,
many British Jews were careful to avoid any outward appearance that they were encouraging
immigration from the East. 87
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The Alien Restriction Act of 1905, which received support from many within the AngloJewish community, was designed to abridge the admittance of their Eastern European Orthodox
co-religionists and other immigrants by enacting “highly selective port controls for aliens
traveling in steerage class.”88 Immigrants were barred from landing if they lacked sufficient
funding and resources and risked deportation if they went on the public dole within one year of
entry. This legislation marked the first time the central government excluded immigrants who
might pose a “burden to the state” 89 but refugees fleeing religious or political persecution were
still granted admittance. The creation of the Act was stimulated, in part, by fears that foreign
Jews living within the East End of London posed “an economic and social threat” to the British
population.90 The subsequent Alien Registration Act of 1914 effectively terminated immigration
for a number of years and authorized the Home Secretary to control the “entry, registration,
residence, and disposition of all aliens.” 91 They were effectively denied the right to come into the
country unless they could demonstrate their value to the nation. 92
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By the 1930s many of the Jewish immigrants of the late 1800s had become integrated
within all social classes, professions, and trades and a well organized communal life had given
rise to Reform, Liberal, Orthodox, and Ultra-orthodox denominations. The Reform movement,
similar to American Conservative Judaism, focused upon changes in religious practices, such as
the increased use of English as the favored liturgical language. The Liberal division, comparable
to the American Jewish Reform movement, self-identified as British, but aspired to retain a
connection with Judaism. The “Cousins,” a privileged group of elite Anglo-Jews, assumed
responsibility for the majority of sectarian philanthropic activities. All groups, however, were
confronted with two compelling problems: the rise of National Socialism with its burgeoning
policies of anti-Semitic persecution, disenfranchisement, and involuntary mass migration. 93
Five hundred thousand Jews resided within Germany at the time of Hitler’s January 30,
1933 ascension to power, and children comprised 20 percent of the total. 94 The new regime
rapidly enacted the April 25 Law against Overcrowding in Schools and Universities (Gesetz
gegen die Überfüllung der deutschen Schulen und Hochschulen) that inordinately reduced the
number of Jewish students and educators to 1.5 percent of a school’s total student and staff
population. Consequently, Jewish pupils were compelled to attend Jewish schools, but fell victim
to overt acts of verbal and physical abuse en route to and from classes. 95 One child, later
removed to Britain, recalled that she no longer wanted to be “outdoors [as] life seemed too
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unsafe.”96 Twenty Jewish schools relocated to the United Kingdom (and other nations) during a
time in which His Majesty’s Government did not require entry visas. These reestablished
institutions confronted issues of finance, language, cordial relations with Christian neighbors,
and the provision of religious education. However, many Jews remaining within Germany
regarded these children and adults as an exclusive minority due to their ability and opportunity to
emigrate.97 Deteriorating social and economic conditions, the enactment of the Nuremberg
Racial Laws of 1935, coupled with the resignation of James G. MacDonald, the American High
Commissioner for Political Refugees of the League of Nations, forced the Council of German
Jews (Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden) in late 1937 to place a greater emphasis upon the
expatriation of Jewish children. The majority of refugee children entering the United Kingdom
between 1933-1938 were accompanied by their families, a situation that considerable changed
over time.98
A number of Jewish associations were established in England during this period to
provide aid and sustenance to German Jewish refugee adults and children. While the inpouring
of involuntary émigrés fleeing the Reich intensified, philanthropist Otto M. Schiff, the president
of the Jews’ Temporary Shelter, joined with other organizational leaders such as Neville Laski,
the head of the Jewish Board of Deputies, and Leonard Montefiore, the leader of the AngloJewish Association, to offer the British Home Office monetary guarantees that migrants would
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not become public charges.99 Their efforts led to the inception of the Jewish Refugees
Committee (JRC) that dealt with Jewish and Christian non-Aryans individuals and families. The
JRC was subdivided into operational compartments: Hospitality and Education Committees; a
Professional Committee to deal with displaced academics and scholars; Retraining Department;
Clothing Department; and Free Meal Service. The Emigration Committee would ultimately
become engaged in the Kindertranport, the project to rescue German Jewish children.100
Prominent British Jews recognized that an escalating demand for relief services
necessitated a nationwide fundraising campaign within the entirety of the Jewish community.
Subsequently, the Central British Fund for German Jewry (CBF) was founded in 1933 that drew
upon Zionist and non-Zionist factions. The CBF, in turn, fostered the Council for German Jewry
(CGJ) in early 1936, that initiated a network of international connections. A nexus was
established within the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Continent that included
the American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) and the United Palestine Appeal. The CGJ
functioned as the primary body managing the requisite funding and maintained ties with the new
High Commissioner for Refugees under the Protection of the League of Nations (commencing
January 1, 1939), Sir Herbert Emerson, and global rescue organizations. Viscount Herbert
Samuel, the future chairman of the CGJ in the post-Kristallnacht period, assured the Home
Office that sufficient private funds were available to sustain refugee children who were expected
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to transmigrate in the future. Five thousand was established as the maximum limit out of
concerns that a greater number would overtax the budget.
However, prior to the November 1938 pogroms only the Children’s Inter-Aid Committee,
a non-sectarian group founded in 1936 by the activist Gladys Skelton and Francis Bendit, dealt
exclusively with the immigration and resettlement of Jewish and non-Aryan Christians. One
hundred twenty-four children arrived in Britain between May-June 1936; 55 percent were Jews
and 45 percent were Christians. By the onset of Kristallnacht in November 1938 471 children
had been admitted. 101
Judith Tydor Baumel-Schwartz and others argue that the male elite Anglo-Jewish
community’s shared culture and belief system was crucial for the construction and success of the
various refugee efforts and rescue plans. This group of prominent Jews, molded by the Victorian
era, were infused with communal feelings of accountability, charity, and duty, and the need to
preserve personal reputations. They provided, through their philanthropic enterprises, the “lay
and religious leadership of the assimilated Anglo-Jewish establishment.”102 The very name of
Otto Schiff, a German-born banker and British citizen, engendered such credibility within the
Home Office that officials accepted his personal guarantee that Jewish refugees would not
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become public charges. Consequently, bureaucratic obstacles were removed to facilitate the
admission of forced migrants.103
Eminent women such as Cissie (Phina Emily) Laski; Helen Caroline Bentwich; Anna
Schwab and Alice Model were products of a similar Victorian cultural background that
emphasized “female helping behavior.” 104 They were representative of the many women who
effected the success of a variety of refugee organizations. 105 Feminist writer Sybil Oldfield
suggests that the patricians of Anglo-Jewish society provided “institutional legitimacy” but it
was the women who assured the enterprise’s outcome.106
The Anschluss, the German annexation of the former Republic of Austria, marked a
milestone in the history of Jewish emigration from the Reich. At the time of this March 1938
event, 180,000 Jews lived in Austria (30,000 were children younger than twelve years-of-age)
with 165,000 residing in Vienna. 107 The slower implementation of anti-Semitic laws and
regulations within Nazi Germany from 1933-1938 had fostered a gradual social, economic, and
political disenfranchisement of the Jewish community.
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However, rapid enactment of these policies within the Ostmark precipitated frenzied
searches for means of escape. Thus, the British Government, fearing a potential flood of frantic
and poverty stricken refugees, instituted a system of visa restrictions that diminished the chances
that Austrian and German Jews and non-Aryans could gain entry into the British Isles.
Applications were carefully examined by passport control officers assigned to embassies and
consulates. Prospective immigrants were required to meet specific security and economic
requirements. Overall, the process was cumbersome and ineffective for processing large numbers
of refugees.108 The Evian Conference of July 1938 was constituted as a reaction to these events,
and as earlier noted, represented a futile attempt to find an international resolution. The situation
was further exacerbated by the Munich Crisis of September 1938 in which Great Britain and
France compelled Czechoslovakia to cede the strategic Sudetenland to the Reich, inciting
additional waves of coercive migration.
Over time, however, official British policies towards German refugees began to change,
in part, due to a sense of responsibility over Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s policy of
appeasement towards Hitler and press reports describing the condition of Jews, non-Aryans, and
political dissidents within the annexed territory and Czechoslovakia itself. 109 Sir Neill Malcolm,
MacDonald’s successor as League of Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees, and Sir Harry
Twyford, the Lord Mayor of London, undertook a tour of the now abbreviated country. They
observed that Jews and non-Aryans who had fled the Sudetenland were either denied entry into
108

The number of Germans Jews and non-Jews who entered the United Kingdom between 1933-1938 is unclear,
as a number returned to the Reich, and varied among different historians. By the end of 1939 42,000 had been
admitted. Sherman, Island Refuge, 54, 89; Sir John Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem, Report of a Survey
(London: Oxford University Press, 1939), 562; T.W.E. Roche, The Key in the Lock: A History of Immigration
Control in England from 1066 to the Present Day (London: John Murray, 1969), 126; Joshua Berton Stein, Britain
and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1939 (Dissertation: St. Louis University, 1972), 303.
109

Baumel, Never Look Back, 44.

30

or expelled from the remainder of the Czech nation. Officials claimed that the situation had been
created by the interference of Britain and France who were now obligated to assume
responsibility for the now stateless refugees. Consequently, the central government was
compelled to become “as hard as those countries that condemned them” to this onerous
circumstance.110 For example, thirty Jewish men, women, and children, ejected from the new
German territory, were prevented from entering Czechoslovakia and were relegated to the zone
between borders, deprived of all sustenance.111 Anti-Jewish rioting erupted in Prague when
Czech law and medical students, joined by young physicians, declared “Out with the Jews!” and
“Czechoslovakia for Czechoslovakia.” 112
Premier and Defense Minister Jan Syrovy accused Great Britain and other European
democracies of abandoning Czechoslovakia and he informed Sir Malcolm that he was
determined to guarantee his country would never again fall victim to two decades of
“suffer[ing]…on the grounds of the German minority” 113 that spelled the ruination of the state.
In an attempt to ensure its survival, his government cultivated closer relations with the Nazi
regime; a futile attempt that would be demonstrated by the imminent German occupation of
Bohemia and Moravia. Members of the British Parliament Giller and Grenfell admitted that
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Czechoslovakia had been betrayed by both the French Republic and Great Britain. 114 At the same
time, tens of thousands of Jews, Czechs, and German political refugees within the Sudetenland,
were subjected to mass arrest, seizure of assets, and incarceration within concentration camps,
torture and murder. Waves of suicides were occurring reminiscent of those that followed in the
wake of the Anschluss.115
The number of unaccompanied German children began to rise during the summer months
of 1938. Contributing causes included the Anschluss and the juni Aktion, the intensification of
anti-Jewish polices that began during June.116 The Children’s Inter-Aid Committee was the first
refugee organization to discern this change. 117 A. Levay Lawrence, president of the First B’nai
B’rith lodge of Great Britain, called upon the Jewish community to provide foster care for a
limited number of refugee children or to donate funding to support a displaced refugee child or
their resettlement within Palestine via the Youth Aliyah program. 118
The situation within Czechoslovakia was a portent of future events. 119 The Polish
Parliament (Seym) adopted legislation in the wake of the Anschluss that nullified the citizenship
of all Polish Jews who resided outside of the country for greater than five years, unless Polish
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Consulates issued them new visas. Implementation was scheduled to begin during October. 120
Unsuccessful negotiations between Germany and the Polish Government necessitated the Reich
authorities to take actions that restricted the number of Jews who, in all likelihood, would be
denied “revalidation” and become stateless and on the dole. 121 As a result, twelve thousand
Jews were deported to the German-Polish border “with only10 marks and the clothes on their
backs.”122 Four thousand were permitted entry into Poland but eight thousand remained stranded
within “little villages along the frontier near where they had been driven out by the Gestapo and
left.” Belatedly, the majority of Jews held at the border were relocated within Poland but
approximately three thousand remained in the town of Zbaszyn and its adjacent horse stables,
lacking in adequate food, clothing and shelter. 123
At this moment, Bertha Grynszpan, the daughter of a family expelled from Hanover,
Germany, contacted her seventeen-year-old brother, Herschel, an illegal alien living in Paris, and
informed him of their situation: “No one told us what was up, but we realized this was…the end
[italics added] …We haven’t a penny. Could you send us something?” 124 After receiving her
distraught postcard Herschel heard of “instances of insanity and suicides” among the
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deportees.125 This prompted him to attempt an assassination of the German Ambassador to
France, but he mistakenly murdered the Embassy’s Third Secretary, Ernst vom Rath.
The more extreme elements of the Nazi regime had long sought an opportunity to carry
out violent actions against the German Jewish community. Vom Rath’s death provided such an
opening. Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, ordered the
unleashing of allegedly popular “’spontaneous demonstrations’” 126 that were, in reality, carried
out by the SS, SA, and Hitler Youth. 127 Throughout the Reich synagogues were set ablaze,
Jewish businesses were looted and destroyed, terror swept the streets, and approximately thirty
thousand Jewish men were arrested, with many sent to concentration camps. One hundred were
murdered. Lord James de Rothschild noted that “almost the only thing left [for Jews was] death
and for many that would be a welcome and blessed relief.” 128 Failure to act, he warned, must
result in enormous fatalities. 129 The levying of an atonement fine of one billion Reichsmarks
($400,000,000) as a “penalty for the dastardly murder”130 of vom Rath severely curtailed
prospects of emigration, for no nation was willing to accept refugees likely to become a public
charge.131 Professor Johan J. Smertenko, Executive Director of the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi
League, declared this manner of collective punishment effectively decimated the “entire Jewish
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race in Germany”132 by relegating five hundred thousand people to starvation, bereft of
employment or charitable aid. 133 The accelerating political, social and economic
disenfranchisement that followed the November 1938 nationwide pogrom essentially sealed the
fate of Jews within Germany.
Many Britons expressed a sense of moral outrage in the aftermath of Kristallnacht.
Letters to The Times criticized the Nazis for their “excesses of hatred, malice,” 134 destruction,
and disruption of the policy of appeasement, and called for the provision of aid until refugees
could emigrate.135 A reporter for this daily touring Berlin labeled the actions as a rampage of
business-like pillage and devastation that targeted Jewish men, women, and children.136 Sir
Archibald Sinclair, a Liberal Party leader speaking before a town hall meeting in Northampton,
described the violence as the worst pogrom Central Europe had witnessed since medieval
times.137 The spectacle served as an impetus for the development of organized programs to
deliver assistance to unaccompanied refugee children. Increasing numbers of German Jewish and
non-Aryan parents recognized that survival of their offspring depended upon evacuation, even if
the fracturing of their families proved to be permanent.
Similarly, refugee organizations, as well as governments, prioritized the admission of
children over adults. Various reasons were offered for this selectivity. Children garnered a
132
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greater sense of humanitarian need because of their vulnerability. They were not seen as a threat
to domestic employment because of their age, and assimilation would be facilitated by their
youth.138 France, Switzerland, and The Netherlands viewed the problem of forced migration
through this lens and strictly limited the numbers they were willing to accept. 139 The response of
the United States to Kristallnacht and its aftermath was constrained: the recall of Hugh Wilson,
the American Ambassador from Berlin, and the indefinite extension of visitors’ visas held by
12,000-15,000 Germans and Austrians. Roosevelt believed it was inhumane to force their return
to the Reich upon expiration of the permits. 140
Anglo-Jewish groups increased their political pressure upon His Majesty’s Government
to accept child refugees, but officials were faced with two conflicting choices: either increase
Jewish immigration into Palestine or continue the Foreign and Colonial Office’s practice of
seeking Arab and Muslim appeasement. Wilfred Israel (1899-1943), a member of the British and
German Jewish upper class, called upon the Council for Germany Jewry to propose the urgent
salvation of an estimated 60,000-70,000 children, seventeen years-of-age or younger. He
collaborated with the Society of Friends in Britain who attested to the willingness of parents to
be separated from their offspring. Consequently, a delegation of members of the CGJ met with
Chamberlain on November 15. Lord Samuel assured him that Jewish organizations possessed
138
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sufficient resources to maintain the children who were to be educated in Britain with the
expectation of future emigration to other countries. Chamberlain realized that the government
needed to find a solution that assuaged mounting American pressure to admit refugees into
Palestine while preventing greater levels of Jewish immigration into the island nation. 141
The Jewish Agency and Chaim Weizmann, the Director of the World Zionist
Organization, insisted, in the shadows of Kristallnacht, that the Mandate immediately accept one
hundred thousand Jews, but their demands were tempered by a willingness to accept the transfer
of ten thousand children from Central Europe to Palestine. The Agency assumed all costs and
child-care responsibilities and the proposal generated domestic and international interest. 142 The
Colonial Office, however, opposed any increase in Jewish immigration and deferred the issue of
refugee children to the Foreign and Home Offices.143 Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax attempted
to find an alternative solution by instructing the British Ambassador to the United States to
recommend to the State Department that the underutilized British quota be applied to Germany
and Austria. The British diplomat was informed that American immigration law barred the
employment of one national quota to fill another. 144 Lord Winterton, the United Kingdom
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representative at the Evian Conference and chairman of the London-based Intergovernmental
Committee on Political Refugees, commented during an October Cabinet meeting that the
American delegation was hailed for its consolidation of the Austrian and German quotas (total of
27,370) following the Anschluss, but had not committed itself to accept any refugees.145
A rescue plan was finally devised by the Emigration Department of the Jewish Refugees
Committee that relocated five thousand children to temporary housing in summer camps along
the British coast. Groups of 200-500 children were to arrive at intervals and be placed under the
auspices of the Inter-Aid Committee for Children (IAC). Education and vocational training was
to be provided for potential employment within the United Kingdom or in countries of final
resettlement. However, the Council for German Jewry argued that the resources of the IAC were
inadequate to handle large numbers of émigrés. Therefore, a new structure, the Movement for the
Care of Children from Germany (MCCG) was created that proposed the scheme to the Home
Office. It evolved into a non-sectarian group that included Christians of various denominations
and Jews but lacked Orthodox Jewish representation.
The response of His Majesty’s Government to this escalating humanitarian crisis was
primarily guided and shaped by political rather than charitable considerations. These included
criticisms of British acquiescence to the cession of the Sudetenland, shifting policies regarding
immigration into Palestine, and pressure from the public at large and prominent Jewish
individuals and groups. As a result, Chamberlain and his Cabinet were compelled to seek a path
that dampened domestic and American censure while enhancing positive popular opinion at
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home.146 He informed the House of Commons that the government was committed to the pursuit
of any strategy that ameliorated the extreme dangers confronting German Jewry while deflecting
international and domestic pressure. 147 The proposal provided the Government with the means to
achieve its political goals, clothed in charitable intent, while avoiding any meaningful
opposition. However, refugee children admitted as transmigrants were obligated to re-emigrate
following the completion of their education and vocational training.
Home Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare concluded, in the face of mounting disapproval that
the only option was to offer expressions of compassion. 148 The admission of 66,000 Belgian
children in the opening year of the Great War, coupled with Basque refugees from the Spanish
Civil War, set a precedent for charitable enterprises. 149 Addressing the Commons on November
21 he assured the nation that the United Kingdom was capable of providing care for large
numbers of Jewish and non-Aryan children without detriment to domestic interests. 150 He
announced that guarantees of financial support and care by relief organizations or private persons
minimized the bureaucratic hurdles confronting these children. 151 Individual applications for
entry were waived and the necessary documents were to be issued on a group basis.

New York Times, October 10, 1938, “Munich Pact Denounced: Rabbi S.S. Wise Declares Merely Postponed
War,”; Christian Science Monitor, October 22, 1938, “Lloyd George Hits Munich Peace Pact”; Washington Post,
October 25, 1938, “British Cabinet Considers Roosevelt Stand on Palestine” in Judith Tydor Baumel-Schwartz,
Never Look Back, 49-55; Cabinet Conclusions 55(38), November 16, 1938, CAB 23/96, 221-228, U.K., National
Archives; Internet; http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/image/Index/D77389?index=3&page=1;
accessed January 12, 2015.
146

147

London, Whitehall,” 99.

Cabinet Meeting, record of meeting by Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, November 16, 1938, FO
371/22536, W 15037/104/98 in Baumel-Schwartz, Never Look Back, 60.
148

149

New York Times, November 22, 1938, 1.

150

Stefan K. Schimanski, Contemporary Jewish Record 2, 4 (July 1, 1939): 24.

151

London, Whitehall, 104; The Times, November 22, 1938, 9, 14.

39

Ideally, every child was to be placed in a foster home, carefully selected, and given a £50
bond to pay for eventual transport to another country. Seventeen years was established as the
maximum allowable age and the Home Secretary called for public donations to the Lord Baldwin
Appeal Fund that served Jewish and Christian victims of persecution. 152 The endowment,
established by former Prime Minister Stanley Earl Baldwin and affiliated with nondenominational organizations, agreed to pay the £50 for un-sponsored children and for sponsors
who were unable to afford the bond. 153 Baldwin issued a radio appeal for contributions by
describing the children as victims of “man’s inhumanity to man.”154
Ultimately, £200,000 was donated to the Refugee Children’s Movement. By the time its
fundraising efforts were concluded in the summer of 1939 more than £500,000 had been raised;
90 percent derived from Jewish sources. 155 In summary, the project was portrayed in terms
designed to be palatable to the general British public: no competition in the domestic job market;
children expected to be students for a number of years; transmigrants and not permanent settlers;
private funding and consumers who would stimulate the economy. Overall, the leadership of
British Jewry collaborated to a greater degree with HMG, although there were significant
conflicts among the various denominations, particularly with the Orthodox. This cooperation
may, in part, reflect a longer and greater presence of Jews within government, as British Jews
had served as Prime Ministers and were frequent members of Parliament. The American Jewish
community was, however, more reluctant to engage in pressure tactics to advance their specific
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causes, particularly the enactment of the Wagner-Rogers Act. In addition, few Jews served in
Congress and many of those who functioned within the Roosevelt Administration maintained
little connection to their co-religionists.
The British nation, Hoare argued, was presented with an opportunity to preserve “a
young generation of a great people”156 while moderating the afflictions of parents and friends.
Lord Winterton commented that compassion alone was insufficient and, therefore, England was
prepared to expend great effort to assist these stateless children. The number admitted was linked
to the resources of the voluntary organizations that assumed care. He hoped that thousands could
be admitted whose education would enable their eventual overseas resettlement.157
However, not everyone in British society shared these beneficent feelings. A letter writer
to a newspaper, for example, declared that the provision of foster homes to foreigners further
diminished the domestic birth rate due to increased household financial burdens.158 Hoare’s
actions, along with many in the government, were, however, framed by ulterior motives. The
Cabinet believed that the admission of German children was more acceptable to immigrationconscious Americans than adult German refugees.159 If the people of Britain were supportive of
such an operation it was presumed that comparable actions would be undertaken by the United
States and other nations so that the burden was shared.160 In reality, the number of refugee
children to be admitted had already been predetermined to match the ten thousand suggested by
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the Jewish agency. The Home Secretary believed that such a numerical restriction was justified
by the presence of a domestic anti-Semitism that responsible people wanted to see repressed.161
The Catholic Herald predicted that Catholics were not willing to assist refugee children
who did not share their faith. 162 Other papers, such as Lord Beaverbrook’s The Daily Mail,
Sunday Dispatch, and the Evening Herald, opposed the general principal of immigration into
England. The Times, for the most part, avoided any expression of public support for the rescue
program.163 Overall, the relocation of German refugee children was regarded essentially as a
Jewish concern and only the Jewish Chronicle provided frequent coverage. The outbreak of war
and the internal evacuation of British and refugee children relegated the issue into obscurity. The
Jewish paper published over the course of the war only thirty-seven articles dealing with this
issue. Although public sentiment and the press coerced the government to accept German
children in the aftermath of Kristallnacht, its overall impact on His Majesty’s Government was
limited.164
The selection of children for evacuation was to be carried out within Germany and
Austria. The division of child emigration (Abteilung Kinderauswanderung der Reichsvertretund
der deutschen Juden) had been created in 1933 by the Council for German Jews. The German
office, located in Berlin, served as a central clearing house for applications and determined
which files were to be forwarded on to Britain and the Movement for the Care of Children in
German, which was transformed into the Refugee Children’s Movement (RCM) in April 1939.
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Christians primarily directed this new organization out of concerns that a higher Jewish profile
strengthened domestic anti-Jewish sentiments and prevented a more expansive popular base of
support. A Gentile directorship, it was believed, would garner greater financial and political
backing from wider segments of British society. 165
The Central Committee of the RCM was thus composed of Roman Catholics, Anglicans,
and secular Jews. Its functions were diverse: meeting refugee children upon their arrival in
British ports; establishment of transit camps; notification of local relief committees of arrival
times; intermittent inspection of foster homes and youth hostels; provision of financial
guarantees to the Home Office, and the maintenance of a central card file that recorded personal
and demographic information.166 The local committees were charged with supervision of the
children and the provision of public and parochial education and vocational training.
Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox children were essentially excluded from the purview of the
RCM. The Chief Rabbi’s Religious Emergency Council (CRREC) assumed responsibility for
their care. Adaptation into the dominant Christian culture or less observant Jewish families
complicated their placement. The CRREC criticized the RCM for its willingness to place Jewish
children into non-Jewish foster homes, in which it was feared they would be exposed to
proselytizing influences and pressured into potential conversion. In response, the Refugee
Children’s Movement cited the immediacy of the situation within Germany and the inadequate
number of Jewish homes willing to accept foster children. The ongoing lack of cooperation and
internecine conflicts had previously led the Home Office to establish in May 1938 the
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Coordinating Committee for Refugees (CCR). It operated as a bridge between the different relief
groups and the government by formulating joint policies and fostering improved cooperation.
The CCR assumed responsibility for refugee children arriving from Czechoslovakia and German
children accompanied by their parents through the work of the German-Jewish Aid
Committee.167
In addition to the work of formalized refugee organizations, such as the RCM, three
additional modes of transfer were devised to facilitate the shepherding of children from the Reich
to Great Britain. They could be incorporated within groups of children subsidized by sympathetic
individuals with sufficient financial resources and the ability to provide foster homes. Nicholas
Winton, for example, focused primarily upon Sudeten orphans, abandoned children or parents
seeking the evacuation of their children from the remnant of Czechoslovakia. He, like the RCM,
accepted placement of Jews within Christian homes and recognized the risks of possible
conversion but, when possible, preferentially chose B’nai B’rith or Youth Aliyah due to their
emphasis on the preservation of Jewish identity. By the conclusion of his efforts he had saved
669 primarily Jewish children. The Society of Friends was able to create such aggregations by
virtue of a special standing granted by the Nazi government due to their relief work within
Germany following the end of the Great War. Such positioning allowed the Quakers to operate
as intermediaries between German officials and Jewish rescue organizations. Finally, an
individual child could be escorted by an individual adult or as part of a family group, frequently
led by their mothers, who sought employment in the United Kingdom as domestic servants. 168
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Geoffrey Lord, Undersecretary for the Home Office, announced on November 24, 1938
that the British government refused to subsidize the costs of maintenance, education, and training
for refugee children. Citing the declaration of the Evian Conference that all costs must be borne
by private organizations, a tax deduction was granted to foster parents. The authorities, however,
came to recognize that private funding was insufficient, forcing the government to bear 75
percent of the administrative and maintenance costs.169 Financial constraints at the level of the
RCM and the inadequate availability of foster homes mandated a limitation on the number of
children that could be transferred to Britain.
Children selected for evacuation made their way to the United Kingdom from the port of
Hoek van Holland in The Netherlands. The first group of 600 children departed on December 1,
1938 and the initial allotment of 196 arrived in Harwich, England the next day. Following
screening interviews potential foster parents were permitted to travel to reception centers where
they selected a child from the non-guaranteed group of refugees. “Looks, coloring, and [a] docile
personality” 170 played a prominent role in the decision process. Younger children and girls with
blue eyes and blond hair, aged three to seven years of age, were particularly sought after. 171
Eventually, specific households were selected by the RCM prior to the meeting of foster parents
and child.172 Guaranteed children were sent directly to London to meet their sponsors and travel
to their new homes. In general, German Jewish refugee children were dispersed to avoid over_________________________________
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concentration that could promote endemic anti-Semitism. Teenagers were significantly less
likely to be accepted into foster homes and were most often sent to hostels, which frequently
failed to provide consistent mental health services, emotional care, and religious education. 173
This Kindertransport or Children’s Transports program proved to be the largest and most
successful rescue scheme carried out during the years of the Holocaust. The British government
accepted 9,354 German, Austrian, Czech refugee children, of whom 6,690 were Jews, during the
period between December 2, 1938-May 14, 1940 when the fall of The Netherlands prevented
further evacuation. Acceptance was conditional, however, upon their re-emigration when they
reached the age of twenty-one years.174
Overall, approximately twelve thousand Jewish and non-Aryan children were saved
through various projects in the United States, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, in
addition to the Kindertransport.175 France, Belgium, and the Netherlands permitted the entry of
3,000 refugee children from December 1938 until August 1939 but many perished in the Nazi
extermination program.176 The conception of the German Children’s Refugee Bill, better known
as the Wagner-Rogers Bill, stemmed from British private and official attempts to salvage a fixed
number of German and Austrian children following the Night of the Broken Glass. While the
Kindertransport served as a template for the American effort, there were fundamental
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conceptual, organizational, and mechanistic differences. Both schemes were driven by similar
humanitarian and political considerations, but they drastically diverged in their ultimate
accomplishments.
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CHAPTER 3:
THE WAGNER-ROGERS BILL: A PATH TO NOWHERE
“The lamp remained lifted beside the golden door, but the flame had been
extinguished and the door was padlocked.” 177
“Suffer little children to come unto Me and forbid them not;
for of such is the Kingdom of Heaven.” Sen. Robert Wagner” 178

The British acceptance of German children refugees established a model that reverberated
within America. The committee for the Care of Children from Germany (British Inter-Aid
Committee) was constructed to facilitate the admission of Jewish and non-Aryan children,
seventeen years and younger, via a network of local non-denominational, social and
philanthropic chapters and organizations. Initial care and orientation of these young émigrés took
place through a system of hostels whose staff determined the appropriate home setting for each
child while attempting to satisfy the preferences of potential foster parents: generally younger
than ten years of age, of which there were limited numbers, as the majority were 14-16 years old.
A centralized commission supervised the transport, maintenance, distribution, and resettlement
of these children within carefully inspected and selected free or compensated private foster
homes. Assurances were given to the Home Secretary that sufficient private capitalization was
available for proper childcare. Prospective parents were held responsible for the needs and
177
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education of their wards until they could be reunited with their parents or reached an age of selfsufficiency. Over time, they would either emigrate abroad (U.K. serving as a site of transit) or be
granted citizenship if all immigration rules and regulations were met (U.K serving as site of
permanent refuge).
It was recognized that the majority of these displaced children were Jews and that
placement of the non-Orthodox within Christian homes might become necessary. However, the
decision was made that an Orthodox child must be assigned to an Orthodox household, a process
that frequently failed. 179 Quentin Reynolds, an associate editor at Collier’s Weekly, attempted to
paint a human face on these involuntary immigrants as he described a group of five hundred
German Jewish children arriving in Harwich, England of whom less than 10 percent knew the
location of their parents or religious affiliation. 180
Subsequently, a group of forty-nine leading American Protestant and Catholic clerics,
seeking to emulate the Kindertransport in Great Britain and the rescue projects of The
Netherlands, petitioned Franklin Roosevelt to admit at least ten thousand German refugee
children. Four prominent Catholic and Protestant clergymen, headed by Monsignor John A.
Ryan, a member of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, delivered the appeal to the
Executive Mansion. 181 They represented the Committee for Catholic Refugees from Germany,
the American Friends Service Committee, the Committee for Catholic Refugees from Germany,
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and the National Coordinating Committee for Aid to Refugees and Immigrants. They focused
primarily upon children under fourteen years of age whose parents had been forced into
concentration camps, necessitating their placement within orphanages or the domiciles of family
friends after they had been deprived of country, home, and kin. The nation, they believed, had
been particularly affected by the predicament of these children and needed to do fulfill its moral
obligations. Such action served as a symbol of American compassion and conviction in the
sanctity of the brotherhood of man. Acceptance of a limited number of refugee children, these
clergymen argued, would lessen opposition from nativist and restrictionist groups. Private
financial resources were expected to satisfy and be in compliance with the provisions of the
Likely to Become Public Charge (LPC) clause of current immigration law. 182
FDR, according to his wife, Eleanor, gave the “the green light” 183 to the bill that had been
endorsed by Herbert Hoover, one-time Kansas Governor and 1936 Republican presidential
candidate, Alfred M. Landon, newspaper editor and publisher, and Frank Knox, 1936 Republican
Vice-Presidential running mate, and Secretary of the Navy in the Roosevelt Administration. 184
Hoover’s support was a surprise to many in view of his administration’s policies that constrained
immigration due to domestic economic conditions. However, review of his historical record
demonstrated multiple points of intersection with Jewry and Zionism and the quest for a Jewish
national homeland in Palestine. His relief activities in post-war Europe had enabled the feeding
of starving Jewish enclaves. He persuaded the new government of an independent Poland to take
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action against local pogroms that had arisen against Jewish communities. Over time, he
developed friendships with prominent Jews on the basis of shared humanitarian concerns. These
avenues of personal contact provided the former President with vital information regarding the
problems and anxieties of this minority group. While serving as Chief Executive he publicly
supported the enactment of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 that called for the foundation of an
independent Jewish state within Palestine, despite the anti-Zionist positioning of State
Department officials. He also instructed William Dodd, his Ambassador to Berlin, to protest the
Nazi treatment of German Jews; a course of action Roosevelt did not pursue with Dodd or his
successor, Hugh Wilson. Finally, Hoover, in spite of his policy of abridging immigration during
the early phase of the Great Depression, endorsed the German Refugee Bill as a unique
exception to the law. 185
Hoover wired Rev. Anson Phelps Stokes that the willingness of America to accept its
proportionate percentage of European refugee children would be readily accepted by the public.
This act, he predicted, would not exacerbate domestic unemployment, but was in harmony with
the national tradition of offering sanctuary; reflective of the desire of every American to provide
for the protection of children. 186 In addition, he attempted to influence members of Congress
behind the scenes who were undecided in their support for this endeavor. 187 James McDonald,
the Chairman of the President’s Advisory Committee for Political Refugees, suggested to FDR
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that Hoover should, in view of his experience in delivering mass relief to post-Great War
Europe, be named to head the effort to raise the needed funding for and the placement of refugee
children within acceptable homes. However, Roosevelt and his administration resisted this
suggestion.188
The First Lady advised Justine Wise Polier, the daughter of the prominent Rabbi Stephen
Wise, a New York juvenile court justice, and one of the organizers of the newly formed NonSectarian Committee for German Refugee Children (NSCGRC), that her husband believed
successful passage of such a bill through Congress was highly dependent upon bipartisan
sponsorship from a member of each Chamber. The selection of these individuals required careful
consideration as well as an attempt to obtain “all the Catholic support you can.” 189 Polier
responded that she and other members of the committee had already been receiving widespread
endorsements from a host of sources.190 Eleanor provided private backing and advice but did not
take a strong public position on the bill. 191 When asked whether she favored the measure Mrs.
Roosevelt responded that it appeared to be the “humanitarian thing to do.” 192
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Clarence E. Pickett, the Executive Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee,
formally announced the formulation of the Non-Sectarian Committee. The organization was led
by prominent members of the Christian clergy and lay public. 193 The task force was the end
result of the combined work of the Quakers and experts in the field of child welfare. A proposal
had been formulated, Pickett declared, to provide refuge for the youngest and most vulnerable
children; a movement, he believed, that was supported by large segments of the American
public. Their endorsement, he asserted, had crystallized into the writing of the German Refugee
Children’s Bill. Responsibilities for enacting the program were be borne by and channeled
through the Committee, which planned to disperse the children across the nation to prevent
congregation in large cities.
Pickett cited the work of The Netherlands that had received more than ten thousand
requests for placement. Dutch sources indicated the willingness of German parents to be
separated from their offspring as a means of shielding them from “ghastly moral degradation and
actual physical danger.”194 He noted that Holland had accepted 1,700 children, England 5,000,
and France, Belgium and Sweden were in the process of formulating similar plans. Pickett
observed that offers of American foster homes of all religious denominations had been received
from forty-one states. The nation, he contended, had a responsibility to recall the “admonition of
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Him who said, ‘Suffer the little children to come unto me.’”195 The admission of these innocent
subjects of German persecution was, in their view, commensurate with American certainty in the
principles of human fellowship. 196
The Catholic Senator Robert Wagner (Democrat, NY) and Protestant Representative
Edith Nourse Rogers (Republican, Rhode Island) co-sponsored the German Refugee Children’s
Bill (S.J. Res. 64 and H.J. Res. 168, 767th Congress, 1st Session), introduced on February 9,
1939, to allow the one-time entrance of ten thousand Jewish and Christian non-Aryan children
into the United States outside of the quota in 1939 and 1940.197 This act, Wagner declared,
would free these children from a life devoid of optimism and opportunity, and allow them to
endure and flourish within highly selected foster homes. The bill specifically stated that existing
immigration laws remained in force and guaranteed that the children, 6-14 years of age, met
mandated mental health and physical standards. Private financial backing ensured that the LPC
Clause was satisfied and that they did not pose any danger to American industry and labor. 198
Wagner unequivocally affirmed that he opposed any legislation that linked religious affiliation
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with admission. As a result, the bill deliberately omitted any reference to the Jewish identity of
refugee children as a means of minimizing anti-Semitic resistance. 199
Representative John H. Dingell, an African-American Democratic Congressman from the
Fifteenth District, Michigan, introduced his own measure, Joint Resolution 165, prior to that of
Congresswoman Rogers. He stated that both plans sought to achieve the same ends. Dingell
asserted, during the Joint Hearings, that the United States possessed the capacity to receive and
absorb an extremely small number of refugees without detriment to American citizens. He
declared that opponents of the rescue plan had been misinformed. The argument that charity
began at home was ill-founded as many prospective foster parents who came forward to receive
German refugee children were unwilling to accept American children from orphanages. In
addition, Dingell echoed the observation that domestic demand for local adoptions decidedly
exceeded supply. He challenged the claim that the legislation must include persecuted children of
other nations. The situation within the Reich, the Representative believed, was much more
compelling. The United States, he insisted, was obligated to follow the example set by the United
Kingdom, The Netherlands, Belgium, and France. 200
Representative Rogers, who had won the seat occupied by her husband, John, upon his
death in 1925, announced her intention to introduce a House resolution seeking admission of
twenty thousand German refugee children over a two-year period. She believed that this action
demonstrated the bipartisan nature of the proposed immigration legislation. Roger’s scheme
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reflected her 1937 warnings of the dangers posed by Nazism and Italian Fascism and her moral
outrage over the treatment of German Jewry. 201
Commenting on the components of the joint enactment, she assured the nation that the
current quota system remained intact, and that provisions for the care and upkeep of these
children had been secured. Rogers interpreted the support of the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. as
recognition that they did not pose a threat to the American worker. Their parents or other family
members were required to apply for admission through the established channels of the quota
system. The Congresswoman stated that fifty thousand children were at risk in Germany, of
which slightly more than half were Jews. They had been forced out of school, frequently
separated from kith and kin, and in extremis, they were bereft of a life of hope and joy. She
admitted that many German parents were willing to part ways with the foreknowledge that
separation could be permanent as long as they were provided with the opportunity to resume a
normal life.202 By mid-April five thousand homes had proffered refuge.
Dr. Marion Kenworthy, Director of the Department of Mental Hygiene of the New York
School of Social Work, and other professionals in the field of child-welfare, provided Pickett and
the NSCGRC, in the aftermath of the announcement of the Wagner-Rogers Bill, with a schema
that outlined the critical mechanics, steps, and benchmarks that needed to be satisfied. This plan,
aided by the cooperation and assistance of the Federal Children’s Bureau, grew out of a
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collaborative effort of individual Christian and Jewish welfare workers motivated by
humanitarian concerns, and the clerical appeal to the White House and Congress. 203
Kenworthy observed following Kristallnacht that other nations enacted contingency
plans that permitted the acceptance of thousands of young refugees. She believed that admission
into the United States, should the government decide to travel down a similar road, mandated
new legislation that presented a unique opportunity to avoid provocation of a social crisis within
any receiving community. Accordingly, the group presented Pickett with a comprehensive
breakdown of the primary difficulties that such a program engendered, coupled with potential
resolutions to problems should they arise. Success was aided by the expertise and experience of
the Children’s Bureau of the United States Department of Labor, the International Migration
Service, and the American Friends’ Service Committee.
Kenworthy gave Pickett a first draft of the machinery that transformed the WagnerRogers Bill into a viable and functioning reality. The proposal was carefully designed with the
aim of conjoining efficiency of effort with the legal requirements of immigration law. Every step
of the process was clearly delineated: selection, reception, distribution, and finances. Each of its
components would be reiterated in the testimony of pro-bill witnesses who sought Congressional
approval and the reassurance of a potentially doubtful and resistant body politic.
The proposition did not seek the disruption of the family; the process was already
intensifying under the pressures of the Nazi onslaught. Every means were to be employed to
preserve contact, if possible, between the refugee child and parents. Many Jewish and non-Aryan
203
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fathers and mothers regarded emigration of their children as a method of ensuring their
protection from harm. Selection was to be guided by expert inquiry and parental discussion, to
ensure that resettlement was imperative for their child’s current and prospective wellbeing.
Kenworthy and her associates highlighted the experience of the American Friends Service
Committee (AFSC) in the provision of care to children in post-Great War Germany. The
organization was already accruing real-time experience in the handling of refugee children
within the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Belgium and the expanded Reich. Accordingly,
the Quaker organization was expected to serve as the central body for the selection of foreign
children, aided by well-trained American social workers and child-welfare experts, conforming
to the requirements of U.S. immigration laws, the Departments of Labor and State, and the
decisions of American Consuls. If accepted, a visa for permanent residence within the United
States was to be granted.
The body receiving children at a port of entry would function as parental surrogates while
the staff of accredited child-welfare agencies facilitated their introduction into American society.
Variations in the times of arrival of passenger ships and of the awaiting personnel necessitated
the provision of local temporary housing for the promotion of quietude, diversion, and
readjustment prior to placement. The religious background of the child and parental preference
for a particular theological education was factored into the assignment process. The new
immigrants were to be distributed across the country to avoid the appearance of ghettoization, an
over concentration of Jews within the port cities.
Kenworthy cited the White House Conference on Children of 1909 that affirmed every
child possessed a constitutive right to domestic stability and security; a principle consistently
reaffirmed by subsequent administrations. The NSCGRC engaged experienced welfare and
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social agencies to ensure child-care satisfied approved standards and to offer assistance in the
identification and selection of suitable foster homes. Similarly, the delivery of medical and
psychological services and education were subject to local and state requirements. Individual
case files were to be maintained in a centralized database that accrued essential information
regarding each child and their new home. The Non-Sectarian Committee guaranteed the
necessary financial support and a contingency fund was created to meet unexpected needs.
In summary, the Kenworthy plan affirmed that each child was subject to a deliberate
process of selection that assured only the best material were granted visas. Proper supervision en
route to the United States and after landing was expected to diminish the emotional impact of
separation while aiding orientation into a new country, society, and home. Hopefully, the unified
collation of demographic and official information would enable parents to establish and retain
contact with their children. Although this scheme was devised in response to exceptional
circumstances it was held accountable to American norms, abetted by the knowledge and skill of
experienced child welfare workers.204
Although FDR had privately given the go-ahead for the Wagner-Rogers Bill, he warned
that any attempt at amending or modifying the annual quota could provoke the anti-immigration
elements in Congress to promote more restrictive immigration laws and regulations. 205 When
Representative Caroline O’Day (Democrat, NY), a long-time friend, confidante, and ardent
supporter of the First Lady, sent a message to FDR in June 1939 questioning his position on the
Wagner-Rogers bill, he did not respond and ordered that her message be marked “File No
204
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action.”206 Eleanor Roosevelt did openly express her support for the rescue plan during a press
conference held on February 13, 1939. She stated that the United Kingdom, France, and the
nations of Scandinavia were “admitting their share, and I think we should also do so”207 and
hoped the legislation would be adopted, as it was the right and fair action to pursue. 208
Privately, however, the Eleanor was skeptical of the bill’s fate. She informed Justine
Wise Polier that James G. MacDonald had warned that any attempt to pressure FDR into openly
promoting the bill could be harmful if the measure was defeated. Failure risked the immediate
introduction into Congress of more stringent quotas and regulations. 209 North Carolina
Democratic Senator Robert Reynolds was already seeking a 90 percent cut in immigration, and
claimed during an hour-long oration in the Senate, that the admission of these refugee children
represented an opening for mass Jewish immigration into the country. 210 Therefore, the
P.A.C.P.R. was hesitant in explicitly affirming its support.
Faced with this situation, Eleanor wired the President seeking his consent to publicly
articulate her endorsement and to conduct conversations with Undersecretary of State Welles.
The President responded that he favored passage of the measure but declined to issue any formal
206
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statement of approval. Welles advised Mrs. Roosevelt that any attempt by her husband to
verbalize his backing hazarded extreme political embarrassment should the bill fail, although he
believed that FDR desired to see it succeed. He, like MacDonald, feared the potential backlash of
restrictionists and acknowledged the volume of letters that the State Department was receiving
accusing it of conspiring to admit large numbers of Jewish refugees. Thus, he would not attempt
to influence Roosevelt. 211 The First Lady belatedly sought an explanation from her spouse
explaining his refusal to publicly endorse the German Refugee Children’s Bill. He responded:
“They are not our Jews.”212
In short, the President did not attempt to employ his executive influence to promote
passage. Katharine F. Lenroot was allowed to testify as a private individual but not as the
director of the Federal Children’s Bureau. As with the earlier Evian Conference, Roosevelt did
not want to expend critical political capital on issues to which he assigned lower national
priority. Congressional support, particularly from Southern Democratic Representatives and
Senators, was crucial for his plans to modernize and expand the military and its infrastructure
while providing the French and British with armaments and munitions in an environment that
was infused with increasing isolationist sentiments. 213
FDR once again attempted to attain the moral high ground by engaging in non-committal
generalities. He declared on March 5, 1939 that the United States would peacefully contest the
widening suppression of personal liberties, particularly religious freedom, and along with the
other democracies, reaffirm its opposition to oppression and despotism. The nation, Roosevelt
211
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insisted, could not, by inaction, “lend encouragement to those who today persecute religion or
deny it.”214 Instead, he asserted the country’s answer to the erosion of human rights and the
ascension of dictatorships must remain, as it had from the birth of the republic, a resounding
“NO.”215
Other members of the Roosevelt administration were non-supportive of the WagnerRogers Bill. Cordell Hull and the State Department opposed the bill, arguing that the official
handling of twenty thousand visas in its current formulation created administrative hurdles, cost
$150,000, and required additional employees and space. 216 Privately, the Department warned
that the legislation could precipitate more rigorous immigration laws. Assistant Secretary of
State George S. Messersmith had, during the period leading up to the Evian Conference,
informed six Jewish Congressmen, including, Representatives Emanuel Celler of NY, and
Adolph Sabath, of Illinois, that any suggestion of liberalizing immigration laws must result in
greater degrees of restriction. As a result, they accepted his advice and pledged their opposition
against any new legislative attempts to liberalize the quota system. 217 The Undersecretary further
suggested that adoption of the children’s refugee bill would undoubtedly encourage other
European nations, such as Poland, Hungary and Rumania, to emulate Germany by engaging in a
214
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policy of forced expulsion; an act that would dramatically exacerbate the problem of mass
migration.218 Furthermore, Messersmith described Labor Secretary Frances Perkins as a threat
due to her flexibility regarding the admission of refugees. 219 Overall, he held an anti-refugee bias
that accused forced émigrés of believing that America “owe[d]” 220 them some form of obligation
and that the United States was specifically conscripted to be their deliverer. The nation and its
ideals, he asserted, remained the inheritance of native-born Americans. 221
At this moment Eddie Cantor, the singer, comedian and strong supporter of Roosevelt
and the March of Dimes Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, sent a letter to the Presidential
Secretary, Marvin H. McIntyre, urging FDR’s advocacy for the Wagner-Rogers Bill. Cantor
predicted that positive action on the part of the Executive Branch would lead these refugee
children to regard the President as “a saint…for generations to come.” 222 He offered to provide
the names and qualifications of those families willing to accept the émigrés. McIntyre passed on
the missive to Sumner Welles who provided guidance for a reply to Cantor. The Press Secretary
indicated that although large numbers of people were sympathetic to the victims of Nazi
persecution he believed that it was not prudent to broach, during the current Congressional
session, any proposal that increased or markedly altered the present quota allotments. Such
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action, he warned, strengthened the hand of the anti-immigration faction within Congress. 223
The institutional anti-Semitism and the rigid enforcement of the quota system was
exemplified by Wilbur Carr who had served as Assistant Secretary of State and Director of the
Consular Service under several Presidents from July 1, 1924-July 28, 1937, and subsequently, as
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotenitary to Czechoslovakia until its assimilation into
greater Germany. He had long opposed the entry of Jewish immigrants, particularly those from
Eastern Europe, and professed during the early 1920s debates over the enactment of exclusionary
immigration laws, that they were “filthy, most un-American…often dangerous in their habits,
economically [and] socially undesirable…abnormally twisted…mentally deficient [and
potential] political and labor agitators.” 224
However, Carr also regarded non-Jewish aliens as a threat to the social order and
economic stability of the nation during a time of depression. 225 He had authored a 1933 State
Department memo, “The Problem of Aliens Seeking Relief From Persecution in Germany,” that
encapsulated his views and those of his Foggy Bottom colleagues regarding the admission of
refugees. The paper argued that American immigration laws did not provide any special
consideration for foreigners who desired sanctuary to avoid religious or other forms of
persecution.226 Nonetheless, by March 1939, while serving in Prague, he informed Hull of the
mass arrests carried out in the typical Nazi fashion. Local Jews, Czech Social Democrats, and
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members of the fallen national government were, Carr argued, facing particular dangers from the
new National Socialist regime. As a result, he asserted that the American Government had a
moral duty to collaborate in an international movement that enabled enable the emigration of this
population at risk, although he was doubtful of its success. 227 However, the failure of the 1938
Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, and the refusal of attending States to
modify their immigration laws, demonstrated to Carr the futility of global collective action.
Thus, international apathy coupled with State Department prejudices and rigid enforcement of
administrative entrance requirements produced additional impediments to the implementation of
the Wagner-Rogers Bill.
The German Refugee Children’s Bill created a battleground on which proponents, and
adversaries, espoused their opinions within the halls of Congress and in the pages of the national
and local press. The persecutions underway within the Reich were vividly reported and generated
a sense of public moral outrage against Germany. Supporters of the Bill regarded expressions of
sympathy as proof that the legislation would be enacted into law. Public opinion polls, however,
provided a different view in which compassion did not transmute into a willingness to open the
Golden Gates of immigration. This discordance, reflected within the media, was to play a key
role in the forthcoming Congressional hearings.
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CHAPTER 4:
THE PRESS AND THE WAGNER-ROGERS BILL

Newspapers around the country expressed their support for the Wagner-Rogers Bill. At
least eighty-five papers published within thirty-six states printed editorials calling for its passage.
Twenty-six were located within the South; a region of the country known for its restrictionist
stance. Proponents of the bill placed more than ninety editorials into the Congressional
Record.228 Significantly, however, the issue of twenty thousand German refugee children that
was regarded as an exceptional case was not equivalent to consent to liberalize or breach the
quota system.229 America admittedly was unable to serve as the haven for all refugees but
rejection of the German Refugee Children’s Bill was perceived by many as a violation of longheld national beliefs in compassion and liberty. 230 The assertion that these young involuntary
emigrants would, with time, compete with Americans for employment was dismissed with the
argument that “objections to letting down the bars to men and women of working age [did] not
apply to children.”231 Minors chosen for admission were expected to possess the desired qualities
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and abilities that facilitated evolution into worthwhile citizens, indoctrinated with American
ideals and values, who could readily assimilate into the body politic. Ultimately, they might
compete for employment, but in the interim they functioned as consumers of domestic products
and services. The possibility that they could be Jews was not mentioned in this opinion piece. 232
However, other columns were careful to point out that non-Aryan Protestant and Catholics were
expected to be included within the parameters of the bill. 233
One editorialist predicted that the German annexation of parts of Czechoslovakia—
Bohemia and Moravia—and more recently of the Memel Territory (detached from the defeated
Imperial Germany and ceded to Lithuania) hastened the refugee bill’s enactment as a means of
expressing America’s collective rebuke of Nazi policies and aggression. The writer predicted
that the severance of child from parent would become permanent. The opinion piece accentuated
the chronic under filling of the annual German and Austrian immigration quotas. Following the
Anschluss the sole American contribution to the Intergovernmental Committee for Political
Refugees had been the amalgamation of the per annum Austrian allotment of 1,413 with the
German, numbering 25,957. However, during the remainder of the 1938 fiscal year, only 65 per
cent of the combined cohort of 27,370 were admitted. A similar situation applied to the total
annual immigration allowance of approximately 150,000. Only 42,494 had been granted entry
permits during 1937, of which roughly 20,000 were younger than twenty-one years old.234
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Another paper commented that during 1938 net immigration amounted to 42,648—a
fraction of 1 percent of the entire nation’s population; a figure that robustly challenged
oppositional claims that hoards of aliens were inundating the country. Analysis of 1937
immigration statistics disclosed that the number of aliens admitted approximated 7 percent of the
amount allowable for 1924, the initial year of the National Origins Act. These numbers, one
editorialist argued, exerted an insignificant impact on the American society and employment.
Consequently, it was inconceivable that if the public recognized this fact that such a
limited scheme could be defeated by a minority that promoted “a hysterical Americanism”235
conjoined with the fear of the Other. 236 Some papers qualified their endorsement by ensuring
their readership that they remained opposed to any modification of immigration laws while
noting that admission of twenty thousand children translated into the placement of five refugees
per county in the United States.237
The Los Angeles Times extolled the bill as a sign of “the purest of human sentiments” 238
and argued that the children created a pool of consumers and future reservoir of skilled labor.
The California Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution that urged Congress to enact the
bill.239 Columnist Herbert Agar of the Louisville Courier Journal insisted that America had an
overriding duty to assist the victims of racial, political and religious prejudice in Germany and
Central Europe. Although mass migration was an international concern, the admission of twenty
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thousand children did not threaten the integrity of the immigration system. The children selected
for entry were taken “from the cream of the oppressed people of Europe,” 240 and leading experts
in child social welfare declared their admittance would focus domestic attention upon
underprivileged American children. 241
Smaller papers joined in the debate. The Asbury Park Press reported that Rabbi Ario S.
Hyams of Temple Beth Shalom, Roslyn Heights, had called upon local residents to tune into a
special radio broadcast of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America that expressed
its support for the bill. Significantly, he concluded that the creation of the Non-Sectarian
Committee demonstrated that an increasing number of Americans were acknowledging that
Nazism represented a preeminent threat to both Jews and Christians. 242 A Burlington (VT) paper
noted a Boston sub-committee of the Federal Council was offering assistance to German
Protestants, but remained opposed to any alteration of the quota system except for the admission
of refugee children under the Wagner-Rogers Bill.243
The New York Times argued that a precedent had been set for the reception of refugees in
American history: Belgium, France, post-Revolutionary Russia, Eastern Europe, and China.
Although the United States was no longer able to afford or support an open door immigration
policy, its innate humanity allowed the reception of a small number of refugee children. This
non-partisan and non-sectarian legislation simply represented the kind act of offering assistance
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to those in desperate situations. The editorialist was certain that a popular groundswell of support
would propel the bill through the halls of Congress and into law. 244
On the other hand, T.M. Dobbins submitted a letter to the editor of the Asheville CitizenTimes that was critical of the Wagner-Rogers Bill. His arguments and their refutation by the
newspaper’s editorial writer presented a microcosm of the debate that in due course resonated
through Congress and its hearings. Dobbins professed that altruism began at home. The
resources of the country needed, he believed, to be mobilized to succor its own underprivileged
children whose wants superceded those of the children of Europe. The admission of these
German refugee children would intensify, he predicted, domestic competition for a finite number
of jobs. The diversion of aid represented an act that deserved public condemnation.
In response, the editorial argued that humanitarianism and kindness transcended national
boundaries and cited the “Parable of the Good Samaritan” (Luke 10:25-37); an act consistent
with the long-standing United States’ custom of offering refuge and assistance to the maltreated
and unwanted. More importantly, the writer argued that the plight of young German Jewish and
non-Aryan children outweighed by orders of magnitude, the problems confronted by needy
American children: escalating persecution and privation; physical abuse and terror;
homelessness; and the fracturing of the family and separation from parents who were missing,
emigrated, imprisoned, or dead. Native-born children, it was asserted, were not subjected to
such an organized program of discrimination, danger, and exclusion by the national government,
but were protected by the tenets of American democracy. The admission of twenty thousand
refugee children represented a minute percentage of all of the nation’s children. Finally, the
paper acknowledged that to a certain extent German refugee children would help offset a
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declining birthrate in which an aging population became more dependent upon the productivity
and taxpaying abilities of younger workers.245
Bertram Benedict, an editor and writer of the Washington based Editorial Research
Reports, constructed a hypothetical dialogue between the members of a stereotypical American
married couple, Helen and Howard Robinson, in which the arguments for and against the
Wagner Rogers Bill were dissected and expressed in easy to understand terms. Separated into
their respective positions, Helen presented the pro-stance position. The American Friends’
Service Committee was to be responsible for the selection, provisioning, passage, and
resettlement of the migrant children. However, acceptance remained contingent upon the
consuls’ assessment of the worthiness of every child immigrant. The refugee group included
Jews, Catholics and Protestants; particularly Christians who had been categorized by the 1935
Nuremberg Race Laws as Jewish. Helen noted that the American population in 1939 contained
more than forty million children under the age of fifteen years. Therefore, this “little temporary
act of mercy”246 that distributed approximately four hundred young refugees per state could not
have a marked impact upon the care and nurturing of American children.
The fictitious housewife cogently observed that the quota allowance, stipulated by the
National Origins Act of 1924 and its modification in 1929, permitted the entry of 1.2 million
aliens during 1930-1939, with 150,000 slots set aside for Western and Central Europe. However,
consular biases and restrictions greatly diminished the number of aliens granted admission. In
reality, she argued, a net loss of immigrants had occurred due to rising levels of admitted
Europeans returning to the Continent or other destinations. She also cited the under filling of the
245

Asheville Citizen-Times, “Unto the Least of Them,” May 7, 1939, 12.

Pittsburgh Press, Bertram Benedict, “Husband Accuses Wife of Being Sentimental Over Refugee Children,”
June 11, 1939, 1.
246

71

annual quotas allotted to Great Britain, Ireland, and the Scandinavian nations and suggested that
the unused visas be awarded to refugees fleeing greater Germany. Rather than becoming future
competitors for employment these children would function as consumers that stimulated
industry, job creation, production, and the flow of cash. The children, Helen contended, were to
be chosen from “the best heredity that we can get” 247 and did not jeopardize the adoption of
American children because many foster parents were dissatisfied with the available choices of
orphans; an allegation validated by children welfare agencies across the nation. She cited the
contributions and accomplishments of immigrant children such as the German born Senator
Robert Wagner and Danish William S. Knudsen, President of General Motors.
The fabricated husband, Howard Robinson, provided a voice for the opposition by
presenting oft-repeated objections to the bill’s passage. Although in absolute terms the twenty
thousand refugee children embodied a very small number, he insisted that they represented an
opening that enabled the admittance of their foreign parents. Large-scale immigration, up to the
time of the enactment of the National Origins Act, had resulted in the dilution of the American
“old stock,”248 the acceptance of physically or mentally inferior aliens, and the dissemination of
ideologies inimical to national ideals and democracy. “For every Knudsen or Wagner, we’ve let
in 10 Reds or Pinks. Ten incompetents and shovel leaners. Ten shyster lawyers and quack
doctors.”249 Howard claimed that large numbers of American children suffered from unmet
needs and that it was the responsibility of the country to take care of its own. When the refugee
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children reached the age of majority they would deprive the nation’s young of a like number of
jobs.250
Newspaper editorialists and writers to the editor also expressed their disapproval of the
Wagner-Rogers Bill. A column in the Arizona Republic (Phoenix) endorsed Senator Reynolds’
call for a total ban on immigration for a minimum of ten years. Passage of the children’s refugee
bill, the paper alleged, threatened the collapse of the entire immigration system by encouraging
other nations to dispatch their undesirable and impoverished minorities to the United States.
Alternatively, the writer argued that the Senator’s push for a complete prohibition against
acceptance of these castaways could be met by a rigid enforcement of the LPC clause.
Nationally syndicated columnist Ray Tucker perceptively noted that the humanitarian
goals of the Wagner-Rogers Bill were insufficient to overcome an “overwhelmingly nationalistic
and materialistic”251 76th Congress. Despite exceptional pressure brought to bear by proadmission forces, and the assumed silent support of the President, fears that refugee children
would eventually compete for jobs against American born high school and college graduates had
evolved into an insurmountable obstacle. 252 King Feature’s columnist and Roosevelt critic Paul
Mallon presciently predicted that the bill would be amended to deduct the twenty thousand from
the annual combined quota. He argued that Congressional legislators were not cold-blooded but
were determined to provide assistance to America’s unfortunates. Mallon also contended that
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opponents of the legislation believed that child refugees from other sites of conflict such as
Spain, China, and Ethiopia were equally deserving of special consideration for admission. 253
One writer articulated commonly held attitudes that the nation had crossed the boundaries
of rationality by maintaining an unrestricted admissions policy towards non-Americans. Such an
undertaking, he asserted, exceeded the absorptive capacity of the country. The Division of
Immigration and Naturalization had become too lax but needed to become more selective. The
United States was unable keep its “own house warm and comfortable by leaving the windows
and doors open to the great outside.” 254
Edward James Smythe, the Chairman of the National Executive Committee of the
Protestant War Veterans of the United States, castigated fundraising by the supporters of the
Wagner-Rogers Bill. Instead, he advocated for Federal financial support of the brave American
veterans of the Great War who were now dependent for survival upon the public trough. Reciting
the mantra that compassion begins at home, Smythe maintained that “American children [were]
America’s problem [and] European children [were] Europe’s problem.” 255 Smythe was noted for
his promotion of anti-Semitism, praise of Hitler and Italian Fascism, ties to the pro-Nazi
German-American Bund and its leader, Fritz Kuhn, and the Ku Klux Klan. He was an ardent
critic of Roosevelt and avidly described him as a puppet of an international Jewish conspiracy. 256
Eventually, he faced indictment as a co-defendant under the Smith Act of 1940 (United States v.
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McWilliams) and charged with attempts to demoralize members of the American military during
a time of peace.257
G.W. Jackson, of Seattle, affirmed his opposition to the refugee children’s scheme in a
letter to Episcopal Bishop Anson Stokes. Noting the support of Hoover, Jackson suggested that
the efforts of the former President and like-minded individuals be directed towards the
deprivations afflicting the children of his city and that of Los Angeles. Neglect, Jackson warned,
risked the genesis of a generation of miscreants and criminals. He declared that the Democratic
and Republican Parties had abandoned their responsibilities and must be replaced by a new order
based on Fascist principles that led the nation into an era of stability and progress; a strategy that
was dependent upon the collaboration of a “few practical farsighted men.”258 Stokes responded
to Jackson that although penury was a grave problem for many American youth, the bill
represented an attempt to assuage the lot of the persecuted German child. It was a Christian act
of conscience and did not threaten domestic stability. He disavowed any role for American
fascism as a remedy to the nation’s afflictions. 259
R. B. Baker, the Chairman of the Welfare Committee of the Virginia State Council of the
Junior Order United American, wrote a letter to the editor of the Richmond Daily News’ column,
“Bring Over the Children,” that encapsulated the objections that populated the presentations of
the Wagner-Rogers Bill’s opponents during the upcoming hearings: diversion of charity away
from needy and neglected American children; additional costs to be borne by an already stressed
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population of taxpayers; loss of employment that deservedly belonged to the youth of the
country, and the eventual entry of alien parents, siblings, and extended family members. Baker
calculated that each immigrant child would produce four children, who in turn would become
parents, resulting within five generations a national population increase of 640,000. He alleged
that if admission of these German refugee children had become a national priority then ten
thousand slots of the annual quota should be preferentially granted to this group. However, he
maintained that the Ethiopian victims of Italian aggression, the persecuted “Reds” of Spain,
China, and Germany, and Palestinian Arabs who were being downtrodden and robbed of their
homes deserved equal humanitarian consideration. 260
African-American newspapers expressed a variety of opinions regarding the persecution
of Germany Jewry and the question of immigration. An editorialist of the Chicago Defender
averred that unemployment would be exacerbated by the admittance of German refugees and
wondered if many of the proponents of the legislation were more concerned about the fate of
European Jewry than that of colored Americans. If their concerns were driven by moral
convictions then a similar degree of attention must be expended upon the economic tribulations
of fifteen million blacks of which half were victims of starvation. 261 This theme of
disingenuousness influenced black opinion towards Jews and anti-Semitism. The papers attacked
Hitlerism and expressed sympathy for its Jewish victims but were unable to “tolerate the
nauseating hypocrisy of those who are all against race prejudice” 262 within the Reich but could
not admit its existence in the United States. Many viewed each group as equal victims of
260

Richmond News Leader, Letter to the Editor, March 13, 1939., cited in April 20, 1939 Joint Hearings, 35.

261

Robert L. Fleegler, Ellis Island Nation: Immigration Policy and American Identity in the Twentieth Century
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 57.
262

“American Hypocrisy,” Pittsburgh Courier, July 22, 1933, 10.

76

prejudice that necessitated cooperation, but American Jews were frequently criticized for
remaining silent or complicit in the maltreatment of African-Americans. Jewry was poised to
rebuke the treatment of its German co-religionists, but infrequently spoke out against
“discrimination practiced against Negroes.” 263 Appeals to the President for racial justice went
unanswered.264 The events of Kristallnacht stimulated feelings among the black community that
similar actions could take place in America due to the proliferation of propaganda espousing
racial hatred. African-Americans were more vulnerable due to financial constraints, lack of
political power, and the absence of supporting organizations or networks.265
Correspondent and author Marquis W. Child suggested it was highly unlikely that the
Wagner-Rogers Bill was going to be adopted. He declared that the fundamental opposition to the
legislation was derived from particular Southerners within both Houses, and highlighted Senator
Reynolds who alleged that thousands of members of his new patriotic society, The Vindicators
Association, Inc., shared his restrictionist doctrine. If the bill made it to the Senate floor, he
threatened a filibuster. Child described him as a political zealot whose career would be enhanced
by engagement with the “anti-alien, anti-ism cry”266 that echoed across the country. Furthermore,
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the writer asserted that the Senator’s rhetoric and writings in his paper, The American Vindicator,
risked incitement of overt anti-Semitism.267
The arguments for and against the Wagner-Rogers Bill debated within the press were
reiterated during the various immigration committee meetings held within the Senate and House.
Events proved that newspaper editorial and opinion pieces did not function as an echo chamber
for popular sentiment. Professor of Jewish Studies Deborah Lipstadt noted that the print media’s
support for the legislation represented a rare instance in which it “vigorously moved out ‘ahead’
of the public.”268 Still, these arguments were not, she insisted, powerful enough to overcome
popular resistance to any exception to immigration law.269

St. Louis Post-Dispatch, “Wagner-Rogers Bill,” June 11, 1939, 1, 6; Julian M. Pleasants, Buncombe Bob: The
Life and Times of Robert Rice Reynolds (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 159.
267

268

Lipstadt, Beyond Belief, 14.

269

Ibid.

78

CHAPTER 5:
PROPONENTS
“In a sea of human beings, it is difficult, at times even impossible,
to see the human as being.” 270 Aysha Taryam
“The world will not be destroyed by those who do evil, but by those who
watch them without doing anything.” 271 Albert Einstein

The Kindertransport served as a guide for the individuals and groups that developed and
coalesced behind the German child refugee rescue plan, the Wagner-Rogers Bill. Both schemes
were marked by consonance and divergence in their construction and concerns. The children
were perceived as more acceptable immigrants than adults who might aggravate unemployment
or become dependent upon the financial support of taxpayers. 272 Nonetheless, the Children’s
Transport project regarded these young evacuees as transmigrants; temporary residents of the
United Kingdom, expected to re-emigrate once they had reached age 21 with completion of their
education or vocational training. This concept was anomalous to the United States in the context
of its long tradition of granting permanent residence and citizenship when legal requirements had
been met.
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However, British Jews maintained a higher profile in the development and promotion of
the Kindertransport. American Jewry, on the other hand, exerted pressure upon HMG to admit
increasing numbers of German refugee children into Britain and Palestine but failed to make
similar demands upon the American government. The majority of Jewish leaders, with the
exception of the Jewish Labor Committee, adopted a more hesitant approach towards
modification of the quota system, out of fear of stimulating anti-Semitism or provoking Congress
to adopt a more restrictive posture towards refugees. Greater emphasis was placed upon the
economic boycott of Nazi Germany than in attempts to change immigration policies. 273 Although
the number of Jews testifying in support of the Wagner-Rogers Bill was purposefully kept to a
minimum, there was a long history of institutions dedicated to the provision of aid and
deliverance to Jews of Europe. 274 Proponents of enactment strove to contest perceptions that this
legislation was a Jewish bill by underscoring its non-sectarian inclusivity. The supportive
arguments were essentially formulaic and repetitive, as were the objections raised by the
measure’s opponents.
Senator Wagner was the first to testify before the April 1939 Joint Hearings. He
reiterated the terms of the proposed legislation which, he insisted, evolved from American
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concerns regarding the tragic situation unfolding upon the Central European stage. Wagner cited
the failure of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, but insisted that the
collective conscience of America and the world had been sufficiently aroused to undertake
positive action. The Senator accepted the reality that events within the Reich had torn families
asunder. He acknowledged the willingness of parents to accept a potentially permanent
separation from their offspring as a means of securing their lives and future. This resettlement
effort, driven in part by parallel efforts in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and the
Netherlands, was a highly symbolic act. The detailed planning of Dr. Marion Kenworthy and
other child-care experts, conjoined with the leadership and expertise of the AFSC and the
NSCGRC, advanced the program’s chances of success.275
Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers explained to the Joint Hearing that various
individuals and groups that aspired to admit Jewish and non-Aryan children under the auspices
of accredited refugee organizations had contacted her to be a co-sponsor of the German Refugee
Children’s Bill. She believed that this venture would draw the support of anyone ingrained with a
sense of humanity. Her decision was bolstered by the involvement of the AFSC, the provisions
that assured careful selection and placement, and the assent of the A.F.L. and C.I.O. 276 Troubling
events within Germany necessitated prioritization of this particular group of children as
compared with other nationalities. Although she was opposed to the disruption of families,
Rogers accepted the realities of the situation.
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However, Roger’s comments deviated from those of Wagner and Dingell. She was
concerned that excessive numbers of children would be admitted at one time. Concentration in
the ports of entry was to be avoided and the children were to be diffused across the nation. If
they became ill-behaved or displayed ingratitude to the democratic country that had provided
sanctuary then, she believed, they must be subject to deportation, but did not specify if this
meant a return to Germany. There was not any rationale for permitting such miscreants to remain
within the United States to create problems or oppose the American system of government.
Citizenship was a right to be earned and Rogers believed that in due course such status was
achievable. Perhaps, of greater significance, she predicted that protections written into the bill
prevented the admission of 20,000, let alone 10,000 children over the course of two years. 277
Clarence Pickett came to the fore during the opening session of the Joint Hearings and
identified himself as the Executive Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee of
Philadelphia and the Acting Director of the Non-Sectarian Committee for German Refugee
Children. He recounted the extensive experience of the Friends in the provision of post-war relief
on the European Continent and his role as eyewitness to Nazi persecution of Jews and nonAryans. The AFSC estimated that 100,000 children were in harm’s way in Germany with an
additional 30,000 within the former Czechoslovakia. Pickett again outlined the key components
of the Wagner-Rogers Bill.278 He asserted that these children were to be carefully chosen in
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anticipation that they would become ideal American citizens and, contrary to Roger’s opinion, he
did not believe that disobedient and unredeemable minors represented a compelling issue. The
planned detailed screening obviated such a occurrences.279 The children, because of their age and
the better-educated background of their families, were expected to be readily “assimilated, cared
for, educated, and made into useful men and women and good Americans.” 280
Pickett countered the allegation that the United States was being flooded by aliens, noting
that 241,962 immigrants had entered while 246,000 left permanently during July 1, 1932 to July
1, 1938. The addition of twenty thousand children offset to a minimal degree a declining national
birthrate. He also contended that the disintegration of refugee families was the inevitable
consequence of German policies that drove parents to suicide or into concentration camps, and
that the bill did not represent an involuntary separation of families or “a case of childrensnatching.”281
Newbold Morris, the treasurer of the NSCGRC, presented the financial arguments. He
cited three primary reasons for the formation of the committee: an expression of tangible support
for the legislation; the fulfillment of all legal, immigration, and financial requirements and
obligations, once the measure was passed, and the assumption of organizational responsibility for
transportation and aftercare. Morris informed the Joint Hearing that 1,500 letters had been
received from 46 states offering free foster homes and he anticipated that this number would
extend into the thousands should the bill come to fruition. The NSCGRC was prepared to
provide funding for placement in foster boarding homes and for any necessary expansion of
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child-welfare or social service staffs. He identified three important reservoirs of financial
support. The first entailed a $250,000 revolving fund derived entirely from private sources.
Second, an emergency account was created to meet unexpected or additional needs. Third, and
perhaps most importantly, he announced that negotiations between George Rublee, the Executive
Director of the London-based Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees, and the
German government had achieved a successful denouement regarding the capitalization of
resettlement. The Reich was prepared, Morris revealed, to provide $120 per child for
transportation costs to America. Unfortunately, despite his assertions to the contrary, such an
accord had never been reached. Its failure reflected internal conflicts over Jewish policy between
the moderate and extreme wings of the Nazi hierarchy.
Representative Charles Kramer (Dem., CA) referenced earlier statements of Secretary
Hull that the admission and processing of refugee children necessitated additional expenses
(personnel, space, and supplies) for the Department, Bureau of Immigration, and consuls. The
Bureau’s Commissioner James L. Houghteling, however, reported that the Immigration Act of
1917 allowed the Department of Labor to admit children younger than sixteen years of age
provided the LPC clause was satisfied; a guarantee that had been offered by the NSCGR. He did
admit, however, that his agency required only the hiring of three to six additional staff
workers.282
D. Robert Yarnell of the Philadelphia Friends testified that he and several other Quakers
had met with Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht and officials of the German Foreign Office
during December 1938. They left with the firm conviction that the Nazi regime was determined
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to continue, with unflinching determination, the maltreatment of Jews and non-Aryans, despite
American abhorrence towards the events of Kristallnacht. The Reich officials declared that the
violence represented a “spontaneous uprising of the [Aryan] people,” 283 and ominously warned
that such outbursts were likely to continue until the “Christian conscience of the world” 284 agreed
to accept this unwanted minority. Crystal Night intensified, Yarnell observed, the desperation of
Christian and Jewish parents to seek evacuation of their children. Failure to provide sanctuary, he
warned, ensured the immediate or near future demise of these children. 285
Samuel McCrea Cavert, the General Secretary of the Federal Churches of Christ in
America, had written to Sen. Wagner expressing his organization’s support; one of the few
Christian church groups to do so. He cited an Executive Committee resolution that trumpeted
efforts to admit refugee children outside of the quota. The unanimity of Protestant clergymen,
Cavert argued, was derived from the shared belief that the effort embodied a pragmatic
exposition of Christian faith and actualized the duty to extricate and care for children caught up
in a frightful maelstrom. America must not, he proclaimed, as it had done at Evian, merely
engage in diplomatic protests, expressions of moral outrage or call upon other countries to act.
Rather, it was a moral imperative for the United States to fulfill its humanitarian obligations. He
concluded that churches ranging across the country were willing to join together during this time
of great peril. 286 Cavert’s position was fortified by fellow clerics, Harry Emerson Fosdick and
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Henry S. Coffin who firmly believed that the majority of the American public endorsed the
German Refugee Children’s Bill. 287
Anson Stokes, Canon of the Washington Cathedral, had been one of the Christian clerics
who visited the White House during January 1939 to discuss the issue of refugee children.
Significantly, but not uniquely, Stokes presented himself not as an official church spokesman but
as an individual offering his personal opinions regarding the Wagner-Rogers Bill. He argued that
four critical questions demanded satisfactory answers before Congress could consider passage.
First, the act needed to mitigate, in a limited manner, a great human need, as one hundred
thousand children were in peril within Nazi Germany. Second, the components of the enactment,
aided by the AFSC and the NSCGRC, must be credible and assured of a high degree of success.
Third, if the children were permitted entry then their care and supervision had to be safeguarded
by eminently reputable and experienced child-welfare workers and organizations. Finally,
admission must not exacerbate unemployment or place an undue strain upon the American
taxpayer. Stokes considered this last eventuality to be unlikely due to the advocacy of the A.F.L.
and C.I.O. and the provision of appropriate financial guarantees. Fulfillment of these stringent
criteria, he proclaimed, demonstrated that the Wagner-Rogers bill was an exemplary plan.
Consequently, he did not conceive of any reasonable objections that could be raised and was
secure in the belief that the country’s churches supported this endeavor that would stimulate the

_________________________________
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America” in April 21, 1939 Joint Hearings, 107-108. The Council was
comprised of 24 nationwide denominations listing a combined membership of 22 million.
287

Letters from Harry Emerson Fosdick and Henry S. Coffin to Sen. Robert Wagner, February 15, 1939, Joint
Hearings, 13. Fosdick presided at the New York City Riverside Church and Coffin at the Union Theological
Seminary.

86

expansion of social welfare assistance to the nation’s disadvantaged while reaffirming American
principles.288
Reverend Carl C. Rasmussen, D.D. of the Luther Place Memorial Church of Washington,
D.C. spoke in favor of ratification. He was the President of the Maryland Synod of the United
Lutheran Church in America, one of the three-major Lutheran groups in the country. He admitted
that he spoke not as a representative of the collective church, which had not staked an official
position on the issue, but rather as a voice for co-religionists who supported the act. Rasmussen
focused attention upon Christian and non-Aryan children, whose parents faced, because of
resistance to Nazi policies, imprisonment in concentration camps or death. Therefore, he
interpreted the immigration exception as a non-sectarian measure. On a broader plane, he argued
that the deteriorating situation of German Jewry was a harbinger, a social canary in the mine of
intolerance that predicted German Catholics and Protestants were to become the next victims of
the Hitlerian regime. 289 His admonition antedated the more famous post-war quotation of the
German Lutheran theologian, Martin Niemöller, who warned that “first [the Nazis] came for the
socialists…”290
Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, the founder of the Free Synagogue of New York City, a major
voice within the American Jewish community, and himself a child immigrant from Hungary,
confronted the conundrum of the need to demonstrate that he was an American first and not an
American Jew who could be accused of divided loyalties. His remarks to the Joint Hearing were
infused with internal conflicts. “No sane person,” he insisted, justified any alteration of the
288
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existing immigration laws.291 The welfare of the nation and its children took precedence over
German refugee children. Speaking as a citizen, and not as a Jew or Rabbi, he proclaimed that
charity began at home and in any conflict of interests the United States must take precedence. If
it was impossible to aid these foreign children, then they could not be helped because no action
should be undertaken inimical to the nation’s interests. He believed that the Congressional
members of the committee shared his view.
Wise then pivoted into the role of a supporter of the Wagner-Rogers Bill. He cited the
large number of American Jews and Christians who voiced their desire to receive a German
refugee child. He described the opponents of the legislation as “folk to whom children are a
nuisance, [and] are strange and alien beings,” 292 but he ardently believed that the United States
was always prepared to help and would, like the United Kingdom and Holland, carry out this
compassionate action. Contradicting his opening comments, the Rabbi avowed that he clearly
recognized the nation was unable to ignore conditions within Nazi Germany or refuse to offer
sanctuary to Hitler’s victims. In his view, America was morally obligated to act but he, like
many, failed to define the parameters of such intervention. Wise described the German
persecutions as a sign of the “rebarbarization of mankind” 293 in which innocents were being
“crucified upon the cross of racial and religious differences [and] political opinion;”294 a
Christian allusion that suggested that German refugee children could be resurrected into a new
life in a democratic and free America. While reaffirming his devotion for his adopted land, the
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cleric insisted that America was bound to extend its “hands to a certain number (which was not
delineated) of these children, to shield, defend, and bless them [within the] radiance of the
freedom from oppression, which is ours.”295 Quoting Psalm 118:19 Wise called upon the nation
to open “the gates of righteousness and freedom and hope [so that] we may enter therein.” 296 He
believed that such a plea would be heard. 297
Jacob Kepecs, a member of the NCCGRC, and a leading expert in the field of childwelfare and placement within foster homes, painted a portrait of the three categories of people
who were motivated to take in foreign children. Childless couples, infused with strong parental
instincts constituted the first group, who were unable to successfully reproduce or adopt an
American orphan due to demand that exceeded supply. These adults regarded alien foster
children as their own. Kepecs anticipated that a sufficient number of homes were available to
accept and provide care for these children.
The second group of prospective parents included those whose children had reached
adulthood. Kepecs speculated that a significant percentage of these mothers needed the presence
of children to fulfill a utilitarian function; the instilment of a sense of purpose and to have
something to occupy their time. These women, he believed, preferred to function primarily
within the domestic sphere and had filed at least one hundred applications for refugee children.
He predicted that this number would grow appreciably if Congress successfully passed the bill.
A family that already possessed one to two children but sought to add more to the household
constituted the third group. As with the second cohort of parents, the mothers did not seek
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outside employment, but needed to be engaged in some activity. The refugee children would be
accepted if a reasonable rate of payment was offered that compensated for the costs of
maintaining each child. Therefore, according to Kepec’s analysis, each cluster of prospective
foster parents was driven by different goals or endpoints that superceded pure humanitarianism,
although this charitable act was strongly emphasized by the bill’s proponents as a fundamental
rationale for its adoption. 298
New York Post foreign correspondent Dorothy Thompson’s testimony mirrored many of
her earlier concerns that influenced the formation of the Evian Conference. Continued forced
mass migration, of which twenty thousand German refugee children represented a small fraction,
posed a fundamental threat to democratic nations and its institutions. The Wagner-Rogers Bill
represented a minor but reasonable expression of humanitarianism and moral justice that
inevitably benefited the nation. Failure to adopt this measure, Thompson warned, provided
negative imagery that defamed American values. She reiterated a litany of the guarantees
embodied within the legislation and reaffirmed that the demand for adoptions significantly
eclipsed the supply. 299
Alf Landon sent a letter of support to Clarence Pickett, which was submitted to the
immigration hearings. His backing was qualified, however, as he believed that the maximum age
of the refugee children should have been markedly lowered. Landon warned there was a danger
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that pressure would be exerted upon Congress to admit the parents of these children; a
circumstance that “create[d] another heart-rending situation.”300
Although humanitarian considerations induced A.F.L. President William Green and
C.I.O. President John L. Lewis to endorse the bill, they opposed any move to alter the restrictive
terms of the National Origins Act. Green recognized that the proposal was a one-time limited
exception to existing laws.301 Thus, he believed the union’s executive council was supportive of
the plan as it did not involve the admission of alien adults.302 Joseph A. Padway, attorney for the
A.F.L., represented Green before the Joint Hearing and reiterated his approbation of the
legislation. The union continued its long-standing resistance to immigration but the altruistic
nature of the Wagner-Rogers Bill superceded such concerns.303 Padway presented a missive
written on union letterhead that Green had sent to Senator Wagner on the first day of the
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hearings. While Green indicated that he viewed the project with compassion, he carefully noted
that he was speaking as an individual and not as the president of the A.F.L. since the
organization as a whole had not taken an affirmative stance on the bill. He was certain, however,
that its leadership and rank and file shared his sympathy and favorable mindset, particularly
since the immigration system remained intact. 304
Recalling Roosevelt’s April 1938 announcement of his call for an international refugee
conference, Green asserted that America was acting in harmony with its historic role as an
asylum for the victims of political and religious persecution. He had long been engaged with the
Jewish Question and was a member of 125 leading American signatories to an April petition that
urged foreign nations to participate in the nascent Evian conclave. 305 The labor leader also
endorsed the application of pressure upon Great Britain to satisfy the terms of the 1917 Balfour
Declaration that called for the establishment of a Jewish National Homeland within the Palestine
Mandate.306 The closure of the Golden Gates to German and Austrian refugees was antithetical
to time-honored principles, but he agreed with Cordell Hull that the country was unable to accept
more aliens than provided for by existing immigration statutes.307 Thus, his personal position on
the issue of refugee children was consistent with his view of America’s role in the world, but his
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official position as the president of a major labor union opposed any adjustments of the current
quota system.
The extremity of the situation was illustrated by the events of Kristallnacht, which
evoked within Green a profound feeling of horror and abomination. He offered, on behalf of the
A.F.L. membership, an emphatic protest against Nazi savagery. 308 Green appealed to all
“national and international unions, State Federations of Labor, central labor unions and directly
affiliated local unions”309 to conjoin protest with meaningful action by reinvigorating the
Federation’s five-year economic boycott against the Reich; an act that articulated American
workers’ rejection of its inhumane treatment of the Jewish minority. 310 He affirmed the support
of the A.F.L. for any practicable project of refugee resettlement, not as a form of largesse but as
practical sign of social conscience.311
Green’s assumption of the role of an individual testifying before the Joint Hearings, and
not as the president of one of the preeminent labor unions, diminished the power and impact of
his promulgations on Germany, Roosevelt, Congress, and the American public. This polarity of
identities undermined the affirmations of various witnesses that the American Federation of
Labor had, as a unified body, expressed its advocacy for the Wagner-Rogers Bill. The economic
boycott of Nazi Germany was the unambiguous sanction employed by organized labor against
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persecution of minorities. Labor unions had finite influence upon dictatorial regimes, but the
embargo against German goods was regarded as a legitimate and potentially compelling form of
protest. More importantly, it did not impinge upon the collective interests of labor in a
compromised American economy. The union leadership had to remain cognizant that the
organization was not only a special interest group, but also one composed of individuals who
could be condemnatory of German inhumane practices while simultaneously harboring personal
anti-Semitic beliefs.
Despite President Green’s individual opinion regarding the Wagner-Rogers Bill, the
A.F.L. conventions, witnesses testifying before Congressional committees, and its official paper,
the American Federationist, spoke with unanimity against modification of the quota system,
irrespective of the degree to which the union identified with Hitler’s victims. These sentiments
conformed to the unions’ traditional resistance to the importation of competing foreign labor and
its support of the National Origins Act. A resolution was submitted during the 1935 Illinois
Federation of Labor convention that reaffirmed the traditional American role of providing
sanctuary. However, the resolutions committee voted it down. Similarly, from February 1936
through November 1938 various labor representatives testified in Congress in favor of marked
reductions or complete cessation of immigration. The high level of domestic unemployment
provided justification for this stance. 312
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John Brophy, Director of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, on the other hand,
announced before the Joint Hearing that the union’s four million strong membership collectively
endorsed Senate Joint Resolution 64 and House Joint Resolution 168 as a symbol of a shared
humanity and collective protest against Nazi policies. He read a statement from President John L.
Lewis that called upon the United States to do its share in accepting German refugee children
and indicated that he was enthusiastically in favor of any reasonable project that accomplished
this goal.313 He linked attacks on Jews and non-Aryans with assaults on German free labor,
supported the economic boycott, and upheld the privilege of asylum.314
Mrs. Gertrude Foltz Zimand, a spokesperson for the Executive Committee of the National
Child Labor Committee, challenged the arguments of the bill’s opponents that a singular
adjustment of the immigration quota adversely impacted domestic employment. She noted that
the refugee children ranged in age from 6 to 14 years of age. Properly selected and accredited
child-welfare agencies were charged with their close supervision until they reached the age of
majority or, if the situation within Germany permitted, returned to their country of origin. Each
minor was to be placed in school as long as necessary.
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Under accepted guidelines a child was excluded from the labor pool until eighteen years
of age. Enrollment in college, trade, or technical schools delayed this process until ages 20-21.
Consequently, a minimum of four years elapsed before any refugee child could seek
employment. If age range was factored into this labor equation a period of 15 years, from 1943
to 1958, would transpire before the entirety of the group entered the work force. This translated
into an average of 1,500 per year. She cited the Unemployment Census of 1937, which estimated
that the number of unemployed 16-24 years olds was approximately 6.5 million. This figure
included both genders and those that were completely or partially unemployed or engaged in
emergency projects but seeking permanent positions. The accession of 1,500 refugee children
into the labor pool represented “only one additional youth per year for every 4,500-unemployed
youth—an almost negligible increase.” 315
Reed Lewis, Director of the Foreign Language Information Service, highlighted one of
the prime but more covert arguments of the opposition: The inordinate admission of excessive
numbers of Jews that surpassed other nationalities, and that the nation must place limits on
Jewish immigration. He admitted that this allegation resonated widely, influenced many
considering the virtues of the legislation, and infused the discourse with emotions rather than
rationale reasoning. As a result, it became increasingly difficult to provide an adequate response.
He noted that Jewish-Americans represented approximately 3.4-4.0 million people of the entire
national population and argued that even if the vast majority of the 20,000 German refugee
children were Jewish it would have minimal impact upon the Christian majority. The number of
Jews in the United States had increased by only 282,000 over the previous 10 years. Lewis
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observed that “most of us cannot tell who is a Jew and who is not…”316 despite the opinions of
the unenlightened. Overtime, he believed, some of these refugee children would provide a major
contribution to the country that benefited all citizens. Antipathy to this immigration bill based on
the number of Jews admitted, he insisted, was un-American and ran contrary to the core of the
nation’s value system. 317
Former Wisconsin Governor Philip LaFollette argued that the controversy of offering
refuge to German refugee children transcended religious persuasions. He was asked by Senator
William H. King (Dem., Utah) if the “reported horrors in Europe were overestimated.” 318
LaFollette insisted, based on his recent travels within the Reich, that the magnitude of these
stories was grossly underrated. It was erroneous to conceive of this problem simply as an issue
affecting Jews and Christians. Rather, its impact and implications afflicted the population as a
whole.319
Helen Taft Manning, the Dean of Byrn Mawr College and the daughter of former
President William Howard Taft, was one of the more pre-eminent figures selected by Pickett to
appear before the Joint Hearings. She presented two contrasting views of immigration. While
speaking before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on the issue of amending the Neutrality
Act, Manning described herself as a vehement isolationist who accused the Roosevelt
administration of pursuing an “unneutral national policy” of “bullying tactics” 320 that risked
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dangerous entanglements within European Continental affairs. She argued that the United States
could do little to counter the abhorrent actions of dictatorial regimes and cautioned that
liberalization of the quota system threatened domestic employment. The admission of German
refugee children, however, was a different matter as it satisfied the demands of charity while
emulating the actions of the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and France. Additionally, it
supplied a pool of children who, Manning believed, would evolve into useful and productive
American citizens. 321
Douglas Carroll was the Dean of the School of Commerce of the University of North
Carolina who also addressed the Joint Hearing as an individual, invested in the role of an
educator and businessman. Although he cited some of the oft-mentioned guarantees of the
Wagner-Rogers Bill he contended that the infusion of young foreign refugees into the South
represented a boon for the region that counteracted, to a degree, the diversion of earlier waves of
European immigrants from Southern states to other parts of the nation. Carroll believed, but
advanced only anecdotal comments, that Southerners ardently approved the legislation, an
opinion countered by opposition witnesses. Perhaps the most telling moment of his appearance
was the ominous question posed by Congressman Charles Kramer of California: Should the
20,000 children be deducted from the annual 27,370 allotments granted to Germany and Austria?
Carroll did not believe that such a reduction should occur, but the echoes of this inquiry
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reverberated throughout the many presentations inimical towards any modification of the
existing immigration laws.322
A number of celebrities and popular figures testified before the Joint Hearings. The
actress Helen Hayes, presenting herself Mrs. Charles MacArthur, claimed that her role as an
“American mother”323 qualified her to bear witness. Although she spoke as an individual, she
believed that her words reflected the sentiments of other mothers who had both natural and
adopted children. The Wagner-Rogers Bill served as a moral precept to her own children as she
strove to raise them free of racial bigotry. The lessons learned were fostered by actions rather
than insignificant words. Passage of the bill would demonstrate to her children that the United
States had disavowed racial bigotry, violence, and persecution. Hayes observed that the state of
affairs of German Jewish and non-Aryan children was apparent to the young members of her
family who were old enough to comprehend the newspapers. She was unable to understand how
the country could not follow the lead of European nations in rescue operations. The fact that
parents were seeking their child’s resettlement abroad, with its potentially permanent separation,
provided the “most moving evidence of the immediate need of those little children. I beg of you
to let them in.”324 Hayes commented at a meeting of the New York City Conference on the
Émigré and the Community that she had received numerous acrimonious letters challenging the
plan following her Congressional testimony. She attributed this attitude to an arrogant sense of
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self-righteousness coupled with a “willful misunderstanding of realities that disturb[ed] their
peace of mind.”325
The proponents of the Wagner-Rogers Bill concluded their testimonies before the Joint
Hearing on April 22. Clarence E. Pickett, returned as the penultimate witness before the
committee and reiterated, via the insertion into the Congressional Record of letters received from
notables across the country, the litany of rationales for the adoption of the immigration measure,
and its inherent guarantees. Review of these correspondences demonstrated broad and
unanimous support from labor unions such as the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union
(ILGWU) and the Charleston, South Carolina chapter of the United Miners Union. 326
Individual espousals of support were submitted as well but in the overall scheme these
letters were, perhaps, counterproductive, in that they indirectly highlighted the absence of the
backing of larger groups or organizations to which the writers belonged. The President of the
Northampton, Massachusetts-based Smith College, W.C. Nelson; Robert M. Hutchins, the
President of the University of Chicago, and Ray Lyman Wilbur, President of Stanford
University, collectively praised the goals and mechanisms of the Wagner-Rogers Bill but did not
acknowledge any support from their Boards of Trustees, Faculty, or Alumni Associations.
Almon R. Pepper, the Executive Secretary of the Department of Christian Social Relations of the
National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church, offered his singular and unofficial
endorsement. Finally, James E. West, Chief Scout Executive of the Boy Scouts of America,
325
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similarly attested to his advocacy of the Wagner-Rogers Bill, but carefully indicated that his
organization had not adopted a positive stance. He claimed that his personal motivation stemmed
from the 1909 White House Conference on the Care of Dependent Children and as an orphan he
felt a special accountability and connection to the German refugee children.
On a higher plane, however, Pickett declared that the lives and vitality of Americans were
deeply intertwined with the fate of the refugee bill. Communal failure to confront such suffering,
he admonished, stripped the country of “one of the richest and greatest privileges” 327 endowed to
the people of an independent nation: the right to religious and racial freedom. Pickett argued that
the admission of German refugee children was a reaffirmation of that principle and the longstanding practice of offering haven, rescue, and the chance for a new life.328
Senator Wagner opened and now closed the pro-bill presentations. He emphasized, the
involvement of Clarence E. Pickett, the American Friends Service Committee, and the
membership of the Non-Sectarian Committee for German Refugee Children, who engaged with
Dr. Marion Kenworthy and other notable experts in the field of child-welfare and care. This
relationship provided the construct with increased credibility. In addition, children were
positioned not as competitors for jobs, but as consumers who could stimulate the economy and
employment. Wagner also inserted into the Congressional Record a last-minute flurry of letters
that represented a cross-section of pro-bill advocates. The majority of these communications
expressed personal endorsements of the bill but few provided collective approval. Various
clergymen from Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Episcopal Churches offered their
individual support but did not speak in the name of their respective denominations. The faculty
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of Wellesley College regarded the young émigrés as the bearers of a “rich cultural heritage” 329
that would augment the intellectual and social milieu of subsequent generations. Lewis Merrill,
General President of the 46,000-member United Office and Professional Workers of America,
declared his union’s support for the Wagner-Rogers Bill; a beneficent act that adhered to the best
of established American values. Samuel Levine, the Manager of the Chicago Joint Board of the
thirty thousand member Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, proclaimed its approval of
a charitable deed that emulated the Kindertransport. The Jewish profile among these letter
writers was negligible to non-existent. This omission may have represented a purposeful strategy
to minimize the Jewish background of the majority of the refugee children and to lower the
Jewish community’s profile in the campaign to win passage of the immigration legislation. 330
Analysis of these witnesses’ testimonies demonstrates a uniform adherence to the tenets
and terms of the Wagner-Rogers Bill. The text of S.J. Res. 64 and the H.J. Joint Resolution
placed stipulations on the age-range and number of children to be admitted, imposed financial
and child-care guarantees, and work restrictions. Assurances were given that existing
immigration laws were to remain unchanged outside of this one-time exception. and strict
adherence to entry physical and mental standards would be maintained. Continued under filling
of the yearly quota coupled with a net loss of immigrants countered the charges that the country
was being flooded with refugees. The ultimate power to grant admission remained within the
purview of American consuls. It was repeatedly recognized that the fracturing families was
accelerating and that an increasing number of natural parents pursued the potentially permanent
evacuation of their offspring. The bill was not promoted as a Jewish rescue plan, but one that
329
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benefited both Jews and non-Aryans. Wagner framed the legislation as a moral response to the
events of Kristallnacht that was consonant with American traditional values, its longstanding
role as sanctuary, and as a concrete expression that the United States was attempting to do its
share in abetting a growing problem. The children selected for admission were regarded as
highly desirable for a nation whose birth rate was declining and in need of future productive and
loyal citizens. Supporters noted that foster homes were readily available and did not detract from
domestic adoptions due to the disparity between demand and supply. The requirements of the
nation’s needy children were not to be diminished.
The discourse between the adherents of the legislation and their Congressional
interrogators revealed undercurrents that threatened the approval of the Wagner-Rogers Bill.
Rep. Charles Kramer repeatedly returned to a critical question: should ten thousand refugee
children per year be deducted from the annual quota? Although discounted by members of the
committee, Representative Rogers, co-sponsor of the bill, readily stated that any refugee child
who was disruptive or unappreciative of their admission into the United States should and would
be deported. The nationally influential Rabbi Stephen S. Wise offered conflicted declarations to
the Joint Hearing that reflected the dilemma faced by many Jews in the United States: the
imperative to avoid any appearance of split loyalties and the need to be considered as an
American citizen rather than as an American Jew. Consequently, the verbal footprint of the
purported Jewish leadership within the country and its diverse Jewish community remained
conspicuously small. By design the case for rescuing German refugee children essentially
remained within the hands of its Gentile promulgators. British Jewish were compelled to follow
a similar strategy during the Kindertransport campaign. Although they had played a key role in
the initiation and development of this plan, it was recognized that Christian Britons harboring
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anti-Semitic sentiments would reject the immigration program if it was perceived as primarily
benefiting Jews. Therefore, it became necessary for Anglo-Jewry to assume an inconspicuous
presence.
The anti-Wagner-Rogers Bill constituency called for benevolence at home and asserted
the primacy of American citizenship. Their arguments were arrayed across a landscape that was
marked by a belief in a particular form of Americanism, burgeoning isolationism, fear of aliens
and foreign ideologies, and anti-Jewish prejudice. The oppositional speakers presented
arguments that were, in many cases, the direct antithesis of those offered by the legislation’s
proponents, but were further shaped by new arenas of contention. The warning signs of failure
that were becoming apparent during the initial phase of the hearings gained increasing
momentum and greater form as time passed.
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CHAPTER 6:
OPPONENTS
“The poorer and therefore more burdensome the immigrating Jews is to the country absorbing
him, the stronger the country will react.” 331
“The influx of Jews in all parts of the world invokes the opposition of the native population and
thereby forms the best propaganda for the German Jewish policy” 332

The adversarial phase of the Joint Hearings in many respects mirrored the arguments
presented by those that favored its enactment. Observers of the proceedings and readers of the
transcripts reported by the press witnessed two opposing sides that viewed the same details while
reaching diametrically opposite interpretations. Assurances provided by child-welfare experts
and the reputation of prominent supporters did little to assuage the fears of those who regarded
aliens and any modification of the quota system as a threat to the nation. This stage of the
committee’s work was also invested with more overt taints of prejudice towards immigrants in
general and Jews in particular. Unlike Wilbur LaRoe who functioned as floor manager for the
NSCGRC’s carefully selected presentations, there was an apparent absence of an overriding
authority that was selecting adversarial witnesses. As a result, some of the counter-arguments
seemed haphazard, although highly organized immigration restrictionist and nationalist
331
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coalitions operated within a more regularized landscape. 333 Nevertheless, their collective
criticisms resonated with diverse members of Congress and the public at large and significantly
reduced the likelihood of passage of the German Children’s Refugee Bill.
Mrs. (Sara Hawks) Edward B. Huling of Larchmont, NY, who described herself as the
representative of the Manhattan-based Board of Directors of the Allied Patriotic Societies (APS),
unofficially initiated the anti-bill phase of the Joint Hearings.334 She appeared to be a rather
impromptu and self-selected witness who interjected herself into the midst of proponent
presentations, and claimed to have only recently heard of the convening of the committee.
Huling admitted that she was unaware of the bill’s guarantees. She quoted the President’s
declaration that one-third of the nation’s children were “ill-fed, ill-clothed, [and] ill-housed”335
and insisted that America was incapable of functioning in the role of “Santa Clause when our
own people are starving.”336 She predicted that refugee children would aggravate unemployment,
strain social services and resources that rightfully belonged to underprivileged American
children, lessen the prospects of adoption, and further inundate the country with undesirable
European immigrants. 337 Huling doubted members of Congress were cognizant of the total
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number of foreigners that had entered the country to date, and cited the claim of John Cissel, the
chairman of the National Committee on Immigration, who declared that every passenger ship
arriving in the Port of New York City was transporting 550 refugees. 338
This purported spokesperson for the APC suggested the admission of German refugee
children, separated from parents, subjected them to great adversity; an argument that resonated
throughout this phase of the hearings. When pressed by Representative Caroline O’Day, who
observed that many had been involuntarily parted from fathers and mothers who may already be
dead, imprisoned or exiled, Hurling harkened back to the unemployment thesis, particularly
emphasizing the joblessness of American youth. Michigan Democratic Congressman John
Lesinski alleged that the Patriotic Societies were seeking a singular goal: an absolute and
irremediable resistance to any modification of existing immigration law, no matter how limited
its scope. Huling attempted to temper this allegation of ideological rigidity by insisting that the
“100 per cent Americans”339 of these associations were unanimous in their animus towards any
bill that did not benefit the United States. 340

_________________________________
Appendix, April 27, 1939, “Admission of Refugee Children,” 76th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 84, part 12, 1722-1723. The
phrase “ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed,” was frequently employed by FDR and reported in a number of news stories,
such as Dorothy Thompson’s November 2, 1937 column, “On the Record,” in which she referred to the President’s
comments during a press conference held on October 29, 1937. It also was a favored slogan utilized by a variety of
politicians, members of the public, and media writers.
338

The National Committee on Immigration had long supported immigration restriction. The Committee was
connected to the Junior Order of United American Mechanics, a nationalist patriotic society that came to favor a
total ban on immigration due to the “great danger” that the nation faced due to “unrestricted immigration.” The
Wilmington Journal (Wilmington, OH), December 13, 1905, 5; The Baltimore Sun, February 7, 1907, 7.
339

“Statement of Mrs. Edward B. Huling” cited in April 20, 1939, Joint Hearings, 85.

340

Ibid., 82-85.

107

Read Lewis, Director of the Foreign Language Service, disputed, although not by name,
the claims made by Huling regarding the numbers of immigrants entering the United States. 341
He had, according to Pickett’s assistant, Agnes King Inglis, canvassed every member of the
House and Senate but was disheartened by the plethora of unfavorable responses. 342 Lewis
emphatically argued that it was the adverse economic and social conditions precipitated by the
1931-1938 years of the Depression that provoked a net loss of immigrants. 374,767 had entered
but 411,626 permanently departed, resulting in a deficit of 36,859. The German refugees
totaling 45,952 admitted during July 1, 1932 to June 30, 1938, compensated for the number
leaving the country. He also challenged Huling’s assertion that 550 refugees arrived on every
passenger ship docking in the port of New York City. The annual combined quota for Germany
and Austria, if completely filled, amounted to 27,370, which translated to 500 arriving each
week. The entire yearly quota of 150,000, he insisted, was under filled, with only 15 percent of
the slots having been granted.343
Mrs. Benjamin Franklin Soffee, the official advocate of Michigan-based proponents of
the legislation, also impugned Huling’s opinions regarding the effects of familial separation. The
dangers of remaining within the Reich clearly outweighed the vicissitudes engendered by the
parting of the ways. She quoted a letter from a German mother that was paradigmatic of the
primal dilemma confronting persecuted parents: “Conditions are so dreadful” that only
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resettlement in a democratic land offered the possibility of a future life. “As for ourselves,” the
beleaguered mother somberly observed, only one avenue lay open: “suicide.” 344
Francis H. Kinnicutt was the formal opening speaker in the dissentient chapter of the
Joint Hearings. His arguments were formulaic and, with few exceptions, were reiterated by
subsequent witnesses. He identified himself as the President of the Allied Patriotic Societies and
enumerated its multifaceted goals. 345 The organization’s strength was centered within New
Jersey and the City of New York and functioned as an umbrella organization and informational
clearinghouse for its membership. One representative from each constituent society served on the
conglomerate’s board of directors. 346 Kinnicutt, a Harvard University educated attorney,
delivered many speeches for the APC between 1920 and 1931 that promoted stringent
immigration restrictions and adoption of the National Origins Act of 1924. 347 This legislation, he
declared, expressed the right of a nation to perpetuate the uniformity of its population by
preventing mass immigration. 348 His efforts accelerated in 1926 when Congress was considering
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the admission of familial relations of assimilated aliens. He assumed the presidency of the antiCommunist national association in 1929 until his death in July 1939.349
Kinnicutt disclosed that he had been directed by his Board to present the rationale for the
groups’ objections to the Wagner-Rogers Bill. He referenced a February 15, 1939 Board
resolution that was inimical to Senate and House Joint Resolution. It declared that all social and
welfare agencies were unanimous in their conviction that the integrity of the family unit must be
protected. In addition, the bill failed to provide sufficient monetary guarantees that the LPC
clause requirements were satisfied. Refugee children were future competitors for jobs that
rightfully belonged to Americans younger than twenty-five years of age and he predicted that the
entry of these children would inevitably lead to calls for the admission of parents and siblings
outside of the quota.
The APC’s president insisted that the proposed Wagner-Rogers legislation breached a
fundamental principle by awarding an unjustified and disproportionate percentage of the annual
quota to “one European state…to the prejudice of all others.”350 He argued that such a decision
must be subjected to public debate if action on the bill appeared to be progressing in a positive
direction. Similarly, Kinnicutt argued that the measure was at its heart not a rescue plan, as it was
not exclusively applicable to German children alone. Rather, any child currently residing within
or who had once lived in the Reich over the previous six years was eligible for consideration. As
a result, the German Refugee Children’s Bill violated the public trust and a core tenet of the
quota system that apportioned a legally mandated number of visas to each nation. Abrogation of
this principle seriously breached the principle of restriction, which had garnered the majority
349
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support of the two leading political parties and the American people. Therefore, he concluded,
that twenty thousand children could be derived from either Jewish or National Socialist families
and from any nationality or racial group. The net result was an augmentation of the annual
combined German and Austrian quota of 27,370, although he accepted that data provided by the
Bureau of Immigration that demonstrated a chronic under filling of this yearly allowance.351
Finally, he addressed the axiological objection of the APC to the legislation: “Strictly speaking,
it is not a refugee bill at all, for by the nature of the case, most of those to be admitted would be
of the Jewish race.”352
Kinnicutt alleged that the Wagner-Rogers Bill was another in a line of immigration
legislation that sought to fling open the borders that, if successful, ensured the total collapse of
the highly selective entry system. Resistance to these attempts, he believed, challenged the longstanding and widely accepted tenet that reception of persecuted refugees reflected American
conventions and practices. He argued that if such a paradigm were true then logic required the
country to admit millions from Europe and Asia. However, since the enactment of the
Immigration Act of 1921 there had not been any liberal immigration bills successfully signed
into law.353
Kinnicutt concluded his presentation by emphasizing the central objections of the
American Patriotic Society to the Wagner-Rogers Bill. Immigrants, whether child or adult,
351
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threatened the employment of American born and naturalized citizens. Any abrogation of the
quota system risked inundation by the unwanted of Europe. The balanced principles that guided
the allotment system were under attack by domestic and foreign sources. The nation no longer
required cheap sources of labor for the development of the country. He did not refer to the needy
children of the United States as they were not a specific concern of the APC. Rather, its primary
purpose was the promotion and enactment of stricter immigration policies; an action that was
critically needed in the country. 354
Attorney John B. Trevor, Sr., one of the leading protagonists in the anti-immigration
debate, appeared frequently before Congressional Committees where he was described as the
paramount lobbyist for restriction.” Trevor, in concert with the APS and leading members of the
eugenics movement, that included Madison Grant, Charles Stewart Davidson, and Harry H.
Laughlin, rendered key roles in the formulation and passage of the National Origins Act of
1924.355 His perceived antipathy towards the admission of aliens led Louis Adamic, a prominent
Slovene-American author and advocate for greater ethnic diversity, to declare that “if a man’s
love for his country [was] measurable by his detestation of all who have had the bad taste to be
born elsewhere, [then] there probably [was] no greater patriot in America today.” 356
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Trevor served as the director of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies (ACPS); an
umbrella association that coalesced 155 fraternal, civic, and patriotic organizations that boasted a
collective membership of 2.5 million. He submitted to the Joint Hearing a resolution, adopted
during its January 24, 1939 annual convention that called for a ten-year ban on immigration to
allow for economic recovery, a 90 percent permanent reduction of alien admissions, and the
abolishment of visitors’ visas. 357 Trevor claimed that the vast majority of American citizens
opposed the transformation of the United States into an “orphan society” 358 that provided care for
destitute child refugees.359
The former MID operative described a frequently cited March 1939 Fortune magazine
opinion poll that asked whether the quota system should be modified in view of contemporary
European events. Eighty-three percent were against, 8.3 percent did not have an opinion, and 8.7
percent favored admission outside of the quota. This represented a marked increase of 67.4
percent in the level of opposition compared to a July 1938 Fortune poll. The publication claimed
that the survey’s purpose was to test the validity of a commonly held belief that American
tradition favored the granting of sanctuary to the persecuted of the world. The pollsters
concluded that the majority of those questioned endorsed immigration restriction by a margin of
10:1. This degree of resistance, they deduced, signified a resolution to the question of
liberalization of immigration policies. The findings highlighted the discordance between the

357
“Statement of John B. Trevor, Representing the American Coalition” in April 24, 1939 Joint Hearings, 215;
Wyman, Paper Walls, 85-86.
358

Washington Post April 25, 1939, 7.

359

Ibid.

113

expression of popular benevolence and a willingness to accept distressed minorities. 360
Congressman Anton Frank Maciejewski (Dem., IL) contested the Fortune magazine’s
conclusion by noting that he had received 260 letters of support during one hearing day.
Representative Charles Kramer (Dem., CA) likewise recounted similar messages and observed
that the majority of writers who opposed the Wagner-Rogers Bill complained of its preferential
treatment of German and Austrian children. Representative Noah M. Mason responded that
supporters of the measure recognized the move as a one-time exception to a quota system that
was otherwise inviolable. Trevor agreed that the question of immigration remained unresolved as
measured by the activities of supporting organizations and statements of certain members of
Congress. Nevertheless, he believed that the matter of German refugee children was subsumed
within the broader issue of the admission of all refugees.361
The dissidence between professions of compassion and the disposition to provide refuge
was further illustrated by an earlier Gallup poll, which noted that while 94 percent and 97
percent criticized the Nazi treatment of Jews and Catholics respectively, moral condemnation did
not translate into a readiness to accept the victims of increasingly violent discrimination. 362 A
Gallup Poll taken during January 1939 observed that 61 percent of American voters favored

360
Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Poll Reveals Majority Here Would Bar Doors to Refugees: View on Jews Held
Static,” March 27, 1939. A Fortune poll was conducted in April 1939 to assess the degree of domestic anti-Semitism
and public opinions of Jews. It concluded that a multiplicity of forms of anti-Jewish hatred existed in the United
States. The New Republic, April 19, 1939, 293-294. Fortune magazine, a publication of Henry Luce and an offshoot
of the business section of Time, employed the pollster Elmo Roper to conduct the “Fortune Survey” that sought to
challenge the dominance of the Gallup Poll. Fortune expanded its reporting horizon from the realm of business and
finance to international affairs, particularly dealing with the rise of Nazism, Fascism, and Japanese imperialism.
Kevin S. Reilly, “Fortune Magazine,” in Robert E. Weir, ed., Class in America: An Encyclopedia, 3 volumes,
(Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 2007), 272.
361

“Statement of John Trevor,” Joint Hearings, 215.

“Voyage to Doom” Arthur D. Morse Heritage Vision, http://paperpen.com/heritage/350/look/look2.htm;
Internet; accessed February 17, 2008.
362

114

imposition of an economic boycott of Nazi Germany as a form of protest. A majority had
adopted a dispassionate stance towards the Reich until the dramatic events of the Anschluss on
March 12, 1938 when 62 percent believed that war with Germany was an inevitability. However,
despite feelings of sympathy or antipathy a majority of the public remained resistant towards any
modification of the quota system. 363
The collection of polling data, subjected to detailed statistical analysis, was a relatively
new science during the 1930s. George Gallup established the American Institute of Public
Opinion in 1935 (Gallup Poll), which were published on the date data was disseminated to
subscribing papers. Elmo Roper founded Elmo Roper, Inc. in the same year, and conducted
surveys for Fortune Magazine. The polling information became available when a particular issue
of the periodical was printed. 364 Both companies sought to obtain a representative sampling of
the voting public based upon a variety of variables: economic status, employment, membership
in the A.F.L. and C.I.O., educational level, age, political party affiliation, size of towns or cities,
rural or urban areas, region of the country, and timing in relation to specific events. Questions
posed were frequently repeated with alternative language. Panels, constructed of smaller sizes,
periodically would re-interview the same individuals and were regarded as being as statistically
reliable as large cohort sizes. 365
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However, it was noted that the polling process was imbued with intrinsic problems that
potentially impacted the interviews and analysis: the wording of questions and its interpretation;
the inquisitor and subject’s knowledge and understanding of the topic under consideration; the
bias and political views of those conducting the encounter; potential of pressuring the
interviewee for answers; the tone and inflection of the questioner, and if the conversations were
held in private or in the presence of onlookers. Nonetheless, it was believed that the process
possessed sufficient authority to reflect broad and meaningful popular opinions. 366
Trevor warned that the native-borne child must inevitably submit to the foreign-born due to
the power of their “race affinity.” 367 The Nation concluded that Trevor tapped into domestic antiSemitic currents. While overt expressions of such rhetoric had not arisen during the course of the
Joint Hearings there was a nuanced and effectual argument being made that the Bill was at its
heart a Jewish measure designed to benefit Jewish children who would represent the bulk, or the
entirety of the German refugees admitted outside of the quota. 368
Margaret Hopkins Worrell, the National Legislative Chairman of the Ladies of the Grand
Army of the Republic, expanded upon this belief. After acknowledging the usual objections, she
declared that these alien Jewish children viewed life and the world differently than the typical
American. Rep. Kramer reminded her that the bill included both Jews and non-Aryan Christians.
Worrell insisted that German Jews were the only group that was subjected to persecution within
the Reich but was again corrected by Kramer who replied that Catholics as well as Lutherans
_________________________________
and Independent. Employment was broken down into executives, factory labor, unemployed and “prosperous” and
“poor.”
366

James Wechsler, “Interviews and Interviewers,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 4, no. 2 (June 1940): 258-260.

367

“Statement of John Trevor,” Joint Hearings, 223.

368

The Nation, “Wagner-Rogers Bill: Editorial,” July 1, 1939, 148, 3.

116

were targeted as well. She admitted that she may have misspoken but insisted that the lower age
limit be reduced to four years in order to ease their Americanization. 369
John Thomas Taylor, a long-time lobbyist for the American Legion, recounted a resolution
adopted by the organization that opposed any immigration adjustments or the acceptance of
religious and political refugees. The Legion asserted that admission of these aliens posed an
internal threat to the nation and existing entrance barriers. Although the American public, and
particularly the clergy and the bill’s proponents, expressed sympathy for the sufferers of
oppression, it was alleged that such sentiments violated their primary duty towards the needy
American child. The Legion felt morally bound to aid the unemployed by seeking a ten-year
moratorium on immigration. Taylor raised the oft-repeated objections regarding entry of German
refugee children but significantly he introduced two new rationales for the group’s
obstructiveness: If conditions within the Reich were so dire then these immigrants must be
prioritized within the annual quota. He also anticipated that children received by the United
Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Belgium were ultimately to be transferred to the United States
with guarantees of permanent residency. 370
A letter from J.E. Nieman, Educational Director of the Regular Veterans Association, to
Senator King, was introduced into the Congressional Record. The Regulars were, according to
Nieman, obstinately and fiercely opposed to the Wagner-Rogers Bill or any similar pieces of
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legislation. Their resistance stemmed from two major sources. First, the granting of permanent
residency was regarded as a frontal assault upon America’s national-defense. The refugees were,
he argued, proponents of anti-democratic ideologies that would be disseminated across the
country via schools, churches, mass media, and transportation. Feelings of abandonment by the
government they had once served on the battlefield provided a second line of disaffection. The
Regular veterans denounced Roosevelt and the Congress for the appropriation of billions of
dollars to rebuild the nation’s military and infrastructure while continuing to pay the armed
forces low wages. Nieman claimed that FDR opposed military pay raises because it diverted
funds from unemployment relief. He noted that disabled veterans were paid meager pensions far
below the amount authorized by Congress, threatening themselves and their families with
poverty. Governmental support of aliens and their offspring through welfare and employment in
the Works Progress, Public Works, and Youth Administration, and other official bodies, was
regarded as a form of administrative discrimination against loyal Americans. Fears were
widespread among the active duty community that upon discharge from military service they
would enter the ranks of the unemployed and be unable to provide for their families. Although
the Association was sympathetic to the plight of beleaguered foreigners, Nieman argued that five
million Regulars believed that the needs of America and of Americans took precedence. The
issue of twenty thousand refugee children was merely a small side issue to the group’s
membership.371
Herman A. Miller, the National Secretary of the Patriotic Order of the Sons of America,
presented counter-arguments against the bill. Representative Noah Mason asked if Miller’s
371
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organization was willing to charge the German refugee children against unused quota slots from
previous years. Immigration Commissioner Houghteling stated that for the previous six to eight
years approximately 80 percent of the total European quota remained unused. Consequently,
Mason asserted that if the refugee children were deducted from the German quota for a two-year
period then it represented only a small fraction of the total visa allotment. Miller was against
such a solution as he staunchly believed that the Wagner-Rogers Bill compromised the intent of
the National Origins Act and established a moral precedent that obligated the United States to
accept persecuted children from around the world. Although Miller was for “America, first, last,
and forever,”372 he stated that the Sons of America could accept a plan that prioritized German
refugee children within the established quota. 373
Elizabeth Dilling, a “militant crusader,” 374 became the primary figure of the women’s far
right movement during the 1930s. She actively campaigned against Communism, which she
believed was the result of an international Jewish world conspiracy that had ensnared Franklin
Roosevelt, his administration, and created the New Deal. 375 Agnes Waters was a protégé of
Dilling and had been described as the most incendiary speaker among women’s activist groups
during the pre- and intra war years. She regularly appeared before Congressional committees and
became known for her disruptions and harangues of members of Congress. She habitually
accused the British and Jews of seeking to embroil the United States in European affairs, with
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Roosevelt serving as the tool of the Jewish cabal that had been outlined in the infamous and
fictional Protocols of the Elders of Zion.376
Waters described herself as a descendant of patriotic ancestors, the widow of a Great War
veteran, and the mother of two children. Her goal was to safeguard the sanctity of the “fruits of
our Constitution”377 for the current and subsequent generations. She dedicated her life to the
protection of the nation and the preservation of the people’s life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness; a goal endangered by the influx of masses of European persecuted minorities. Waters
insisted that German refugee children, cleaved from the “tender, gentle love of a mother,” 378
were forever tainted by a legacy of malignity that obviated the necessary evolution into loyal
American citizens. The experience of persecution had shaped “seasoned veterans [and] the shock
troops of the revolution of tomorrow” 379 that imperiled American democracy and she foresaw the
eruption of anarchy within five years of the bill’s passage. Ultimately, the preferential admission
of German refugee children granted a gateway to budding Stalinists and she denounced every
supporter of the bill as a de facto Communist. Prominent clergy who called for passage of the
Wagner-Rogers Bill were, in her view, functioning as a vanguard for a Red infiltration of the
nation. The committee did not ask Waters any questions. 380
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An editorialist of a Danville, VA, paper took umbrage with Water’s comments as a
demonstration of “how blind some people may be to the immediacy of a great racial tragedy.” 381
The writer warned that unless a carefully designed and executed project was undertaken for the
rescue of German Jews they faced destruction from physical violence or spiritual affliction. The
opinion piece included a poem written by a young Jewish woman, who having been “driven from
pillar to post,”382 denounced the United States for its failure to act:
This was one country you could get a visa for
This country of the gold.
The one unguarded frontier of them all;
The only one that had an open door.
The only one with quota still unfilled.
Where race and credo matter not at all.
Now, you’ve equal franchise with the dead.
To rot and fertilize for future days
Another culture man may use to breed
New variants on these their old injustices. 383

Mrs. (Blanche) Charles Fuller Winter, a Detroit-based co-traveler of Waters, represented
the Young Americans, Inc., and claimed to have studied laws pertaining to children and childcare over the previous twenty years. The child-care system, she argued, was inordinately
deficient and required widespread reform. The admission of German refugee children, Winter
believed, degraded the care of needy American children who deserved, by nature of their
nationality, priority. She postulated that these refugee children might become “communistic
children”384 who could potentially infect foster homes and American children. If the United
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States was to remain a republic, and if the citizenry were to retain their Constitutionally protected
rights, then “we have got to keep not only these children out of it but the whole damned
Europe.”385
James L. Wilmeth represented the Junior Order United American Mechanics (JOUAM),
an anti-immigration association that a vaunted a total membership of two hundred thousand,
including five Congressmen. 386 Serving as the National Secretary of its governing council he
testified that the Order had supported immigration restriction since its inception, but denied that
it was opposed to the influx of Jews or Catholics. The organization was “purely an American
society”387 long engaged in the arena of child-care and education; concerns of which he
described himself as extremely knowledgeable. Nonetheless, Wilmeth could not understand the
decision of the Wagner-Rogers Bill’s sponsors to focus solely upon the distress and suffering of
specific racial and religious minorities, namely German Jewish and non-Aryan children. The bill
was, he concluded, a form of “class legislation” 388 that unjustly privileged a particular group to
the exclusion of equally victimized Spanish and Chinese children as well as the entirety of
German children. The measure was an extraordinary example of governmental overreach in
which special legislative advantage was awarded to a unique assemblage; an act that was not
grounded in earlier rules or practices. Senator William Howell Smathers (Dem., NJ) accused
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Wilmeth and the JOUAM of doublespeak and inconsistency in view of their long-standing
promotion of wholesale bans on immigration. 389
When asked by the Senator if the patriotic society was willing to accept an amended
German Refugee Act if it became more inclusive, Wilmeth replied that “It would not [as] we
think this measure is unwise at the present time.” 390 Rep. Kramer similarly criticized this
contradiction to which the Junior Order leader declared that misfortune could not serve as a
criterion for granting entry to one national group to the exclusion of others.
Wilmeth enunciated the rationale of his organization’s resistance to this exception to the
quota system. His fixed opposition to the admission of German Lutherans and Catholics as well
as Poles confirmed the obduracy of the group’s position against immigration. The Junior Order,
he insisted, ardently stood for the preservation of the 1917 and 1924 immigration laws,
legislation enacted at a time when jobs were more plentiful. Current economic conditions and
high levels of unemployment mandated such controls as protection for the American worker.
Representative John Lesinski enunciated again the yearly under filling of the German and
Austrian quotas. Wilmeth suggested that his national group could become more amenable to the
bill if the refugee children were deducted from the annual quota. If such a revision were
accepted, the society would cease its opposition and return to its usual activities.
Despite his avowed willingness to accept the admission of prioritized refugee children,
Wilmeth raised the oft-repeated fear that the Wagner-Rogers Bill contained a hidden agenda that
included the reunification of children with parents and siblings and the liberalization of
immigration laws, acts that could exacerbate domestic unemployment. He asserted that a crucial
389
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underpinning of the legislation was the attempt to prevent the dissolution of German refugee
families. Wilmeth did not believe that such a practice was inherently misguided but argued that
the “great bugaboo”391 in the implementation of existing immigration restrictions was the image
of the broken family; an emotional response that facilitated the entry of illegal aliens. 392 The Bill
represented a potentially irrevocable breach in the Golden Gate. It marked an abandonment of
Congressional responsibilities owed the American people and he feared that once it began no one
knew where and how it would end. 393
The American Immigration Conference Board, a non-partisan, nonsectarian, and nonprofit organization espousing nativism and restrictive immigration, released a flyer declaring that
“America’s Children are America’s Problem! Refugee Children in Europe are Europe’s
Problem!”394 John Cecil, the President and director of the Board, testified that the needs of
children in the United States superceded those of foreigners. “Americanism” 395 demanded that
offers to provide foster care to German refugee children be consigned to the nation’s
impoverished progeny. The admission of foreign children, coupled with the diversion of critical
resources, must result in an upsurge in lawlessness, beggary, and despondency among America’s
youth. Cecil, as did other opponents, argued for the inclusion of the word refugee in the enabling
clause to block the entry of Nazi and other non-persecuted children.
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Despite such textual modifications he predicted that if the Wagner-Rogers Bill was
subjected to a popular vote it would be decisively defeated. He claimed to have received more
than ten thousand letters over the previous four weeks that advocated an end to permanent
residency and inferred by extension the presence of widespread resistance to the German
Refugee Bill. The measure was also criticized for its focus on German refugee children alone.
Cecil also argued that the “sob-sisters”396 who supported the legislation on behalf of
humanitarianism were the same individuals and groups whose sentiments drew the United States
into the Great War for the sake of mankind. He emphasized the failures of the Treaty of
Versailles that threatened to involve the United States, once again, in complex European affairs:
preservation of democracy; self-determination for minorities, and the rehabilitation of Europe.
Instead, Communism, Fascism, and Nazism cast their shadow across the Continent and posed a
direct challenge to American democracy and ideals. Inter-ethnic conflict had generated the
greatest migration of refugees in recorded history but, Cecil insisted, America had met its
obligations. If German refugee children were to be admitted, then must be given precedence
within the quota. Comparing the calamity to that of a sinking ship, it was “children first. Let
adults stand beside.”397 As for the nation itself, the clarion call had to remain charity begins at
home.398
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The introduction of the Wagner-Rogers Bill set off a cascade of anti-immigration and
nativist legislation and discourse. Outspoken North Carolina Senator Reynolds regarded the bill
as impolitic because it breached the nation’s restrictive immigration laws but asserted “My heart
beats in sympathy for those unfortunate children across the seas, but my love and duty belongs
firstly to our children here at home.”399 Invited by a local chapter of the Daughters of the
American Revolution, he delivered a radio address that attacked Senate Joint Resolution 64. He
claimed that twelve million Americans were unemployed at that time with one-third younger
than twenty-five years.400 Six hundred thousand were entering the marketplace per year.
Joblessness, Reynolds claimed, was particularly affecting Eastern white women and AfricanAmericans who were paid 15-20 cents per hour. The children of eight million Southern
sharecroppers, the Senator asserted, were living in shanties, lacking proper nutrition, clothing,
medical care and education. He predicted that unemployment generated disaffection and crime
and charged that one-third of domestic lawlessness was committed by idle youth. The WagnerRogers Bill must not be passed as America’s cardinal obligation was to provide for “her own
millions of ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed American children, the sons and daughters of
American fathers and mothers.”401 [Italics added] German refugee children would, in a matter of
five years, be entering the work force competing with the nation’s youth. He offered this pledge
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to the nation: “Our citizens, our country, first!” 402 Although Reynolds professed his compassion
for the world’s orphans, he steadfastly declared that his commitment remained with those of
America.403
The United Daughters of 1812, composed of thirty-nine national chapters, adopted a
resolution committee report during its three-day annual convention that called for a five-year ban
on immigration and opposition to passage of the Wagner-Rogers Bill. National President Mrs.
Arthur J. O’Neill of Chicago noted, despite the efforts of the bill’s Gentile sponsors, that Jews
would be the primary beneficiaries of the legislation. She denied any personal animus towards
Jews, but claimed that the United States was at its heart a Christian country. Therefore, the
nation was duty bound to care for its own. 404 P. Fioretti, the publisher of a New York City Italian
newspaper, warned that Jews were agitators who posed an immigration threat by seeking to
establish dominion over the majority Christians. The Jews were disloyal citizens who had
despoiled their native lands and plotted against their own governments; actions that cast them
into the role of refugee. 405 Laura Delano Houghteling, the wife of the U.S. Commissioner of
Immigration and a cousin of FDR, remarked at a Washington cocktail party that “20,000
charming children would all too soon grow into 20,000 ugly adults.” 406
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The battle over the passage of the Wagner-Rogers Bill was played out within a variety of
spheres. Multi-denominational members of the clergy served a crucial role in the conception,
initiation, and support of the German Children’s Refugee Bill. However, with few exceptions,
Christian churches as a whole did not exert their ecclesiastical influence to promote its adoption.
Many churchmen who signed the initial petition to the President calling for the admission of
persecuted Jewish and non-Aryan children clearly indicated in their testimonies before the Joint
Hearings that they spoke as individuals and not in any official capacity, a stance adopted by
many secular notables who testified before the Joint Hearing. Clearly, the passage of a one-time
exception to the quota system had to traverse a complicated and arduous path, on a plethora of
levels, if it were to be adopted. Subsequent events would test the formula that public intolerance
of Nazi persecutory policies would evolve into a willingness to accept refugee children or
challenge the veracity of long-held American traditions towards the helpless.
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CHAPTER 7:
RECONSIDERATION: RETURN TO THE FINAL ROADBLOCK
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION

The May 1939 decision of the Joint Committee to release the Wagner-Rogers Bill to both
Chambers for deliberation and voting was not the end of the story. Avra M. Warren, the Chief of
the Visa Division of the Department of State, advised Pickett that changes in the original text of
the legislation were necessary for its adoption. Significantly, he predicted that the bill’s final
amended version would grant German refugee children preference within and not an exception to
the existing quota; a fundamental change in the measure’s intent. Pickett believed that Warren’s
views reflected the recommendation of the Department and did not mirror the opinion of the
Congressional immigration committee. 407 The National Executive Committee of the American
Legion reacted to the pronouncement of the Joint Hearing by urging its 58 national departments
and 11,580 local posts to voice their objections to their Congressional representatives.
The rising tide of opposition and its political ramifications prompted the House
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization to hold a second inquest for further deliberations
on the issue.408 Indeed, the tenor of the new hearing was more confrontational, and earlier
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arguments for and against passage were revisited, expanded upon, and conjoined with fresh
allegations and stratagems. Chairman Samuel Dickstein, a Jewish New York Democratic
Congressman, who had previously promised Under Secretary of State George Messersmith to
block any new immigration bills, attempted to maintain order and focus. He accomplished these
tasks with varying degrees of success. The Immigration Committee’s sessions were marked by
repetition and redundancy, as many of the original speakers returned with the same messaging.
However, additional voices appeared that channeled the discourse into different directions. 409
Joseph A. Padway, the legal counsel for the A.F.L., returned as the personal
representative of President William Green. The union leader reaffirmed his belief in the
humanitarian intent of the legislation, its stated guarantees, and in an April 30 letter to Senator
Wagner, his personal affirmation of its passage. He notably admitted that the leadership and rank
and file. had not taken positive action on the proposal, but he was certain that they were in favor
of its enactment. This lack of definitive unanimity set off a contentious debate between Padway
and certain members of the Committee. Rep. Henry O. Talle (Rep., IA), John Lesinski, and John
Z. Anderson (Rep., CA) questioned the extent of A.F.L. support. Although Green acknowledged
that he had offered his singular endorsement, Padway weakly argued that if he had penned his
name on the letter to Wagner as President of the labor organization then “unless there is contrary
action, you can take it as pretty definite evidence” 410 that he spoke for the union as a whole.
However, Rep. William T. Schulte (Dem., IN), an A.F.L. member, declared that Green “only
_________________________________
409
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represent[ed] us in a certain capacity” 411 and could just proffer his personal judgment. He
reported that he had received hundreds of letters from union members that supported both sides
of the question. He admonished the leader to be more circumspect and not employ the name of
the union in his comments. Padway responded that although an official position had not been
assumed on the legislation Green had discussed the matter with its leadership. He suggested that
this purported discussion provided evidence of organizational affirmation, but Schulte
disagreed.412 Thus, the controversy over the standing of the union president and the strength or
weakness of his advocacy, challenged the oft-repeated assertion that the A.F.L. was staunchly
behind the German Children’s Refugee Bill. Such acrimony did not swirl around the positioning
of its rival, the C.I.O, which publicly acknowledged its endorsement. 413
Rep. Charles Kramer inaccurately claimed that the Joint Committee had decided to
deduct the refugee children from the annual quota for Germany and Austria. Padway indicated
that the A.F.L. opposed such a step, but if adopted the union would be supportive. However, he
doubted that such a contingency would arise. Rep. A. Leonard Allen (Dem., LA) recounted the
union’s history of animosity towards immigration; an assertion confirmed by Padway who
admitted the A.F.L. had long favored exclusionary policies. He reiterated Green’s opinion that
the legislation was a routine immigration act and declared it was not organizational malfeasance
to campaign for its passage. Allen acknowledged the right of the labor group to make its own
determination but he for one was going to stand for America. Padway retorted that the union was
as loyal to the nation as the Congressman or anyone else. The critical difference that separated
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the two, he insisted, was that the A.F.L. stood for charity and kindness whereas Allen did not. Its
national meeting was scheduled to convene in October 1939 and during the interim it would
continue to maintain the position that the German Children’s Refugee Bill was not an
immigration measure but a simple expression of humanity.
Rep. William R. Poage (Dem., TX) declared that any Congressional legislation, including
the Wagner-Rogers Bill, was laden with potentially unforeseen long-term consequences. For
example, public pressure could intensity to admit the parents and extended families of German
refugee children. Poage insisted that such a move would exacerbate unemployment and strain
domestic resources. Therefore, he argued the nation had the right to know the union’s position on
this potentiality. Padway replied that Congress was dealing only with a one-time specific bill and
if this question arose in the future then its members must confront it. Dickstein commented that
this action was currently not under discussion on Capitol Hill. 414
Clarence E. Pickett, Chairman of the NSCGRC, returned to provide additional
clarification of the Wagner-Rogers bill and re-emphasized the deteriorating situation of Jewish
and non-Aryan children. He described the legislation as a “permissive bill only,” 415 limited to a
very small number of refugees, which required the cooperation and agreement of American
consuls within Germany. The Quaker leader acknowledged the figure of twenty thousand
children was not a scientifically derived number but represented a manageable size that did not
necessitate the creation of additional supportive organizations. In addition, it reflected, he
believed, the absorptive capacity of the nation. 416 He also referenced rescue operations then
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underway within certain European nations. 417
Pickett asserted that concerns over the welfare of these German minority children had
spawned the creation of the NSCGRC. Failure of the nation to act made it a complicit participant
in their abandonment and conveyed a poor moral example to American youth. Significantly, he
noted that many domestic child-welfare agencies were underutilized. The Committee had not
solicited foster homes, but press coverage had generated approximately 2,500 letters offering
shelter and care. Public support, Pickett believed, resounded from shore to shore. The LPC
clause, he reaffirmed, had been satisfied through financial commitments, and taxpayer monies
remained well protected.
Representatives Poage and Kramer focused upon the vagaries of the term “satisfactory
guarantee [of] financial security.” 418 The Congressmen sought clear and unambiguous language
that ameliorated such concerns. Pickett agreed and suggested the substitution of “assurance
satisfactory” 419 to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, whose department would review the
validity of any monetary pledge of support. He noted that February 5, 1917, (e) 29.Sec. 3 (m), 39
Stat. 875 endowed her with discretionary power to permit entry of unaccompanied minors
younger than sixteen years if all statutory requirements were met. Individual attestations of
financial backing facilitated admission. The sponsor was obligated to provide the American
consul with proof of pecuniary responsibility, such as income tax returns and bank account
information. Details of organizational guarantees were yet to be completely formulated because

417
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it was a unique situation for the Federal Government, but it had to be sufficient to convince
Perkins that the LPC clause was fulfilled.420
Representative Lesinski injected the issue of Czechoslovakian children into the equation.
He recognized that the under filling of the 1931-1938 German and Austrian annual quotas had
created a deficit of 159,000 unused visas. Similarly, the Czech quota, with a total allowance
during this period of 30,244, had admitted only 8,060. Lesinski noted that a large percentage of
Czech children were non-Jews and suggested an expansion of the annual German-AustrianCzech quota to this limit per year. The Congressman opposed exceptions to the annual allowance
as long as it was underutilized. Conflation of Czech children with those from the Reich, he
believed, would accrue broader support for the Wagner-Rogers Bill, perhaps by diminishing the
perceived Jewishness of the legislation. Pickett responded that the situation of Czech children
was a complicated issue due to the Federal Government’s refusal to recognize German
occupation and annexation of Czech territory. However, the United Kingdom had accepted one
thousand Czech adults and children of whom 95 percent were Jews.421
Following Lesinski, Rep. Kramer again recommended that the twenty thousand German
and Austrian children be deducted from the authorized allotment. However, Pickett opposed both
proposals on the grounds that the premise of the Wagner-Rogers Bill “would be completely
obviated”422 if the refugee children were subsumed into the mandated quota. He believed that
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that the stark situation enveloping these children provided enough humanitarian justification for
the Congress and public to demand their admittance into the United States. Notably, Pickett
warned that the NSCGRC opposed adoption of the German Children’s Refugee Bill unless it
permitted the one-time increase in the 1939 and 1940 quotas. Otherwise, the plan was denuded
of its fundamental rationale. He concluded by admonishing that the tragedy unfolding within
Central Europe “threaten[ed] not only death, but a living death, to thousands and thousands of
children”423 of whom 40 percent were non-Jews. Rescue, he declared, represented a
reaffirmation of the future, a representation of American faith, and a concrete expression of
traditional national beliefs. The Quakers were, Pickett advised, “practical idealists,” 424 who had
joined together with others to formulate a judicious and well thought out immigration plan that
did not pose any threat to the country.
Pickett confronted the issue of incorporating other groups of foreign children into the
refugee bill. He reminded the members of the Committee that U.S. immigration laws had barred
the entry of Chinese. Any modification of the National Origins Act and other restrictive
immigration legislation required a Congressional amendment. Pickett contended that religious
and racial persecution was not a problem in China and he did not believe that Chinese parents
sought the evacuation of their children. In regard to Spanish Civil War refugees the NSCGRC
director observed that 450,000 had entered France and 5,000-6,000 had been relocated to North
Africa. Mexico had agreed to accept 20,000 and 1,800 were then at sea en route to that country.
The AFSC had been providing aid to both sides of the conflict and to refugees housed in France.
The Society ascertained that local conditions in the Iberian Peninsula had become amenable to a
423
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slow infusion of refugees back into Spain. Overall, Pickett believed that the Wagner-Rogers Bill
was not a Jewish bill as it encompassed many Christians as well. 425
Cheny Jones, a Yale-educated attorney with thirty-years experience working in the field
of social service and child-welfare, testified as an individual; “a voter and a father, and even as a
grandfather, and as the foster father of 550 New England children” 426 and not as a representative
of the many organizations and associations to which he had belonged or currently served.
Although he lacked first hand experience inside Germany he was motivated to act by his
relationship with a young academician who had fled Vienna three days prior to his arrest by Nazi
authorities. Jones addressed the issue of the ability of the United States to absorb refugee
children: 1. Approximately 100,000 Americans suffered accidental deaths each year, of which 10
percent were children. 2. A large volume of letters had been received from people seeking a
foster child or one for adoption. 3. Demand for adoption of American children exceeded supply
and not all children were of the proper temperament suitable for placement. 4. Two hundred fifty
thousand children were currently under the care of foster parents and other agencies and
institutions. 5. Two thousand interconnected child-welfare organizations were able to expand
their operations by 10 percent. In addition, the Federal Children’s Bureau and the Child Welfare
League of America had an extensive footprint that spanned the nation.427
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The appearance of Katharine F. Lenroot, Chief of the Federal Children’s Bureau housed
within the Department of Labor, represented the first and sole appearance of a Government
witness during the dual Wagner-Rogers Bill hearings. Importantly, she testified as an individual
and not as a representative of the Roosevelt Administration. This led to a remonstration by
Representative Poage who asked the obvious question: How could the House Committee, and by
extension all members of Congress, expect to understand the official views of the Executive
Branch towards this immigration legislation? Lenroot deferred her answer to the purview of the
“usual channels”428 whose existence was denied by Poage. This silence of the White House was
consistent with its positioning during the July 1938 meeting of the Evian Conference, the
question of refugee immigration as a whole, and FDR’s unwillingness to expend political capital
for potentially little gain.
Lenroot agreed with Jones that the child-welfare system and the nation possessed the
capacity to absorb and maintain twenty thousand refugee children while meeting the needs of
Americans. She presented a Children’s Bureau report, “Protection of Children Accepted for Care
by Agencies,”429 which summarized state policies towards foster care and adoption. The services
offered were standardized with the exception of Nevada which lacked governmental agencies for
child-care. If admitted, Lenroot observed, the German refugee children represented a miniscule
fraction of 1 percent of all children under the age of 15 years, according to the 1930 census. The
“Report of the National Resources Committee on the Problems of a Changing Population” 430
also stated that the percentage of children relative to adults within the total population was
428
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declining: 1900: 44 percent younger than twenty years; 1935: 37 percent; projection for 1980: 25
percent or less. Therefore, infusion of these refugee children benefited the country’s
demographics and expanded the pool housed in foster care by only 8 percent.431
The President of the University of North Carolina, Frank Porter Graham, was selected by
Pickett to appear as a witness for a cause that Graham readily supported. Offering praise of the
past and current relief work of the AFSC he suggested that passage of the Wagner-Rogers Bill
served as a symbolic expression of America’s tradition of offering sanctuary for the
downtrodden. Chairman Dickstein took issue with this belief by arguing that the United States
had “never done the things we preach.” 432 He noted that during 1938 only 42,000 immigrants
were admitted out of a total quota of 160,000. Each alien was granted entry only after being
subjected to multiple admission barriers. The nation, he believed, had not done its share in
confronting the European refugee crisis since the advent of Hitler to power in 1933. Graham
challenged the Congressman’s claim by citing the waves of immigrants that had come to
America throughout its history. The university president extolled the advocacy of the A.F.L. and
prominent clerics, but acknowledged that they functioned as individuals speaking without the
authority of their respective organizations. 433
The Right Reverend John A. Ryan of the Catholic University had been a member of the
multi-denominational delegation that had gone to the White House to attempt to engage the
President in the German refugee problem. He anticipated little opposition to this project as it was
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an inherently humane act that entailed minimal cost to the country. He soon realized, however,
that a significant amount of resistance had arisen against the Wagner-Rogers Bill. He discounted
the argument that these children could worsen the unemployment situation as it would be four to
five years before the oldest came of age to enter the work force. In view of such a limited impact
he did not consider this issue to be a serious matter worthy of consideration. Ryan argued that
many who opposed this legislation desired an end to immigration and the expulsion of all aliens.
He reminded the Committee that every American was descended from foreigners who had
entered the country throughout its history. The number of children under consideration was very
small in relation to the total number of refugees allowable under the quota. Consequently, the
nation was morally obligated to provide beneficence and empathy. Of note, Ryan came to
Congress as an individual and not as a clerical representative of the organized Catholic
Church.434
Gaynell Hawkins, President of the Texas Social Welfare Association and Director of the
Civic Federation of Dallas, challenged the argument that benevolence was solely a domestic
affair. She criticized her home state for being extremely “niggardly in taking care of its own
children,”435 particularly poverty stricken sharecropping families. However, she admitted that
there were individuals and groups that strove to provide aid to needy Texas and persecuted
German and Austrian children. Hawkins cited a number of Dallas families willing to provide
foster homes; an act that compensated in a modest way, for a falling birth rate. Representative
Cliff Clevenger (Rep., OH) theorized that the decline was primarily affecting the more desirable
upper and middle classes due to strains of the Depression and birth control. On the other hand, a
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positive gain was evident within the lower class and those on the dole. This divergence of social
class birth rates was one of the variables that framed his vote on the Wagner-Rogers Bill. He
ignored the assurances provided by the NSCGRC that only the finest material for potential
citizenship was to be selected. 436
Quentin Reynolds was an experienced reporter for Collier’s Weekly who returned to
Germany in the aftermath of Kristallnacht. He met, over the course of two months, with German
Jews and non-Aryans and reported upon his personal observations. Ominously, Reynolds
observed that Jewish and Christian children targeted by the National Socialist regime were
facing both starvation and disease. He was absolutely convinced that an unlimited pogrom
against the Jews was imminent. Chairman Dickstein inquired whether calamitous descriptors,
such as “a new slaughter [and] annihilation” 437 were applicable. He affirmatively replied and
became the first witness in the entire Wagner-Rogers Bill proceedings to espouse, by employing
this particular language, such a dire warning. The journalist also predicted that many Lutherans
and Catholics, who were resistant to the governmental appropriation of their churches, would fall
victim to eradicative actions. Therefore, increasing numbers of Christian parents, he discerned,
sought the evacuation of their children. However, he anticipated that the majority of their
offspring would have become orphaned by the time they had left the Reich, obviating any
American concerns about the fragmentation of families, a need for parental consent to emigrate,
or future calls to preferentially admit their fathers or mothers. Reynolds projected that Jews
would represent 60 percent of the young émigrés with Gentiles comprising the remainder.

436

Ibid., 88-91. Hawkins referenced a Census Bureau report that the annual national birth rate had declined by
700,000 each year since 1931.
“Statement of Quentin Reynolds, Collier’s Weekly, New York City” in May 25, 1939 House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization, 104.
437

140

Despite these portentous signs, the United States, he believed, could only accept as many refugee
children as were readily assimilable. 438
The hearings of the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee provided
opponents of the Wagner-Rogers Bill with a second opportunity to restate their objections.
Clarence W. Brinser served as the salaried State Secretary of the one hundred fifty thousand
Fraternal Patriotic Americans and spoke in the name of the executive board of the JOUAM of
New York, New Jersey, and Virginia, as well as the Fraternal Patriotic Associations of
Pennsylvania and Maryland. Delegates and representatives met in convention on May 13, 1939
and accepted a resolution contesting the immigration measure. However, the declaration was not
subjected to a general vote of all members; similar to criticisms leveled against Green of the
A.F.L. Although sympathetic, it opposed any justification for an increase in the German quota
out of fear of intensifying joblessness. Brinser admitted that his organization had always been
inimical towards immigration, but significantly, it was willing to accept the entry of German
refugee children if they were given preference within the quota system. Although he agreed that
visas were under utilized and that there was a net loss of aliens, Brinser maintained that the board
remained antagonistic towards any expansion of the German immigration allotment. 439
JOUAM National Secretary, James L. Wilmeth, had appeared before the Joint Hearings
Committee in April. He reiterated in May that his organization commiserated with the ill-treated
children of Germany, Spain, China, and other countries. Nonetheless, the group did not believe
that religious, racial, or political persecution justified passage of the Wagner-Rogers Bill. He
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theorized that if “suffering” 440 functioned as the primary determinant for granting entry to
German Jewish and non-Aryan children then it should be equally applicable to other national
groups who, he believed, were subjected to greater degrees of torment. Colored by its long
history of advocating for restrictive immigration legislation, it remained averse towards any
liberalization of the quota system. His willingness to endorse their admission, however, was
contingent upon their deduction from the annual combined quota, although later comments
challenged this limited altruism.
Wilmeth cited press and other accounts emanating from Germany that only specific racial
and religious minorities were subjected to maltreatment as proof of the Jewish essence of the
Wagner-Rogers Bill. The National Secretary argued that Hitler employed the “manifest
oppression of a[n unwanted] minority” 441 as a tactic to hasten forced emigration; a gambit that
could be emulated by Eastern European countries. He insisted that German Jews represented the
group that benefited the most from the legislation although they served as pawns in the Reich’s
quest for ransom, increased trade or other financial inducements. Wilmeth concluded that the
refugee problem was at its heart a Jewish issue and warned that foreign Jews could not be
successfully assimilated due to differences in language, culture, background, ideology and antialien sentiments. Despite his admonitions and concerns about the breakup of families, Wilmeth
reaffirmed the JOUAM’s call for the complete cessation of immigration until the economic and
employment issues of the Depression had significantly improved. 442

440
“Statement of Francis H. Kinnicutt, National Secretary, National Council, Junior Order of United American
Mechanics” in May 25, 1939 House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 121.
441

Ibid., 123.

“Statement of James L. Wilmeth, National Secretary, National Council, Junior Order of United American
Mechanics” in May 25, 1939 House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 119-134.
442

142

Francis H. Kinnicutt returned to the stage and repeated the bulk of his earlier objections.
While expressing empathy for German refugee children he asserted the United States was unable
to resolve the problem alone or violate its existing immigration laws. He noted the failure of the
Evian Conference to achieve its goal. Kinnicutt claimed that the country had admitted more than
100,000 refugees since the accession of Hitler to power in 1933 and that the rate was rising to
47,000 per year. Representative Lesinski questioned these figures by noting that only 17,868
German refugees had entered in 1938 and 59,664 during 1931-1938. Nevertheless, the APC
President appealed for a dramatic reduction, or preferably, a total suspension of immigration
until domestic unemployment had significantly abated. However, his organization was willing to
accept the German refugee children on the condition they were granted partiality within the
existing quota.443
The Director of the National Legislative Committee of the American Legion, Colonel
John Thomas Taylor, made his second appearance in the debate. He repeated his standard
arguments against the bill, but now declared that the veterans’ organization would terminate its
resistance if the German refugee children were given priority acceptance within the annual quota.
Paradoxically, however, he called for a complete cessation of all immigration for a minimum of
ten years. Rep. Kramer posited the idea of mortgaging future allotments as a means of avoiding
an overall increase in the number of immigrants, but the Legion leader surmised that this
maneuver established a dangerous precedent. He predicted that appeals to compassion must
inevitably result in the admission of the children’s parents.
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Representative Poage introduced an amendment to the Wagner-Rogers Bill in which
refugee children were granted temporary visitors’ visas that remained in force until six months
beyond their twenty-first birthday when they became eligible to apply for permanent residency
and citizenship within the annual quota. Poage stressed that his plan did not expand the number
of visitors’ visas allowable per year nor the total number of aliens seeking entry. Children were
excluded from the work force and in due course would become acculturated in the nature of
American democratic dogma and culture. Current immigration law prohibited the admission of
parents until their children reached this age of majority. Poage held membership in the Legion
and disapproved of any alterations to the quota system. He intended to vote against the
legislation as written but was open to amending its terms in order to achieve its humanitarian
goals.444
Representative Allen, became increasingly exasperated by the seemingly endless debate,
and came to the crux of the matter: “We are either going to maintain the quota system or we are
not going to maintain it…[E]ither vote or not vote.” 445 He personally believed that whether they
were admitted or excluded such action must be carried out within the quota structure. 446
Inauspiciously, Dickstein cited a rumor that the decision to vote against the WagnerRogers Bill had already been made: “[This] committee was pretty well controlled to kill this
legislation”447 and Congressional opponents already held “eleven votes in their pockets.” 448 The
“Statement of Col. Thomas Taylor, Director, National Legislative Committee, The American Legion” in May
31, 1939 House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 193-206.
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Congressman observed that Taylor had not questioned the views of committee members who
belonged to the Legion. Dickstein claimed that he had discussed the issue with a number of the
organization’s members who endorsed the bill. He observed that those who resisted the measure
formullaically prefaced their objections by insisting it was not the result of prejudice or absence
of compassion. He proposed that the children be permitted to enter as students who were barred
from employment. After five years if they desired to remain in the United States they could
apply for citizenship via the quota. Otherwise, they were obligated to leave the country. The
Legion National Director objected to this approach as well and then expressed his core belief. He
remained highly confident that the bill was destined to fail and that the American Legion was
and remained opposed to the Wagner-Rogers Bill regardless of any modifications or
reformulations.449
J. H. Patten, representing the State Council of the JOUAM of the State of New York and
other societies, adopted a different tack in his objections to the Wagner-Rogers Bill. He accused
the legislation’s supporters of exploiting refugee children as a propaganda tool that endeavored
to destroy the quota system. Letters of support submitted into evidence constituted the “most
fraudulent propaganda.”450 Patten argued that any failure to amend the language of the bill to
specifically denote these children as members of persecuted religious, racial, or political
minorities permitted entry of Nazi offspring into the country and cast proponents of the measure
as “mere anti-restrictionists.”451 He carefully repeated Roosevelt’s comment, made during the
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April 26, 1939 Fourth White House Children’s Conference that the nation was ignoring its
underprivileged youth. Notably, he underscored the dearth of endorsement of the Wagner-Rogers
Bill by FDR, the Departments of State and Labor, the Inter-Governmental Committee on
Political Refugees, and by George Rublee, its executive director.
The Junior Order spokesman then reinforced one of the key provisions of the Evian
Conference’s invitation and concluding statement: “No country would be expected or asked to
receive a greater number of immigrants than is permitted by its existing legislation.” 452 Patten
opposed Congressman Poage’s plan to mortgage future quotas via the issuance of visitors’ visas.
He interpreted the 1938 and 1939 Fortune magazine polls as confirmation that the public
sanctioned immigration restriction and predicted that if an exclusionary bill was submitted to the
House and the Senate it would be defeated by a 5:1 margin. Patten remained at odds with the
legislation despite its host of guarantees and the agreement to clearly define the term “refugee
children.”453
As other opponents had indicated, he regarded the bill as an expansion of the existing
quota by twenty thousand but conditionally offered his support if they were prioritized and
deducted from the annual quota. 454 Wisconsin Republican Congressman John C. Schafer, on the
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O’Day agreed that a corrective amendment could be written to delineate the identity of German children as
belonging to “the category of political, racial, and religious refugees, as defined by the Secretary of Labor and the
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other hand, viewed the focus on German refugee children as discriminatory as it neglected other
nationalities. He, like Patten, opposed the Poage amendment, but was against the breakup of
families. Schafer did not believe German refugee children deserved precedence within the quota
but “should take their place at the bottom of the waiting list”455 in order to avoid removal of an
individual who had been granted a visa.456
American Legion member Lowell M. Limpus, a political journalist, challenged Taylor’s
declaration that the organization was unanimous in its objections to the enactment of the German
Children’s Refugee Bill. He chaired a joint committee of members drawn from the Unknown
Soldier’s Post and the Ocha Memorial Post, N.Y. and was sent to Washington to counter a host
of fabrications made in the name of the Legion. He disputed Taylor’s earlier assertion that the
Bill had been assiduously discussed throughout all of the posts and that unanimity had been
reached. Limpus denied any personal role in national affairs and described himself as a mere
private “chosen by the gang to come down here and talk to our Congressmen.” 457 He
acknowledged the decision of the two posts to establish a committee that was empowered to
clarify the “record about the Legion’s real position” 458 on the issue; both decided to support the
Wagner-Rogers Bill. A combined meeting was convened that demanded Jeremiah C. Cross,
Chairman of the National Americanism Committee, personally explain why the Legion
proclaimed its organization had undividedly opposed the legislation when there were posts in
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favor of its passage. Cross admitted that neither he nor the National Executive Committee had
read the text of the Wagner-Rogers Bill and had not heard any testimony about it, but he insisted
that “for the sake of the Legion we have got to be quiet.” 459 Limpus concluded that it was a “little
group of brass hats, taking care of one another,” 460 who had made the decision to challenge a
legislative proposal that they knew little about.
Limpus and a Committee of Ten canvassed other Legion posts in his area and determined
that the majority responded affirmatively. They advised the Executive Committee that its
obstructionism ran contrary to the sentiments of the general membership and called upon
Congress to enact the legislation. He reported that many Legion members who belonged to labor
organizations, trades, and churches endorsed the measure. Limpus accepted the Poage
amendment and believed that the United States possessed the resources to take care of German
refugee children enmeshed in an extraordinary situation. 461
Rep. Edith Nourse Rogers was one of two individuals who closed the House hearings
with a final pitch for the passage of the Wagner-Rogers Bill. She reiterated her reasons for
accepting co-sponsorship of the immigration legislation and provided supplementary information
and opinions. The legislator recognized that more could be done for needy American children,
but believed that efforts and the overall situation was improving. Rogers noted that, unlike
German parents who sought the emigration of their children, American parents were resistant to
“Statement of Limpus,” 280. R.J.C. Dorsey of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies had made a
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separations. She was hopeful that Hitler would fall from power, enabling the reunification of
German Jewish and non-Aryan families. The Congresswoman endorsed the Poage amendment
and believed the concept of mortgaging the quota facilitated its adoption, although the deduction
of children from the annual quota was inherently unfair to those who had been patiently waiting
for years to be granted a visa. Poage’s plan, however, affected only a few on the list as Rogers
and Rep. Noah M. Mason noted that these displacements were deferred from 7 to 18 years,
depending upon the initial age of the child. 462
Howard A. Seitz, a Catholic legal counsel for the NSCGRC completed the public phase
of the immigration hearings. His goal was to summarize the case for and against the WagnerRogers Bill. He stated that the avowed purpose of the National Origins Act of 1924 was to
dramatically restrict immigration, but Congress possessed the legislative power to make an
exception. This exemption reflected the time-honored tradition of generosity, tenderness, and
acceptance. Proponents claimed that the situation then existing within the Reich was singular in
its transformation of children into “victims of a planned program of extermination.” 463 Public
pressure was mounting, he believed, for the United States to accept these Jewish and non-Aryan
children.
The bill would admit 10,000 children in 1939 and an additional 10,000 in 1940, under the
age of 14 years. The details and guarantees built into the resolution assured satisfaction of the
LPC clause, the mental and health requirements of immigration law, and the child-care standards
of state and local communities. The Departments of State and Labor were empowered to enforce
the terms of the bill. The reputation and actions of the AFSC garnered support from many
“Statement of Hon. Edith Nourse Rogers, A Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts” in
June 13, 1939 House Immigration and Naturalization Committee, 289-297.
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Americans who shared their ideals. The NSCGRC arose out of this humanitarian milieu and
sponsored and guided the presentation of the bill with the collaboration of multiple individuals,
groups, and organizations. It received multi-denominational religious support and the advocacy
of a host of labor leaders, educators, business and professional associations, and opinion makers.
Newspaper editorials had been almost universally supportive across the nation.
Opponents of the bill offered a variety of reasons to vote against it. The legislation
supplied the means for the dissolution of the quota system and the later admission of refugee
parents and siblings. The bill unfairly focused upon Germany while ignoring other nationalities
at risk. Admission was detrimental to domestic employment and entailed the dissolution of the
family unit. America’s prime responsibility lay in the care of its needy children. Alien youth did
not embody a desirable group due to differences in language, culture, and potentially ideology
and religion.
Seitz attempted to respond point by point to these objections. The Wagner-Rogers Bill
functioned as an emergency measure; a one-time enactment that did not alter immigration law.
Children could, upon receiving citizenship, seek the admission of their parents and other family
members. This step did not increase the number of visa allocations but merely altered the
sequence of admission. The situation within Germany was extraordinary. Spanish children, who
had fled the Civil War, were expected to eventually return to Spain or seek haven in Mexico. At
least seven years were to pass before refugee children reached an age at which they could enter
the work force and during the interim they functioned as consumers of American goods and
services. The parents of needy American children were resistant to placement within the foster
care system. Leading child-welfare experts testified that passage of the Wagner-Rogers Bill
would function as a stimulant to the provision of aid to the nation’s underprivileged children.
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The Nazi regime was responsible for the splintering of family groups. German parental approval,
if available, was essential for selection of a child for resettlement.
Seitz concluded by expressing his unshakeable resistance to prioritizing young refugees.
He argued that it was inherently unfair and immoral to remove displace persecuted adults who
had been awaiting their opportunity to be admitted. This action transformed the intent of the bill
from a “humanitarian proposal into an act of needless cruelty.” 464 He did, however, state that the
Poage amendment was regarded as a workable solution. The attorney asserted that the WagnerRogers Bill was an uncomplicated and merciful expression that was consonant with “America’s
best.”465 The NSCGRC requested that the House Committee adopt a favorable position on the
bill.466
The Congressional public hearings had come to a close. The major debate had occurred
within the purview of the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee and continued
behind closed doors. Senate Immigration Committee deliberations received a lesser degree of
attention, but its impact proved to be critical. Opinions for and against the legislation flowed
through the pages of the press, but the fate of the Wagner-Rogers Bill lay within the hands of a
few individuals within the halls of Congress.
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CHAPTER 8:
FAILURE OF THE WAGNER-ROGERS BILL

Overall, the Wagner-Rogers bill met an insurmountable wall of political and public
opposition to immigration as a whole. Four public opinion polls conducted during 1938
demonstrated that 71-85 percent of all voting Americans opposed any increase in the annual
quotas and 67 percent favored a complete cessation. Following Kristallnacht a National Opinion
Research Center (Gallup) Poll revealed that 94 percent of Americans were critical of the Nazi
treatment of Jews. However, sympathy was not transposable into humanitarian action: 72
percent were resistant to the entry of large numbers of Jews and 66 percent were ill-disposed
towards the one-time exception to the National Origins Act. 467 A May 1939 Greater Cincinnati
“Jury of Public Opinion Poll” asked one thousand women, primarily housewives, the question:
“Do you favor the opening of the doors of the United States to a considerable number of
European refugee children who cannot now be admitted because of our immigration laws?” 468
The essence of the legislation, the admission of twenty thousand German refugee children
outside of the annual quota, was not incorporated into the exchange. 77.3 percent expressed their
antipathy towards the plan, 21.4 percent sanctioned the bill, and 1.3 percent did not provide any
467
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answer. The pollsters concluded that the preferences of the jury members mirrored the general
public’s attitudes towards this issue. Clearly, the majority believed the implementation of the bill
opened the door for unbridled immigration and “for the American public no argument, even the
suffering of little children, justified such a change.” 469
Nonetheless, Wagner remained optimistic that the legislation would be presented to the
entire Senate, albeit with a possible amendment that allowed inclusion of children from other
nations.470 However, the 76th Congressional Session of January 3, 1939-January 3, 1941 was
marked by a myriad of bills that sought to limit, temporarily halt or end immigration altogether.
Senator Robert Reynolds, an ardent nativist, called for a minimum of a ten-year cessation of the
admission of aliens until every American worker was assured of employment. He also proposed
the urgent and sweeping expulsion of a minimum of thirty thousand jobless aliens. 471 The
Wagner-Rogers Bill, despite its guarantees that barred the refugee children from the domestic
work force, had to be defeated. America’s primary responsibility, Reynolds emphasized, was to
take care of its own citizens. The foreign children, Reynolds warned, were future competitors of
the urban poor for employment, potentially condemning “slum children to crime, poverty, and
hopelessness…”472 The Senator joined with other opponents of the legislation who predicted that
the Bill would ultimately lead to the admittance of parents, extended family, and thousands of
additional refugees outside of the immigration quota system. 473
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A private poll of U.S. Senators conducted on March 24, 1939, asked the question: “Do
you favor passage of the Wagner resolution (S.J. Res. 64) permitting twenty thousand refugee
children under fourteen years to enter the United States in the next two years?” 474 The results
demonstrated that for a significant portion of the Senate the immigration issue was politically too
risky to support.475 Out of 45 Senators willing to state their position 24 were against, 21 were
supportive, and 51 were undecided. Regionally, only 15 percent of Southern Senators, 25 percent
from the Far West and Northeastern States, and one-third of Midwest Senators endorsed its
enactment.476 Many refused to openly state their position, but admitted they were averse to
“letting down the immigration bars in any degree.” 477 The NSCGRC interpreted these unofficial
remarks as prognostic indicators of the destiny of the Wagner-Rogers Bill. The hesitant
politicians advanced a variety of rationales for their reluctance: domestic unemployment, the
economic burden that the nation might be forced to bear, the belief that other European countries
were contemplating forced expulsion of their Jewish populations, and the failure of the Evian
Conference to achieve any meaningful solution. 478 Only 10 percent of Republicans and 25
percent of Democrats supported the legislation. Prophetically, the pollster concluded that the bill
had little chance of passage in the Senate. 479

474

Non-Sectarian Committee for German Refugee Children, Congressional Poll (Box 2, Folder 23), 1.

475

Ibid. It was carefully noted that the editors of the Congressional Intelligence were entirely responsible for the
interpretation of the polling data. The Senators were classified as “Republicans, Progressives, Farm Laborites,
Independents, and Democrats.”
476

Wyman, Paper Walls, 82-83.

477
Non-Sectarian Committee, Congressional Poll (Box 2, Folder 23), 1. Appendix F: List of Senators, for ,
uncertain, or against the Wagner-Rogers Bill.
478

Ibid.

479

Wyman, Paper Walls, 82-83.

154

James Kepecs, a member of the NSCGRC, advised Clarence Pickett of a story penned by
the preeminent educator, author, and poet Henry Goddard Leach of the Daily News, which
reported that the Wagner-Rogers Bill had been purposefully “sidetracked” 480 by the Senate
Immigration Committee and was essentially “deceased.” 481 Kepecs noted that an influential
Chicagoan engaged in local politics had conferred with the two Illinois Senators, who, although
sympathetic and supportive, did not believe it was likely to be passed. Consequently, he advised
the Committee to consider alternative approaches, such as soliciting the government to grant
unused entry visas to the refugee children. 482 The wife of former Supreme Court Justice Brandeis
asked Myron C. Taylor, the former chief U.S. delegate to and Chairman of the Evian
Conference, to publicly announce his support for the bill. He declined on the grounds that it
would detract from his efforts to raise funding for the resettlement of German Jewish refugees
abroad.483
Senator Robert A. Taft (Rep., OH) revealed his rationale for voting against the WagnerRogers Bill in a letter written on June 28, 1939 to an adherent of the legislation. His reasoning
paralleled that of many of his Congressional colleagues who were against its adoption. He
viewed the situation of the German children with the “utmost sympathy; words that were
reminiscent of those expressed by diplomats at the meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee
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for Political Refugees held in July 1938.” 484 Taft acknowledged that the humane desire to
provide aid to persecuted children was hard to ignore. However, political realities and national
concerns compelled him to repudiate any adjustment of current immigration laws.
Unemployment, he posited, was the consequence of pre-Great War European immigration that
secured a source of inexpensive labor for American industries. The throes of the ongoing
Depression mandated a restrictive immigration policy. America’s first and foremost duty was to
care for its own children, many of whom were suffering from the pangs and deprivations of
impoverishment. Foster homes earmarked for refugee children should instead minister to the
wants of the country’s needy offspring. Taft argued that there were not any assurances that jobs
were to become available for refugee children when they came of age, and if they were, then
twenty thousand young Americans would be bereft of employment. He denied that the United
States was failing to do its fair share to ameliorate the humanitarian conundrum within Germany.
America could not solve the problem by acceding to mass immigration due to the enormity of the
numbers involved and the unwillingness of other nations to accept more than token amounts.
Resolution of the situation, Taft argued, necessitated consideration of colonization within Africa
and Asia. He concluded his response by citing his belief in the preservation of the family unit but
ignored the reality that the demise of familial bonds within the Reich was escalating. He believed
that the pangs of separation from parents far outweighed the dangers of remaining together as a
persecuted and unwanted minority. After assiduously considering all the arguments for and
against the Wagner-Rogers Bill he decided that he would cast a vote against the legislation.485
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Washington Democratic Senator Lewis Schwellenbach summarized the political benefits
of opposing immigration during a conversation in 1940: It served as the “best vote-getting
argument in present day politics.” 486 The office holder “can beat his breast and proclaim his
loyalty to America”487 while explaining to the unemployed citizen “that he is out of work
because some alien has his job.” 488
However, it was the Senate sub-committee’s amendment of the bill (although the original
measure had been passed out of the Joint House and Senate Sub-committee with the majority of
its members in favor of its adoption) that effectively killed the legislation. The revision that was
introduced by Senator Reynolds and Georgia Democratic Senator Richard Russell, the chairman
of the Senate Immigration Committee, called for the inclusion of five anti-alien plans that
mandated a five-year moratorium on immigration, the registration and fingerprinting of all
aliens, and the deduction of the twenty thousand refugee children from the annual quota for
Germany and Austria. Reynolds had earlier sought to introduce more stringent immigration
restrictions: a total ban on immigration for ten or more years, until employment was assured for
all jobless Americans.489 Russell declared that an “increasingly strong sentiment” 490 to halt all
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immigration due to economic conditions had been progressively evolving within popular
opinion. This proscription, he argued, was reflective of a global movement of similar attitudes. 491
The Senate sub-committee contended that the Reynolds-Russell amendment represented
“a humanitarian gesture of sympathy [that enabled] these 20,000 children…living in Germany
under tragic conditions to find a home.”492 Its report also stated that the decision to admit these
refugees was a response to a dire emergency but, while acknowledging the persistent under
filling of the combined German and Austrian allotment, it declared its intransigence to any
amelioration or erosion of the quota system. 493
The Wagner-Rogers bill was favorably reported out of the House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization on June 23 and the Senate Immigration Committee on June 26,
1939 in an altered form that deducted the refugee children from the annual quota, a change that
fundamentally altered the intent of the legislation. Subsequently, on June 30 Wagner withdrew
the bill, declaring that the amendment was entirely deplorable to him and the countless
supporters of the compassionate scheme that lay at the core of the measure. The Senator reported
that Clarence Pickett had informed him that the members of the Non-Sectarian Committee
ardently rejected this modification and preferred having “no bill at all” 494 than accept a markedly
revised version.

491

Ibid.

“Temporary Prohibition of Immigration of Aliens,” Senate Report, 76 Cong., 1 sess., no. 757 (July 11, 1939)
cited in Wyman, Paper Walls, 92.
492

493

Chicago Sentinel, “Senate Committee Backing Refugee Bill Cites ‘Emergency,’” July 20, 1939,” 27.

“Statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner of N.Y. on Senate Immigration Committee Action Concerning
Wagner-Rogers Resolution,” July 3, 1939, Non-Sectarian Committee for German Refugee Children,
Correspondence, Senator Robert F. Wagner, (Box 2, Folder 2), 16.
494

158

The Senator shared this sense of moral outrage because the deduction effectively
converted a charitable endeavor that sought to provide aid to children in extremis into a
“proposal with needlessly cruel consequences” 495 for persecuted adults who had successfully
secured entry visas. Wagner declared that the Senate subcommittee’s final vote had been
deliberately convened when a portion of its membership was absent. The New York Senator
futilely called a for a re-vote when a full quorum was present, but admitted that he was willing to
accept a variation of the Poage plan that mortgaged temporary visas against the annual quota
when the refugee child reached the age of twenty-one. This action, he affirmed, did not breach
the quota limitations but did satisfy the acute exigencies of an urgent situation. Wagner noted
ironically, that the reformulated version of the bill permitted the entrance of children
unaccompanied by their parents, despite the oppositions’ claims regarding the sanctity of the
family unit.496
Representative Caroline O’Day observed that in spite of expressions of a staggering
amount of sympathy within the public arena, few in the Senate and House supported the bill. She
criticized those members of Congress who allowed the issue of unemployment to dissuade them
from providing assistance to the suffering children of the Reich. 497 Newsweek’s columnist
Raymond Moley chastised Congress for its “groveling before the prospect of a peaceful invasion
by 20,000 children.”498 He criticized the Senate for changing the terms of the Wagner-Rogers
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Bill and the inertia of the House Committee on Immigration; actions that ran counter to the
emotive pleas of the measure’s supporters. Moley challenged the assertions of the legislation’s
opponents: risk of the children becoming public charges, a threat to American employment and
the need to take care of America’s own first. The writer asserted that the situation of the German
refugee children was unparalleled in the desire of their own government, as a matter of national
and ideological priorities, to actively pursue their expulsion from the country of their birth.
Moley, however, laid the bulk of the blame at the feet of specific Congressmen and Senators who
were “itching to burn verbal fiery crosses.” 499 The proponents of the bill, he argued, needed to
ignore demagoguery and focus upon the irreproachable nature of their campaign and place trust
in the common sense and integrity of the American people. He pressed for passage of the nonamended form of the bill as it reflected the country’s generosity and innate humanity. 500
An editorialist from the St. Louis Star and Times took issue with Congress for failure to
pass the Children’s Refugee Bill and declared that the Senate amendment “destroy[ed the bill’s]
significance.”501 The writer noted that if the American public was stunned by the melodrama of
the S.S. St. Louis “aimlessly sailing the Caribbean while search for a place of rest,” 502 then the
United States was morally obligated to provide in a limited fashion the asylum offered by the
United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, and Belgium to a smattering of unfortunate German
children.503 The St. Louis Post-Dispatch derided Russell, and the Senate Immigration Committee
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he chaired, for unfavorably altering the bill; an act that was reprehensible to its sponsors. The
paper argued that peril faced by these German children superceded the general immigration
question. The Iowa Williamsburg Journal Tribune maintained that the majority of Americans
were undeterred by the polling data and ascribed its failure to Congressional “quibbles and
quabbles and hesita[tion].”504 Actress Helen Hayes, a member of the National Non-Sectarian
Committee for Refugee Children, addressed a group of Hollywood celebrity advocates of the bill
and asserted that the “adjournment of Congress was the only reason for lack of favorable
action…”505
The collapse of the emergency legislation was the product of many detractors. Politicians
opposed to the act were driven by myriad concerns: re-election, popular opinion, unemployment,
the introduction of anti-democratic ideologies, national security, nativism, isolationism, latent
and overt anti-Semitism, and fear of the Other. 506 The witnesses selected by the Clarence E.
Pickett and the NSCGRC were carefully chosen for their prominence, expertise, and experience.
However, many of them spoke not in the name of an organization but as individuals; a move that
diminished the power of their supportive arguments. This was particularly true of respected
members of the clergy, especially of the Catholic faith.
The institution of the American Catholic Hierarchy (ACH) and its National Catholic
Welfare Conference (N.C.W.C.) did not, despite personal professions of support from leading
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members of its clergy, officially endorse the rescue legislation. 507 Neither did they provide
authoritative witnesses to testify before the Joint House and Senate hearings. The N.C.W. C.
began to confront the issue of forced emigration from the Reich in 1933. However, its response
was framed by two fundamental principles, which, in the context of the German Children’s
Refugee Bill, appeared to be incompatible. The first was the commitment to provide charitable
aid and comfort to those in need. The second was the preservation of the integrity of the family;
the font from which, it was believed, flowed the country’s political, social and economic unity.
The pursuit of these goals was tempered by the necessity to proceed carefully to avoid resistance
from anti-immigrationists, both within and outside the halls of Congress. 508
Various Catholic and Protestant clergymen and lay activists intermittently raised the issue
of involuntary expatriation from the Reich. For example, Father Raymond McGowan of the
N.C.W.C.’s Social Action Department, Professor Carlton Hayes of Columbia University,
Michael Williams and George Shuster, the founders of Commonweal magazine, established the
Christian Committee for German Refugees during 1936. Their intent was to spotlight the
precarious situation of Christian and political refugees from Germany. 509 The Bureau of
Immigration of the N.C.W.C. attempted to facilitate the entry of Catholic refugees via the annual
507
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quota system.510 Calls for mutual cooperation and assistance from Catholic relief organizations
within the Reich and The Netherlands led the American church leadership to establish the
Episcopal Committee for Catholic Refugees from Germany (C.C.R.) during November 1936. 511
Following the establishment of the President’s Advisory Committee on Political Refugees
(P.A.C.P.R.), the State Department requested that the N.C.W.C. select two Catholic
representatives to serve on its board. Archbishop Joseph F. Rummel of New Orleans and Louis
Kennedy, the President of the National Council for Catholic Men, were chosen for this
position.512 Ultimately, the C.C.R. successfully resettled seven thousand Catholic refugees in the
United States between 1936-1946.513
The Hierarchy and members of the N.C.W.C. were cognizant of the bounds placed upon
any refugee rescue project. The Roosevelt Administration and Congress apparently were not
disposed to permit significant numbers of coerced émigrés to enter the United States. Any efforts
to promote such a scheme risked enactment of more stringent anti-immigration legislation. Louis
Kennedy recorded that FDR, during the opening session of the P.A.C.P.R., informed its members
that his Administration was constrained by the terms of the existing quota system and refused to
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seek any Congressional modification of the allowable limits; sentiments expressed during the
formulation of the Evian Conference. 514
The centrality of family unity in the social, political, and economic arenas significantly
impacted Catholic Hierarchical responses to the problems of immigration and refugees. The
National Origins Act, with its fixed allotment of entry visas, proscribed the abilities of families
to enter the United States as a collective body. Consequently, during the 1920s and 1930s
Catholic social activists and staff members of the N.C.W.C.’s Legal and Immigration Bureaus
unsuccessfully argued before Congress for legislation that amended the visa system in a manner
that enabled the restoration of separated families. 515 Its sanctity was, according to Cleveland
Bishop Joseph Schrembs in 1927, the symbol of the “natural and sacred union between husband
and wife and children.”516
This principle colored the official Catholic response to the perplexing German children
refugee issue. Rummel advised Bishop Bernard Sheil that the Wagner-Rogers Bill lacked
Congressional support; an opinion shared by members of the P.A.C.P.R. He cited comments of
British Lord Rothschild before the Presidential Committee that the United Kingdom had received
five thousand children, but was hesitant to accept more due to concerns over finances,
socialization and assimilation. Most of the children were housed in camps or hostels and not
within private homes. The prospect of an absolute and irrefutable separation from parents and
other family members, coupled with the increasing unlikelihood of a future reunion, complicated
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problems of adjustment. Nonetheless, although Rummel expressed constrained support for the
Wagner-Rogers Bill he pledged his continued engagement with this enterprise. 517
Wilbur LaRoe submitted a letter from Sheil to the Joint Hearings in which the Bishop
identified himself as a representative of the Chicago Archdiocese, George Cardinal Mundelein,
but not as a spokesman for the official Catholic Church. His statement was succinct and mirrored
the supportive comments of other witnesses. The bill served both practical and symbolic
functions: the provision of a safe haven in which the ideals of the “ways of peace” 518 and the
“paths of righteousness”519 could be instilled. Importantly, Sheil noted that the proposal did not
mandate the acceptance of twenty thousand children. Ten thousand per year was merely a
maximum. Parental consent was required but he acknowledged that the schism of the family by
Nazi policies obviated such permission. He declared the United States was obligated to fulfill its
share to preserve the inviolability of the lives of innocent children. 520
Marion Kenworthy of the New York School of Social Work, frustrated by Rummel’s
apparent reticence to promote the Bill, contacted Ben V. Cohen, a Jewish Presidential advisor
working for the Department of the Interior. She asked was it possible, “for the love of God,” 521
for Cohen to identify someone who possessed enough influence to motivate the leadership of the
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N.C.W.C. to publicly express unconditional support?522 Archbishop Rummel demonstrated his
ardent belief in the consecration of the family unit, a potentially significant hindrance to the
resettlement enterprise, in a letter sent on April 11, 1939, to Clarence Pickett in which he made
two incongruous statements. On the one hand, he reaffirmed his signature on documents that
certified his support. On the other, he reiterated the Catholic Church’s fundamental opposition to
the separation, perhaps on a permanent basis, of refugee children from their parents, siblings,
grandp7arents, and others; the core components of the basic family entity. 523
Monsignor Michael Ready, the General Secretary of the N.C.W.C and a member of the
P.A.C.P.R., was approached by Pickett to support the bill. The cleric disputed assertions that the
level of Jewish persecution within Germany warranted admission of refugee children. 524 Justine
Wise Polier recalled that she and her father, Rabbi Stephan Wise, believed that Cardinal Francis
Spellman of New York, a member of the P.A.C.P.R., “had no feeling for helping or lifting his
finger due to his own prejudices.”525
Alternatively, Reverend Maurice Sheehy, Head of the Department of Religious Education
of the Catholic University, downplayed the importance of preserving familial cohesion by
accentuating the immediate needs of the persecuted child. While restating some of the common
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arguments in favor of the Wagner-Rogers Bill, he insisted that the moral concerns of
humanitarianism sufficed as a stand-alone rationale for supporting the legislation. Essentially
Sheey believed that Nazism was a transient phenomenon, a “temporary insanity,” 526 that would
collapse of its own accord, leading Germany to make the proper expiations to its victims.
However, unlike other speakers, he warned that repudiation of the measure reified Nazi ideology
and emboldened the Reich to pursue broader and harsher measures. 527
Many Catholics were critical of the attention given to the Jews of Germany while
ignoring other examples of inhumanity. An opinion columnist in the Catholic journal America
argued that the United States and Europe were afflicted by a “moral and spiritual crisis of the
first order”528 that stemmed from the religious and political persecution of minorities. The writer
asserted that over the previous three months at least a dozen news reports castigated the
maltreatment of Jews by Hitler while briefly commenting upon Nazi abuse of German Catholics.
However, the persecution of Catholics within Mexico, Spain, and the Soviet Union was met with
silence. The editorialist alleged that after a protest meeting had drafted and accepted resolutions
condemning the oppression of Jews in the Reich a motion was introduced to adopt a similar
statement of sympathy with beleaguered Christians in Russia. However, this call was answered
by a fury of protest and the issue was dropped. Significantly, the author concluded that a nation
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which castigates persecution “except when Catholics are the sole victims, is neither ‘liberal,’
Christian, nor American…”529
Another critique blamed the Communists and Socialists for the exile of approximately ten
thousand Basque children to the United Kingdom, France, Mexico, and the Soviet Union. 530 One
America columnist argued that national meetings held to protest Nazi anti-German policies were
designed to involve the United States in a war with Germany, while simultaneously “religious
groups, reputedly Christian”531 were calling for the shipment of arms and munitions to the
Loyalist faction in the Spanish Civil War. The writer accused the press of suppressing or
minimizing the crimes committed against Catholics by the anti-religious and socialist
governments of Spain and Mexico. 532
The further conflation of Jews with socialism, Communism, and Roosevelt’s New Deal
added to the negative imagery of Jews and the belief in a Jewish world conspiracy, and fueled
the anti-Semitic rhetoric of Father Charles E. Coughlin, the Radio Priest of Royal Oak, Michigan
and others.533 Followers of Coughlin organized the Christian Front,534 a group laden with Fascist
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overtones, that physically assaulted Jews, boycotted Jewish businesses, and labeled them as
“’warmongers”’ who sought to draw the United States into war with Germany. 535
Other prominent Christians, (or those who claimed to be members of this faith) espoused
anti-Semitism in America. The Protestant fundamentalist evangelist Gerald B. Winrod, the
“Jayhawk Nazi”536 and head of the Defenders of the Christian Faith promoted a “conservative
[and] patriotic”537 brand of anti-Semitism during the 1930s that employed the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion. His magazine, The Defender, had 110,000 subscribers and many of his supporters
voted for his unsuccessful 1938 Senatorial campaign in Kansas. William Dudley Pelley was the
national leader of the Silver Shirts, an avowedly Christian group that endorsed his conception of
“’Liberation Theology,”538 an amalgam of “Christianity and mysticism,” that raged against the
Jews for their supposed domination of the United States. 539 Gerald L. K. Smith was the
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publisher of the Protestant extremist paper, Cross and the Flag that regularly attacked organized
Jewry as the enemy of the country. 540
As many scholars have illustrated, the anti-Semitic ideologies of these and other
individuals and groups helped to shape public attitudes towards the admission of refugee German
Jewish children and contributed to the defeat of the Wagner-Rogers Bill. The sponsors of the
legislation mistakenly conflated popular criticisms of Nazi policies with a willingness to admit a
very small number of young Jews.
Roosevelt’s primary focus during this period clearly was on economic recovery and the
strengthening of the military. Cognizant of the direction of the political winds, he was unwilling
to expend critical capital that could be employed for the support of his favored projects. The
influence of the purported Jewish leadership and of the Jewish community at large upon
presidential decision-making was limited due to internal divisions, inabilities to adopt uniform
policies and fears of stimulating domestic anti-Semitism. Consequently, the brunt of the efforts
to formulate and present the structure and mechanisms of the Wagner-Rogers Bill to a hesitant
Congress devolved primarily upon Christian supporters.
British Jews, however, were better positioned to influence official policy regarding the
entry of German Jewish and non-Aryan children, although the number that would be accepted
was capped at ten thousand; a figure accepted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Government
acquiescence was influenced by criticism directed towards its attempts to appease Germany at
the expense of Czechoslovakia, the placation of negative American popular opinion towards the
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United Kingdom and preserving support of the U.S., and its policy towards Jewish immigration
into the Palestine Mandate. The White Paper of 1939 was issued by HMG under the leadership
of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. It served two strategic purposes: to put an end to the
Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 and to maintain cordial foreign relations with Muslim nations as the
threat of war with Germany loomed closer. Nonetheless, British Jewry, similar to its American
counterpart, came to believe that success in promoting limited acceptance of refugee children
was dependent upon diminishing Jewish visibility within the rescue project due to latent and
overt anti-Semitism.
The Jewish footprint inherent in the conception of the Wagner-Rogers Bill was
deliberately downplayed for a host of reasons. There was great apprehension that the legislation
was likely to be regarded as a “Jewish” bill; a perception that risked the support of many in the
Christian community and the expansion of domestic anti-Semitism. The conundrum faced by
Sidney Hollander and Rabbi Stephen Wise during their Joint Hearing testimony, the only two
Jewish witnesses, gave proof to the incommensurable position of American Jewry. Their
attempts to minimize the ethnic connotations of the Wagner-Rogers Bill by emphasizing its nonsectarian nature were essentially futile. No matter how much “they professed their unqualified
Americanism”541 it was not possible to dispel their Jewish identity from popular
consciousness.542 A limited Jewish profile was a calculated stratagem but was also representative
of divisions and dissensions among members of the collective Jewish community. American
Jewry failed, as it and international Jewry had done during the Evian Conference, to present a
unified narrative that enunciated its own interests.
Gulie Ne’eman Arad, America, Its Jews, and the Rise of Nazism. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
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Predominantly Jewish labor unions and their rank and file did publicly speak out, but
overall the Jewish voice was muted. 543 Often bitterly divided by religion, class, and politics, and
faced with the extent of current anti-Semitism, the collective Jewish community did not actively
seek the mass immigration of their co-religionists from Germany into the United States.
Constrained by political realities and State Department warnings that any attempt could
precipitate more restrictive immigration policies the leadership was content to seek nominal
revisions of the quota system. 544 Little protest was to be found in Jewish print media between the
critical years of 1938 and 1942, when the Final Solution was well under way. Editorially, the
B’nai B’rith Magazine had long supported open borders, but after 1938 it remained silent as did
the Congress Bulletin of Wise’s American Jewish Congress and the Annual Reports of the more
conservative American Jewish Committee. The Jewish Labor Committee, a non-Zionist
organization, was the sole exception to this reticence as it had consistently focused upon the
“’fight for the right of free immigration in all countries.”545 The implications of the defeat of the
legislation were not lost on the Jewish leadership. Increasing numbers of Americans were wary
of potential involvement in a looming continental European war, a conflict in which the United
States was ill prepared to engage. Presidential endorsement of a measure to rescue German
Jewish children might have created the “image that the war was a Jewish war.” 546 Congress and
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the majority of the American public remained resolute in their determination to closely guard the
Golden Gates, regardless of human need or the gathering of storm clouds in Europe. This
obstinacy, however, was not absolute, as early wartime events demonstrated that some refugees
were more desirable than others.
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CHAPTER 9:
THE HENNINGS BILL: VOYAGE TO NOWHERE

The public debate concerning the admission of refugee children continued into the latter
half of 1940, even as Europe was again enveloped in war. As the Kindertransport served as a
potential roadmap for the Wagner-Rogers Bill, so did the German Refugee Children’s Bill
provide a guide for the Mercy Ship Bill. 547 It represented an attempt to rescue young British
children from the perils of aerial warfare. Many of the individuals and groups who were invested
with the 1939 legislation became ardent supporters of the 1940 measure. Similar employment of
compassionate rhetoric and moral platitudes were expressed, but fundamental and distinctive
differences existed between the two resettlement schemes. Their contradistinctions highlighted a
critical point: the security and lives of one national and ethnic group was awarded greater
priority over the other.
These measures, which on the surface seemed to seek similar goals, were marked by
dramatic contrasts. Passage of the Wagner-Rogers Bill did not serve the interests of the
President, his Administration, nor Congress, and lacked sufficient popular, organizational, and
religious support. Arguments against the bill were wide ranging: aggravation of unemployment,
the prioritization of domestic social needs, antipathy towards aliens (particularly Jews),
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introduction of anti-democratic ideologies, ability of immigrants to acculturate and assimilate,
trauma of separation of children from parents, fears of promoting American anti-Semitism,
desire for more limited admission policies, and concerns about breaching the Golden Gate that
enabled parents and extended family members to enter the country. Roosevelt, unwilling to risk
losing support of restrictionist Senators and Congressmen for an issue that lacked political gain,
and aware of growing voter resistance to a third term in office, rigorously maintained his silence.
The State Department was obstructionist and erected a host of bureaucratic obstacles. The
endorsement of the print media and of a mixture of prominent lay and clerical Americans was
incommensurable with public opinion that, while denouncing German anti-Semitic policies and
violence, remained opposed to the admission of these specific groups of children. Concerns were
also expressed about the potential involvement of the United States in the problems of Central
and Western Europe.
The Hennings Bill, on the other hand, was widely endorsed by members of Congress and
the American people. Eleanor Roosevelt, unlike her subdued actions during the Wagner=Rogers
Bill campaign, was an active proponent of the Mercy Ship Bill, maintaining a much higher
profile. British Christian children, who were not envisaged as undesirable aliens, were to be
admitted for indefinite periods of time and without numerical limits. Diplomatic bureaucratic
hurdles were rapidly removed. The fear of potential armed conflict with Germany was
downplayed and the Neutrality Act was readily amended. The objections raised against the 1939
measure, particularly employment and familial separation, were regarded as irrelevant. Roosevelt
spoke in favor of the legislation, but with the proviso that safe passage had to be guaranteed by
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all belligerents.548 Whereas, the Wagner-Rogers Bill played out over the course of four months,
from its inception and through multiple Congressional hearings, the Mercy Ship Bill was rapidly
enacted by unanimous voice vote and quickly signed into law.
I believe that Roosevelt’s approach to the Mercy Ship Bill was commensurate with his
overall approach and attitude towards the immigration of German Jews and non-Aryans. The
Intergovernmental Committee of July 1939 was constructed in such a manner that assured its
nonsuccess. His silence on the Wagner-Rogers Bill, and the absence of any attempt to sway
popular attitudes, helped to ensure its defeat in Congress. The Hennings Bill, however,
represented a highly significant and calculated exception, but it was clear from its conception
that it would never come to fruition, despite enactment into law. This “moral” act, like Evian,
engendered little political cost, and may have strengthened the President in the upcoming
November 1940 national election.
A St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorialist derided Congress for having turned a “cold
shoulder”549 against the Wagner-Rogers Bill, but added that the cataclysm that enshrouded the
children of Great Britain, following the occupation of France and the Low Countries, was of a far
greater magnitude than that confronted by a mere twenty thousand German refugee children. The
defeated legislation needed to be resurrected, reformulated and enacted; a move that would
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demonstrate that, although the United States was determined to remain a nonbelligerent, it
retained its commitment to traditional humanistic values.550
Initial discussions within private and governmental circles regarding the evacuation of
thousands of children from the United Kingdom began to take place during June 1940.
Motivated by the specter of famine, disease, and aerial bombing, many of the individuals and
groups that had supported the unsuccessful German Children’s Refugee Bill reunited in an
attempt to champion the evacuation of British children to the United States. Selected children
were to enter via the under-utilized British quota provided the mandatory immigration
requirements for admission were satisfied. 551
A June 1940 Gallup poll revealed that 58 percent of respondents sanctioned such
measures for the duration of the war and 25 percent, corresponding to five to seven million
families, offered to be foster parents. 552 Rep. Harry Sandager (Rep., RI) declared that such an
enterprise was crucial for “the sake of humanity and Christianity.” 553
Unlike the negative arguments posed by opponents of the previous immigration
legislation, many members of the public believed that neither the unemployment rate nor the care
of America’s needy children were jeopardized by the entry of British youth. 554 If these innocent
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lives were to be extricated from the “charnel-house that Hitler hopes to make of Great Britain,
there is not an hour to lose.”555 The Ohio parents of an American soldier killed during the Great
War professed that if his sacrifice was to have any meaning, the nation must serve as a “haven
for the children of all lands” while “we…follow our Lord in saying: ‘Suffer little children to
come unto me.”556 Objections to the separation of families did not become a significant issue of
contention as it had during the earlier debates. 557
Consequently, the United States Committee for the Care of European Children
(USCCEC) was born with the First Lady serving as the honorary administrative chairman, and
the Chicago-based entrepreneur Marshall Field III acting as operational chairman, supported by a
host of prominent lay and clerical personages. 558 The Committee, aided by the American Friends
Service Committee and the International Migration Service, stressed that it was “in the truest
sense a nonsectarian, nonpartisan movement inspired by the desire to rescue children—whoever
they may be and wherever they may be—from disaster by all practicable means at our
disposal.”559
Although the subsequent hearings on the adjustment of the Neutrality Act of 1939 to
enable the employment of American rescue shipping met a degree of political resistance, the
open-mindedness of the members of Congress was remarkable in view of the rancorous attitudes
displayed during multiple hearings on the Wagner-Rogers Bill. Warning “death from the air may
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strike at any time, anywhere,”560 the Committee called upon Americans to offer foster homes as
asylum to prevent the far-reaching calamity that imperiled the children of Britain. 561
This new organization, aided unofficially by Katherine Lenroot, Director of the
Washington based Federal Children’s Bureau, set out to systematize American efforts to
facilitate the “care of child victims of the war in Europe,” 562 while actively collaborating with the
Canadian Government. Unlike the German Refugee Children’s Bill other members of the
Roosevelt Administration spoke out in favor of the plan. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes,
for example, proclaimed that the honor of the nation “demand[ed] that it take in refugee and
indicate to the world…that we still retain the status of asylum for the oppressed of which we
used to be proud.”563
The Committee planned to secure the necessary funding for the relief and maintenance of
refugee children and the legal satisfaction of the LPC clause. The extrication plan was
characterized as a dire attempt to secure young lives. The group’s mission statement gave
assurances that its efforts to shield European children from the “fearful fate of bombs and shell
fire”564 did not jeopardize official and private commitments to the ministration of the country’s
needy children. Echoing sentiments expressed during the Wagner-Rogers’ hearings, the
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USCCEC was certain that these humanitarian efforts would inculcate in American children the
tenets of democracy and productive citizenship. 565
The decision of His Majesty’s Government to consider the removal of children from
potential war zones was driven in part by civilian experiences during the recent Spanish Civil
War in which cities and towns fell victim to air assaults. 566 An evacuation plan had already been
developed before the outbreak of the European war. Infants, children, their mothers, expectant
women, and those with disabilities were to be dispersed from urban areas expected to be targeted
by the Luftwaffe. The scheme took two forms: 1. Internal movement to rural areas and 2.
External relocation to the Dominions and the United States.
The Children’s Overseas Reception Board (CORB), the official British counterpart to the
USCCEC, was established on June 7, 1940 under the directorship of Undersecretary of the
Dominions Geoffrey Shakespeare and charged with the selection of children for expatriation.
Overall, two hundred thousand applications for emigration were received by the Government. 567
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Importantly, the British Government announced, with the commencement of the Battle of
Britain, that twenty thousand school children were to be sent abroad. Clement R. Atlee, the Lord
Privy Seal, informed the House of Commons that the operation was urgent, and noted that
requests were increasingly received from east coast regions within range of German bombers.
The War Cabinet limited the children’s age range to 5-16 years, drawn across the span of the
British population. They were to be unaccompanied by parents unless their father had been a
casualty of the war. It was anticipated that the bulk of the financial support would be derived
from American sources. HMG officials hoped that the U.S. Government was willing to provide
flagged vessels to ensure the children a safer passage; a move that did not compromise essential
maritime efforts to transport critical war supplies to the island nation. 568
Undersecretary Shakespeare reported that U.S. Ambassador to London Joseph P.
Kennedy was actively seeking means to slash bureaucratic obstacles. 569 This goal was met when
the State Department adopted a streamlined approach, not considered for the German Refugee
Children’s Bill, that allowed the admittance of children at risk “in whatever numbers shipping
facilities and private assurance of support will permit.”570 Individual affidavits of support could
be wired to the Embassy in London by Western Union. USCCEC corporate guarantees of
568
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responsibility for the child’s financial maintenance, sustenance and supervision, coupled with
fulfillment of the LPC clause, were accepted by the State Department and resulted in the
issuance of immigration visas. 571
In response, FDR announced through his executive secretary that the U.S. Government
was collaborating fully in the evacuation plan, but the inadequacy of available British shipping
presented the major hindrance. This rate limiting step necessitated the usage of American flagged
vessels.572 Kennedy declared that the government had eliminated all bureaucratic encumbrances.
As a result, “no visa has been refused for any qualified child in England” and 13,000 were
cleared for departure. 573
Facing this, the American Embassy and consulates received thousands of requests for
evacuation and an average of one hundred entry visas were issued daily. 574 Canada served as the
first embarkation point as U.S. immigration law barred admittance of aliens whose fares had
been paid by a foreign government. The majority of the children were British due to the larger
size of an underutilized yearly quota, but also included smaller numbers of Czechs, Poles, Dutch,
and French children. German refugee children were excluded as American immigration law
required that aliens who had been granted visas must have the ability to return to their country of
571
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emigration. However, the 1935 Nuremberg Racial Laws had rendered German Jews and nonAryans stateless.
In spite of British Governmental support, official endorsement of the evacuation project
waned as the need for military transports, merchant vessels, and naval escorts intensified. Prime
Minister Winston Churchill warned that any decampment of women and children from the
United Kingdom risked the dissemination of “alarmist and depressing rumors… detrimental” to
the war effort but was willing to allow their exodus aboard American vessels. 575 The U-boat
sinking of the Arandora Star carrying German and Italian prisoners of war and internees to
Canada and its attendant loss of life, raised fundamental questions about the feasibility of
wholesale evacuation and prompted the government to disavow responsibility for overseas
emigration.576 The London authorities announced that the evacuation program was on the brink
of collapse due to its inability to provide protective convoys. Unless the United States furnished
fast liners, a move that conflicted with the terms of the Neutrality Act of 1939, the Cabinet was
prepared to end the scheme or declare that it was a “go at your own risk” program. 577
Ultimately, the USCCEC was officially notified by London of the suspension of the
evacuation plan, owing to inadequate protection of transport shipping. 578 Shortly thereafter,
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Jewish Representative Emanuel Celler announced Congressional plans to reshape the Neutrality
Act to allow the deployment of United States passenger liners to evacuate British children. 579
Consequently, a group of twenty-five prominent women established the American
Women’s Committee for the Release of Mercy Ships for European Children (AWCRMS). Their
goal was to launch a nationwide petition campaign calling for the amendment of Section 4 of the
Neutrality Act to authorize American shipping to traverse through and remove children from
declared war zones. 580 The Committee released a letter from a British mother that was
paradigmatic of parents confronting the dangers facing themselves, family, and the reality of
separation:
I shall be glad when I see…my little boys…going, because, like the majority of
people in England now, I have begun to wonder each time I put my head on the
pillow, whether there will be a morning for me or not. I’m going to fight, and 10
times as efficiently for the knowledge that children are safe. 581
The group acknowledged that the “course we recommend might lead to war,” 582 but they
doubted that “it would mean war.” 583 However, they insisted that its motivation was entirely
humanitarian, devoid of any other meaning than responding to the mothers of Britain who were
New York Times, “Celler Proposes Safe Conduct,” July 23, 1940. He stated that the more modern SS America,
Manhattan, and Washington were available for use.
579
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seeking American protection for their children; inspirations shared by members of the NSCGRC.
The group was very clear in its intent. It did not encourage British parents to send their children
overseas as it remained the parents’ responsibility to make the risk: benefit calculations. The
group merely sought to provide the necessary transportation. 584
As a result, Representatives Emanuel Celler and Thomas J. Hennings, Jr. (Dem., MO),
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced legislation that called for the
revamping of the Neutrality Act to authorize American flagged mercy ships, “well marked, and
lighted by night and day,”585 to enter disputed waters and withdraw British children. Hennings
argued that morality mandated American recognition of the existential perils confronting the
United Kingdom and render all available assistance to its children, dependent upon parental and
official British Governmental consent. He did not believe America risked being drawn into the
conflagration as it was a declared neutral power engaged in charitable actions. 586
Significantly, the Hennings Bill did not call for any change in current immigration law.
The children were to be admitted under the chronically under filled British quota, which
amounted to 65,721 per year or a maximum of 6,572 per month. All costs were to be borne by
private groups and organizations. American ships were to “proceed into a combat area under
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ballast,”587 under the condition that they were provided guarantees of free passage. Mercy ships
were not to be convoyed or armed eliminating any justification for a belligerent power to attack
the vessel.588 The AWCRMS wired Rep. Sol Bloom (Dem., NY), Jewish chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, calling for prompt hearings on the proposed legislation. 589
Perhaps of greater import, particularly in comparison with the Wagner-Rogers bill, was
the decision of the Departments of State and Justice to release unlimited numbers of open ended
visitors’ visas. The issuance of such documents had been bitterly resisted by opponents of the
German Refugee Children’s Bill. The National Origins Act required anyone granted such a
permit to demonstrate they possessed the financial means and authorization to return to their
country of origin. This assurance, provided by HMG, was strictly limited to British children.590
Hennings recognized that the predominant benefactors of the program were British and admitted
that this plan was not “a move… to aid England, but [one] of Christian deliverance…” 591 The
future world, he believed, gained from the preservation of the British child, infused with
democratic ideals, who would be of great value in reestablishing a post-war world.592 These
sentiments paralleled the earlier conviction of supporters of the Wagner-Rogers Bill that
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carefully selected and indoctrinated German Jewish and non-Aryan children could serve as a font
for useful and loyal American citizens.
The political and public criticism of the Hennings bill was, with few exceptions, minimal
when compared to that faced by the Wagner-Rogers bill. The Washington Post predicted
nominal opposition from Congress, including those with an isolationist bent, due to the nearly
unopposed public support of the justness and decency of rescuing children from the repugnance
and hazards of war.”593 Syndicated columnist Raymond Clapper described the plan as a project
of international selflessness and downplayed the hazards of U-boats by asserting Hitler was not
foolish enough to risk drawing America into war. In addition, Clapper claimed that confidential
sources within HMG were optimistic that guarantees of safe transit would be given by the
German regime if it was assured that the mercy ships were not transporting contraband.
Therefore, he asked: “Why not try it?” 594
Washington-based columnist Ray Tucker observed that Roosevelt was hesitant to back
the evacuation project in a “big, diplomatic way” 595 as he was reluctant to seek German
assurances; an official request risked an embarrassing refusal. Roosevelt was leaving the
mechanics of the operation to the British, but lack of convoy protection could force the U.S. to
commit its ships and risk conflict with Germany in the absence of adequate safeguards. 596
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Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 10323: “A
Bill to Provide a Temporary Haven from the Dangers or Effects of War for European Children
Under the Age of Sixteen” officially commenced on August 7, 1940. 597 Contrary to the course of
the Wagner-Rogers Bill, only ten days elapsed from the introduction of the bill to its final vote in
the House of Representatives. The German Refugee Children’s Bill, on the other hand, was sent
to Congress in February 1939 and entailed three separate hearings that ended with a final vote
four months later. In addition, Hennings reported that the financial surety bond required by the
State Department had been reduced from $500 to $50 per child. He argued that the Neutrality
Act had been conceived as a means of lessening the possibility of American involvement in the
European war and cited the executive power of the President to define war zones that excluded
U.S. shipping and personnel. As noted earlier, the American Red Cross had been granted an
exemption to this rule. 598
Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr. (Rep., NY), the Minority Leader of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, stressed the key requirement of guarantees of safe passage from all combatants and
ardently believed that the warring powers were likely to accept such a stipulation. Fish noted that
British children were able to enter the United States via one of two pathways: within the annual
and under utilized quota or with a visitors’ visa. He shared the British Ambassador’s doubts that
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the total number of children was likely to exceed fifty thousand due to the inherent expenses
involved in procuring shipping.
Fish’s support was contingent upon acceptance of non-British refugee children as he
would oppose the bill if it was limited to only one nation. Significantly, he believed that if
promises of unimpeded transit were given to German and Italian children then their respective
governments would be incentivized to reciprocate in kind. However, he asserted that of all the
children under consideration it was the British child who was “at the moment…in the greatest
danger” and comprised the bulk of the refugees.599 This comment harkened back to the
hypocritical insistence of opponents to the Wagner-Rogers Bill who insisted upon the acceptance
of children from other beleaguered nations.
Congressman Celler asserted that the Hennings Bill merely provided an exemption to
Section 4 of the Neutrality Act. He believed that neither Hitler nor Mussolini would be foolish
enough to deny safe conduct. The willingness of the United States to employ its fast ships
currently lying at anchor personified “an act of sheer mercy, the nth degree of humanity”600
designed to safeguard defenseless children from the throes of a “Nazi holocaust.” 601 Abnegation
of this moral accountability, Celler affirmed, would create an everlasting “blot upon [the]
national escutcheon.”602 He acknowledged that it was hard to qualify the degree of jeopardy: sail
or stay. However, he contended the vessels should be sent regardless of formal assurances
599
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because he was deeply convinced that neither Germany nor Italy desired a military confrontation
with the United States.603
Representative A. Leonard Allen challenged Celler, expressing his unwillingness to
endanger the lives of children or the loss of a vessel based solely on German pledges. Celler
admitted that he was willing to take that risk and averred that the Fuehrer dared “not risk
condemnation in the world court of public opinion.” 604
FDR, who had spoken minimally about the Evian Conference and not publicly about the
Wagner-Rogers Bill, stated that the assistance of United States ships was contingent “upon the
validity of assurance of safe conduct.” 605 The nation did not want to make this commitment
without such guarantees. A Gallup Poll conducted during August 1940 asked whether the public
agreed with or opposed the dispatching of U.S. passenger ships to the United Kingdom to
evacuate British children, provided Germany and Italy insured they would not be attacked.
Uniform responses were obtained across the nation with 63 percent supportive and 37 percent
against the plan. The number in favor of the amendment, however, diminished to 45 percent if
secure passage was not secured. 606
Congressman William M. Colmer (Dem., MS) argued that the Neutrality Act had kept the
country out of the conflict and warned that its modification warranted careful deliberation. He
was concerned that an accidental or intentional sinking of an American mercy ship, with its
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resultant loss of life, could propel the nation into the war. Nevertheless, he supported the
amendment.607 Michigan Republican Congressman Earl C. Michener highlighted the danger of
an unintentional foundering by mines lain in war zones despite belligerent affirmations. Adverse
American opinions stimulated by heightened emotions, he admonished, threatened United States
involvement.608
Representative John M. Robison (Rep., KY), one of the very small number of
Congressional members who opposed the amendment, offered some of the most vociferous
objections to the Hennings Bill. His line of argument varied widely from the criticisms of the
Wagner-Rogers Bill, although it retained some of the same assertions. He insisted that the
House Immigration and Naturalization committee had provided insufficient information
regarding the terms of the legislation and its implications. Decision making, he believed must be
based on rational thought rather than emotions. He observed that, unlike the 1939 measure, a
numerical cap had not been placed on the number of British children that could be admitted. This
deficiency, he predicted would lead to a breach of the quota system. Robison declared that the
bill’s sponsors were not concerned with the lives and security of these children, but were more
interested in their propaganda value as a means of further aligning the U.S. with the United
Kingdom. Significantly, he described the plan as devoid of substance, as he highly doubted that
Germany or Italy would provided the desired guarantees. He warned that a fortuitous sinking by
mines or submarines must draw America into the war; a conflict whose effects would reverberate
for years throughout the population. He also noted that European children were already
victimized by the Royal Navy blockade of the European coast. Fears of involvement in a second
607
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Continental war, however, were insufficient to dissuade supporters of the Hennings Bill, as they
had with the Wagner-Rogers Bill.609
The Hennings bill was reported out of the House on August 7 with minimal opposition.
Several amendments were added by the Senate, which voted unanimously on August 19 for its
adoption.610 The bill was sent back to the House three days later for a vote on Senatorial changes,
adopted, and sent on to the White House where Roosevelt signed it into law; six weeks from the
beginning of the Women’s Committee’s petition campaign.
Thereafter, the Treasury Department announced that it granted a tax exemption of $400
to the head of any household that accepted and supported a European child refugee. However,
this credit was not applicable to British children who came from families with sufficient means
to provide for their care. A similar monetary incentive and liberal allocation of visitors’ visas had
not been included in the Wagner-Rogers Bill. The House Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization agreed to provide 200,000 British youth younger than 16 years of these children
with two-year renewable, visitors’ visas; a dramatically larger number of immigrants than called
for by the German Refugee Children’s Bill who were denied such papers. However, other
nationalities were obligated to enter via the quota system as it was uncertain whether they could
return to their country of origin following the war’s conclusion. Although not formally declared,
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both the Departments of State and Justice indicated that it was a certainty that children removed
from the island nation would be British.611
The bill, however, was nonetheless probably destined for frustration, since the German
government refused to grant secure passage for mercy ships traversing war zones and labeled the
humanitarian impulses as fanciful owing to the heavy mining of enemy waters. The Reich
refused to accept any liability for the “impracticality of the plan.” 612 The Women’s Mercy Ship
Committee also had significant difficulties in the procurement of adequate shipping. However, it
was the submarine sinking of the transport, S.S. City of Benares, on September 17, 1940 with the
loss of 256 lives of which 77 out of 90 children died, that led to the British government’s
termination of the official program of overseas evacuation. 613
When nationally syndicated columnist Ludwell Denny, in a series of articles dealing with
the issue of refugee children, attempted to explain the failure of the Wagner-Rogers Bill in the
context of the Hennings legislation. The National Origins Act, with its eugenic underpinnings,
gave preferential treatment to the more desirable children from Northern Europe at the expense
of Jewish and non-Jewish children refugees from Germany and Southern and Eastern Europe.
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The rejection of the earlier Wagner-Rogers Bill, he insisted, was largely the direct consequence
of anti-Semitism. In addition, with the German occupation of Western Europe and the threats
facing the British population, German Jews and political refugees appeared less significant.
Consequently, popular and political resistance to the admission of select alien children refugees
diminished.614 His answer, however, is incomplete and rather simplistic as divisions within the
American Jewish community and strong reluctance to engage in any action that could stimulate
domestic anti-Semitism placed stringent constraints on Jewish activism for their German
counterparts.
Greater press coverage and publicity was devoted to the plight of the British children in
1940 than to the Jewish and non-Aryan subjects of the Wagner-Rogers bill. This was similar to
the paucity of public attention Roosevelt gave to German and European Jews during the pre- and
early years of the conflict. Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the Jewish publisher of the New York Times,
has been described as an “unabashed Anglophile.” 615 Leff observed that Sulzberger was
concerned about accusations of “dual loyalties” 616 and regarded Judaism “solely [as] a religious
[and not as] a racial or ethnic orientation” 617 that was infused with a “special obligation to help
fellow Jews.”618 He asserted that attempts of American Jewry to aid their German co-religionists
eroded their identity as Americans first and foremost. His paper published during 1940 “nine
impassioned editorials with impatient headlines such as ‘No Time to Lose” and ‘They Must be
Pittsburgh Press, August 1, 1940, Ludwell Denny, “America and the Refugees: U.S. Will Demand Proper
Care for War Orphans,” 13.
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Saved,’”619 pleading with Congress to make the requisite changes to the Neutrality Act. The
daily printed three page one stories and five photo spreads emphasizing primarily small and
blond haired children as well as a magazine article containing many photos of British children.
Conversely, it had only published a single editorial supporting the Wagner-Rogers bill followed
by a total of eight dealing with the Continental refugee problem throughout the entire course of
the World War II. 620
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CHAPTER 10:
APPRAISALS OF OPPORTUNITIES LOST
“Oh, haven’t you heard the news?
“We’re at war to save the Jews,
For a hundred years they press our pants,
Now we must die for them in France,
So we sing the Doughboy Blues.
“It’s a hellova fate to choose,
To die to save the Jews,
But the New-Deal busted and left us flat,
So this war was hatched by the Democrat
To end our New-Deal Blues.
“They say that we mustn’t lose,
If we lose, we lose the Jews,
So shout it into a thousand mikes,
Though we lose our lives we must save the kikes!
And Sing the Doughboy Blues.”621

Conflicting assessments of the response of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his
Administration, Congress, and the Gentile and Jewish American public to the great Central
European immigration crises of 1933-1940 were evoked in contemporary debates and have been
analyzed within the historiography of the Holocaust era. Essentially, two diametrically opposed
schools of thought have evolved, but with some writers adopting a middle ground. Academic and
non-academic historians, journalists, attorneys, and former government officials have produced
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frequently cited works, which has fueled the ongoing controversy. David Wyman, Henry L.
Feingold and additional authors articulate the position that the Roosevelt Administration acted to
maintain the level of Jewish immigration below legally mandated levels. The Department of
State and its consulates, they declared, were influenced by anti-Semitism, isolationism, and
nativism, and actively engaged in a policy to deny visas to refugee applicants. FDR, it was
believed, deliberately remained detached from or was obstructive to the refugee issue for
political and personal reasons. Richard D. Breitman and Alan M. Kraut assert that it was the
machinery and indifference of governmental bureaucracy that represented the primary
impediment to immigration. Others such as Robert Rosen and William J. vanden Heuvel argue
that FDR employed every possible means within legal, political, social, and security constraints
to afford rescue.
The interpretation of decisions made or avoided regarding the admission of stateless
refugees, and who was entitled to or should be denied citizenship, must be viewed within the
context of the Great Depression, influenced by diverse political interests, priorities, and
ideologies, rooted in nationalism, isolationism, nativism, religion, and anti-Semitism. FDR
remains the central figure within this debate as varied opinions have evolved over his ability or
willingness to engage in rescue while accepting its attendant political risks.
During the first major wave of scholarship Arthur Morse, 622 David Wyman, Henry
Feingold, and Saul Friedman623 argued that America, influenced by prejudice, fear of foreign
dogma, isolationism stemming from the failed outcomes of the Great War, and economic
depression, offered little more than public expressions of sympathy to the victims of Nazi
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persecution while preserving immigration barriers. The collective response was, they declared,
muted, ineffectual and contradictory. Although the Final Solution was unforeseeable at the time,
it was evident to many that Jews and non-Aryans could no longer survive within the Reich. The
“need for rescue was painfully clear,” 624 but any chance for deliverance was forfeited by October
1941.625 Roosevelt functioned as the crucial link that connected the three major refugee projects
of this time: the Evian Conference, the Wagner-Rogers Bill, and the Hennings Bill. His notorious
unwillingness significantly impacted the outcome of these schemes that collectively failed.
FDR advised his first Ambassador to Germany, William Dodd, that the treatment of the
Jewish minority was purely a German concern. Dodd noted in his diary on June 16, 1933 that the
President said, “This is not [a United States] governmental affair. We can do nothing except for
citizens who happen to be made victims… and do whatever we can to moderate the general
persecution by unofficial and personal influence.” 626 Secretary of State Hull reinforced this
policy when he instructed the Berlin Embassy to inform Reich officials that the United States
Government was not going to “interfere in any way in matters which are essentially the domestic
concern of Germany.”627 U.S. diplomatic intervention was limited to the FDR’s recall of Dodd’s
successor, Hugh Wilson, as a reaction to Kristallnacht. However, Hull did not support this
action.628 Under-Secretary Sumner Welles, as late as April 1939, opposed the unrestricted
admission of aliens who claimed to be suffering from religious, political or racial persecution.
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Entry, he asserted, risked provoking detrimental “delicate and hazardous diplomatic
situations.”629 Therefore, an application for immigration, an onerous task in itself, would remain
the only means of gaining access into America.
Many German Jewish and non-Aryan aliens attempting to enter the United States faced a
bureaucratic labyrinth of governmental, and particularly, State Department red tape;
requirements that waxed and waned dependent upon the particular ethnic group under
consideration—onerous to some and facile for others. Although not considered a special class
within the context of immigration laws and denied such categorization, refugees from the Reich
faced multiple hurdles: the provision to an American consul of proof of an unexpired passport,
certification from local police authorities of personal good conduct, and financial assurances and
affidavits that satisfied the Likely to Become a Public Charge clause. 630
Loss of citizenship under the 1935 Nuremberg Racial Laws and progressive
impoverishment from Aryanization and confiscation created burdensome and potentially
insurmountable obstacles for the would-be émigré. Failure to satisfactorily complete an official
document that could reach 50-60 pages in length resulted in rejection and the necessity of
repeating the paperwork odyssey. 631 Still, the American Jewish Committee, comprised of more
affluent Jews, opposed any increase in the annual German quota, but favored a loosening of
entry requirements. They did manage to obtain a modicum of positive changes in State and
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Labor Department procedures that had minimal impact on the refugee problem as a whole. 632
One Jewish writer derided the time honored “sha-sha philosophy (“quiet diplomacy” 633) of
Jewish polemics,”634 espoused by the Committee that attempted to “turn away wrath with gentle
words, to obscure the Jew from public gaze.” 635
FDR ordered officials abroad to treat refugees applying for entry visas with
understanding and sympathy; instructions ignored by the State Department. 636 Undersecretary of
State William Phillips gave assurances in 1934 to the Committee that consuls had been instructed
to employ the greatest latitude when considering applications. However, in reality they continued
their restrictive practices out of concern that entrants might possess a significant criminal
history.637

Frederick Lazin, “The Response of the American Jewish Committee to the Crisis of Germany Jewry, 19331939,” American Jewish History 68, no. 3 (March 1979): 297. The Committee convinced the Departments in 1933
to waive the necessity of a refugee obtaining a “certificate of character” from the local German police. Fiduciary
bonds posted before a visa application was filed also became acceptable.
632

Lazin, “The Response,” 284-285. “Quiet diplomacy” was a strategy that was based upon the belief that a
backdoor approach to Roosevelt, the State Department and the administration by Jews and Christians could result in
positive actions to ameliorate the refugee crisis. This strategy attempted to employ the influence of “close, personal,
professional and political ties” to Washington while avoiding public censure of government policies. Lavin, in this
detailed analysis of the workings of the AJC concluded that it was markedly ineffective and resulted in few
perceptible results.
633

634
H.C. Engelbrecht, Joshua Tractenberg, et a, “How to Combat Anti-Semitism in America: The Six Prize
Winning Essays in the Contest Conducted by Opinion—A Journal of Life and Letters” (NY: Jewish Opinion Pub.
Corp., 1937), 33; American Jewish Year Book, vol. 39, September 6, 1937-September 24, 1938, 76-78. This
competition was sponsored by the American Jewish Congress, comprised predominantly of members of the
professional and middle classes, and was a frequent adversary of the American Jewish Committee, which opposed
public protests and the economic boycott of Nazi Germany.
635

Engelbrecht, “How to Combat,” 33.

636

Robert Beir, Roosevelt and the Holocaust: A Rooseveltian Examines the Policies and Remembers the Times.
(Fort Lee, NJ: Barricade, 2006), 261.
637

Consul Geist to Secretary Hull, March 5, 1934, 150.626J/74 in Bat-Ami Zucker, In Search of Refuge: Jews
and US Consuls in Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2001), 42.

200

It was not until the latter months of 1940 that the State Department, in accordance with
the recommendations of the President’s Advisory Committee for Political Refugees, categorized
German Jewish and non-Aryan refugees as political refugees who no longer required exit
permits. This new classification was sharply defined as:
Persons of outstanding character and reputation with intellectual accomplishment
in the learned profession…who are either in physical danger or in danger of being
so circumscribed and hindered in the practice of their profession that it would be
for the welfare of civilization that they be removed to the United States as a haven
of safety.638
However, the LPC clause, first enacted in 1882, remained in force and continued to present a
formidable barrier to admission. 639
American Jewish historian David Brody noted official concessions stifled “discernable
agitation”640 from many Jewish organizations for the subsequent four years as maintenance of
the status quo was the desired aim. The number of émigrés admitted increased slightly but
historians Barbara McDonald Stewart, the daughter of James G. McDonald, and David Wyman
observed that American foreign officers continued their capricious practices of intolerance,
abnegation, and conscious under filling of the yearly allotment. It was also noted that the consuls
frequently denied entry visas to applicants despite provision of the required documents. 641 While
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the quota’s entire pool of admissible immigrants numbered 2,616,000 during 1930-1946, only
560,000 landed on American shores. 642
Raymond H. Geist, the long-serving Consul and First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in
Berlin, declared that Jews were gradually being “condemned to death” 643 but the overall process
was proceeding far too quickly for the global community to intervene effectively. However, in
spite of such a dire view, he theorized that if an agreement could be reached with the Nazi
authorities to facilitate mass emigration, Germany, in return, was likely to temper its
exclusionary policies. This approach, Geist concluded, would have enabled the Reich to achieve
its judenrein goal. His conjecture, however, was fatally flawed due to the unwillingness of
nations to liberalize immigration; resistance that was well illuminated during the Evian
Conference. Indeed, the Nazi regime had repeatedly expressed intent to eliminate their Jewish
population. Moderation was incommensurate with such a worldview. 644 Assistant Secretary of
State Messersmith adduced that the prevention of further anti-Jewish actions was unachievable.
The resolution of the Jewish refugee problem was, in his opinion, insoluble without “the
reestablishment of decent governments…and decent treatment of people at home.” 645 War
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provided the only means to consummate such an end; a battle to be conducted not for
humanitarian reasons but for the safeguarding of American interests. 646
In contrast, historian Daniel Tichenor commented that the 1940 enactment of the
Hennings Bill demonstrated that an “ethnic and racial hierarchy” guided the quota system and its
allocation of visitors’ visas. Once the preferred national group was selected impediments were
rapidly extirpated.647 On the other hand, following Kristallnacht Roosevelt authorized the release
of 12,000-15,000 visitors’ visas to German Jews within the United States. They were granted
permission to remain for six months in renewable blocks. Despite this presidential action the
State Department Visa Division director Avra Warren instructed consuls to avoid complacency
in the dispensation of these visas. 648 Commissioner of Immigration James L. Houghteling,
however, noted in early 1939 that the actual number of visitors’ visas granted to German Jewish
refugees did not exceed 5,000. 649
Meanwhile, Assistant Undersecretary of State Breckinridge Long actively contrived to
bar entry of German and other European Jews into the United States. The dispensation of visas,
he stated, could be interminably delayed by consular obstruction and administrative obstacles
that would “postpone and postpone and postpone.” These personal reservations, however, did not
significantly apply to British Christian children refugees. 650
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Contemporary observers and later historians believed that Roosevelt had demonstrated,
particularly from 1938-1945, “a pattern of decreasing sensitivity towards the plight of the
European Jews”651 due to prioritization of American domestic and foreign concerns and personal
beliefs.652 Various attendees and observers of the Evian Conference, for example, were highly
skeptical of the enterprise’s success. FDR had initiated the conference with a modicum of
preparedness and inadequate planning and rarely spoke of it afterwards. Consequently, most
representatives went hesitantly without confidence in the endeavor. George Rublee concluded
that the President was not personally engaged with his own proposition. 653 The absence of
comprehensive forethought and creation of the necessary groundwork, he argued, ensured
failure. If the United States had presented concrete proposals, rather than accentuating its
consolidation of two quotas, some form of positive action might have been achievable.
However, economic concerns and anxieties of provoking anti-Jewish backlashes among their
respective populations led foreign delegations and their governments to equivocate while seeking
the “absolute minimum of practical measures.” 654
Roosevelt was careful not to commit personal thoughts and opinions to paper but
intermittently voiced his attitude towards Jews and Catholics. He recounted his endorsement of
establishing religious quotas for Harvard University. While serving on the university’s Board of
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Overseers in 1923 he called for a reduction in the percentage of Jewish and Catholic students
admitted per year. He believed it was essential to avoid a “disproportionate amount of any
religion.”655 FDR also claimed that Polish anti-Semitism stemmed from Jewish control of the
nation’s economy. 656 Leo Crowley, the Alien Property Custodian, related to Treasury Secretary
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., on January 21, 1942 that the President had reminded him that the United
States was a “Protestant country, and the Catholics and Jews [were] here on sufferance…” 657
Following the successful occupation of North Africa, Roosevelt stated that it was important to
establish limits on occupations available for Jews as a means of “eliminat[ing] the specific and
understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany.” 658 FDR
explained to Winston Churchill during the Casablanca Conference of 1943 that resolution of the
Jewish Question necessitated “spread[ing] them thin”659 across the globe in less populated areas.
Vice President Wallace recounted a conversation between Roosevelt and Churchill
during a White House visit on May 22, 1943. They were discussing the topic of post-war
planning and FDR related his long-standing pre-war engagement of Isaiah Bowman, a noted
geographer and current president of Johns Hopkins, to determine the best means of resolving the
Jewish Question. The scholar, according to Wallace, recommended dispersing the Jews in small
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groups around the world. 660 Bowman had a reputation of being an anti-Semite and had
established an admittance quota system at his university. He commented that Jews did not seek
entrance into Hopkins as a means of improving the world but “to make money and to marry nonJewish women.”661
Raphael Medoff and others suggest that FDR’s relationship with Bowman reveal a
connection between the President’s personal attitudes towards Jews and schemes of overseas
resettlement.662 Roosevelt running as the 1920 Democratic Party Vice Presidential candidate
stated that aliens tended to congregate within large urban areas generating overcrowding and
racial bigotry that interfered with the process of assimilation. The only solution to this
progressive ghettoization was dispersal in small numbers across the country. 663
The New York Times concluded it was no longer possible for the United States to
continue to serve as the sanctuary for the oppressed. The nation’s economic calamity that crossed
all social, religious, ethnic, and political boundaries could not support an infusion of alien
refugees. Rather, colonization into remote and underdeveloped regions of the world provided a
potential viable option. 664 Roosevelt did provide assurances to James G. McDonald and George
Warren, advisor to Myron C. Taylor, that given the proper opportunity, he would seek a
$150,000,000 Congressional appropriation to subsidize the resettlement of German Jews.

660

Ibid., 210-211. Bowman had had served as the principal consultant to President Woodrow Wilson on
geographical matters at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919.
Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2003), 242, 246-247, 309.
661

662

Medoff, “American Responses,” 386.

663

Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2003), 236.
664

New York Times, “The Refugees,” November 16, 1938, 22.

206

Breitman et al regard this pledge, which was described as the “reverse side of FDR’s subsequent
unwillingness to endorse the Wagner-Rogers Bill”665 as a token, not a resolution of a massive
refugee crisis.
Political concerns also influenced FDR’s attitudes towards the admission of foreigners.
The First Lady, following the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, called on her
husband to increase the immigration quotas and pressure the State Department to mitigate its
impediments to Jewish immigration. He cautioned that such action would cost him the support of
the powerful chairmen of important Senate and House Committees; politicians who would desert
the party and obstruct every legislative proposal required to prevent the country from foundering.
The President concluded that a divided Democratic Party jeopardized the nation’s preparation for
war, which was his highest priority. 666 Southern Democrats, who opposed any liberalization of
immigration laws, represented his strongest bloc of Congressional supporters. They voted 127:0
for the 1924 Immigration Act and 106:3 to revise the Neutrality Act of 1939. The Chief
Executive’s advocacy for Jewish refugees risked political confrontations, erosion of support, and
retaliation from Capitol Hill anti-immigrationists.
Congressional representatives, in general, who expressed support for changes to the quota
system faced potential political retribution. A mid-1939 Fortune poll asked the public to
consider, if they were members of Congress, would they be supportive of or against the
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admission of European refugees. Results indicated that 84 percent of Catholics, 85 percent of
Protestants, and 25.8 percent of Jews were resistant to any liberalization of the quota. 667
Edwin “Pa” Watson, the Presidential Press Secretary, recollected that FDR’s lack of
support for the German Refugee Children’s Bill ensured the demise of the legislation. However,
he observed that children under consideration in the Henning Bill were “English and Christians,
not Jews. [Therefore,] the patriotic organizations sure won’t object to this one… mak[ing]
things a hell of a lot easier.”668 Historian William Nawyn noted that the latter legislation was
carefully worded as it was clearly designed for the benefit of British children. Various public
opinion polls demonstrated a predominance of support. FDR, always attuned to the winds of
popular sensibilities was, according to Nawyn, ready to express official support for the plan,
despite the intrinsic realities of the problem of safe passage. 669
FDR, ever the consummate politician, skillfully employed the media as a means of
disseminating acclamatory news reports that overwhelmed negative editorials and dominated
front pages to the consternation of his many political foes. 670 He fastidiously employed the bully
pulpit supplied by Presidential News Conferences and fireside chats to engender a news stream
that overshadowed other press stories. 671 Roosevelt frequently appropriated reporters’ questions
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as a means of promoting, avoiding, and framing the policies of his administration and diverting
or suppressing the reaction of the media and public to current events or governmental actions.
He was not averse to providing journalists with queries on topics he wished to discuss. 672
Steven Casey, Lecturer in International History, London School of Economics, believed
that Roosevelt not only maneuvered to influence frames of mind but was in return susceptible to
the “shifting attitudes of opinion makers,” 673 principally those of reporters, editors, and
columnists who opposed liberalization of quota law or immigration in general. 674
A correspondent recognized that the President had the ability to quickly ascertain the
tenor of the country and the relative importance of “current events, trends, [and] problems” 675
from the manner in which press questions were posed and the character of their construction.
Although the most anti-Semitic acts were occurring with disconcerting and troubling regularity,
Roosevelt maneuvered in a manner to keep his political interests aligned with popular opinion
while avoiding conflicts with an antagonistic Congress.676 FDR also established the Division of
Press Intelligence during 1933-1939 to monitor and analyze the reporting and editorializing of
approximately four hundred newspapers, providing the White House with a daily “intelligence
report”677 of media and national attitudes.678 A 1995 analysis of the themes of the President’s
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first seven State of the Union addresses concluded that Roosevelt responded to “coverage in the
newspapers more than he influenced subsequent coverage”; a trend that continued during the
wartime years.679
FDR maintained a significant level of public silence regarding the situation confronting
Central European Jewry. Only one reporter raised the subject of minority persecutions within the
Reich during the course of eighty-two press conferences held during 1933. The journalist
inquired whether Roosevelt or other administration officials had been approached by refugee
organizations to develop policies that could abate such treatment. The President admitted the
reception of many entreaties, but all referred to the State Department for consideration. The next
reference to Jews in a Presidential news conference took place 5 years and 348 forums later on
September 2, 1938, when he was asked if he had an opinion regarding a Fascist Italian plan to
expel 22,000 foreign Jews; Roosevelt responded “no.” FDR was questioned by the press on
seven separate occasions about his response to Kristallnacht and its aftermath, but offered only
one definitive statement: the Labor Department had been instructed to extend the duration of
fifteen thousand German and Austrian tourist visas with the qualification that they were “not all
Jews by any means.”680
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Anti-Semitism helped to shape the debate over German Jewish refugee immigration,
particularly among certain State Department officials and members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. This was especially true during the crucial years of the 1930s
and 1940.681 Personal journals of members of the diplomatic corps provide a window into antiJewish currents that flowed through this department. Assistant Secretary of State and later
Ambassador to Fascist Italy William Phillips described a Soviet official on May 23, 1923 as a
“perfect little rat of a Jew.”682 Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle recorded in his diary
during 1940 that American Jews were collectively willing to “sacrifice [United States] interests
to English interests…It is horrible to see one phase of the Nazi propaganda justifying itself a
little.”683 The majority of consuls shared similar demographic backgrounds: white Anglo-Saxon
Protestants of the mid-to-upper economic classes who frequently held anti-Semitic and antiimmigrationist beliefs. 684
The plurality of Congressional legislators who espoused such rhetoric were not,
according to American Jewish historian Edward Shapiro, “intrinsically anti-Semitic.”685
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However, the conviction that American and European Jewry were conspiring to draw the nation
into conflict with Nazi Germany on their behalf resonated among these politicians and
significant segments of the population.686 Cultural historian John Higham argued that
“ideological anti-Semitism,”687 discrimination based upon negative ethnic and social stereotypes,
represented a form of nativism or “anti-foreign spirit”688 that branded Jews as inassimilable and
unfaithful to the democratic ideals of the Republic; members of a far-flung international
conspiracy that sought financial domination, erosion of moral values, collapse of the central
government, and the creation of a “superstate.”689
Congressmen Louis T. McFadden and John C. Schafer exemplified Higham’s construct.
These men employed rising global tensions and fear of American involvement in a new
European war as an opportunity to validate their antipathy towards the broader Jewish
community. McFadden was stirred by the supposed revelations of The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion, influenced by Henry Ford’s The International Jew, and fervently supported William
Dudley Pelley, the leader of the far-right Silver Shirts.690

686

Scott-Martin Kosofsky, Jonathan B. Sarna, and Ellen Smith, The Jews of Boston (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2005), 335. The Radio Priest, Charles E. Coughlin, drew support, for example, from white collar
Irish Catholics residing in Boston, when he claimed that Jews were attempting to entangle the United States in a war
with Germany to “save British financial and imperial interests, as well as Zionism.”
687
John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 2008), xi.
688

John Higham, Send Them to Me: Immigrants in Urban America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984), 11
689

Frank E. Eakin, What Price Prejudice? Christian Anti-Semitism in America (NY: New York Paulist Press,
1998), 95.
Shapiro, “The Approach of War,” 47; Lee J. Levinger, Anti-Semitism: Yesterday and Tomorrow (NY:
Macmillan, 1936), 140, 177; Henry Ford, The International Jew: The World’s Foremost Problem (Dearborn, MI:
Dearborn, 1920). McFadden espoused the doctrine that an international Jewish cabal-controlled Wall Street, the
Federal Reserve, programs of the New Deal, the supply of silver, the press, the world’s banking system, and
facilitated the immigration of Communists into the United States in order to establish a socialist state.
690

212

Furthermore, he endorsed the Hitlerian agenda to disenfranchise and isolate German
Jewry by ending its purported monopoly over national finances, politics, media, the professions,
and universities. McFadden opposed the economic boycott of Nazi Germany and eschewed
reports of the persecution of Jews.691 The Reich, he argued, represented the decisive bulwark
against an expansionist Jewish led Soviet Union that sought the establishment of an American
Communist state.692 This theme, Shapiro believed, resonated within future Congressional antiSemitic discourse, particularly after the outbreak of war: Jews coveted an American military
confrontation with the Reich “so that [Jewish financiers and bankers] and their Gentile
fronts…may reap rich profits on everything an army needs.”693 Representative John C. Schafer, a
fervent acolyte of Charles Coughlin, a House committee opponent of the Wagner-Rogers Bill,
and a dedicated isolationist, was overtly anti-Semitic and had been denounced for harboring
affinities with National Socialists. He accused the collective Jewish community of radicalism
responsible for the New Deal and its policies that paralleled Soviet “socialistic [and]

691

Arnold A. Rogow, ed., The Jew in a Gentile World: An Anthology of Writings about Jews by Non-Jews (NY:
Macmillan, 1961), 317.
692
Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Session, June 15, 1934, 11841-11843; Congressional Record, 73rd
Cong., 1st Session, June 15, 1933, 6225-6227. Gail Ann Sindell, Gerald B. Winrod and the Defender: A Case Study
of the Radical Right (Ph.D. Dissertation: Case Western Reserve University, 1973), 221. Sindell argued that
McFadden’s linkage of international Jewry with Soviet Communism, colored by the tenets of the Protocols,
empowered the anti-Semitic extremism of Gerald B. Winrod and his fellow radical travelers. Frank E. Eakin, What
Price Prejudice? Christian Antisemitism in America.
693
Shapiro, “The Approach of War,” 48; Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Session, June 15, 1933, 62256227. These anti-war sentiments and accusations of financial greed replicated earlier accusations made by Senators
Charles W. Norris and Robert M. La Follette, Sr. that the United States had been maneuvered into the Great War
through the machinations of London and New York banking houses, and munitions manufacturers. George W.
Norris, Fighting Liberal: The Autobiography of George W. Norris (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
1973), 195; Nancy Unger, Fighting Bob La Follette: The Righteous Reformer (Madison, WI: Wisconsin Historical
Society Press, 2008), 245.

213

communistic” ideologies. 694
The hesitation of Jewish members of Congress, such as Representatives Celler and
Sabath, to promote admission of German Jewry, was commensurate with the sentiments of many
of their American co-religionists. Although Jews had a long tradition of offering communal aid
and charity it was feared that a mass influx of refugees would overwhelm communal and
welfare-agency resources during a time of economic depression. 695 Wealthier Jews were
indisposed to underwrite large-scale immigration. One Jewish journalist observed that the
affluent felt increasingly encumbered by “brethren…who [were] in distress”696 and derided the
admission of immigrants likely to become dependent upon the public dole. 697 As the depression
worsened, many Jews also experienced economic bigotry, functioning as a “’submerged
class’”698 liable to be replaced by Christian workers, as non-Jewish Americans frequently
regarded refugees as lower paid competitors for jobs. 699
Konrad Heiden, a prominent German-American journalist, reported in 1945 that many
influential Jews, national groups, and organizations endorsed immigration constraints due to
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concerns that Christians associated them with foreign Jews regarded as undesirable aliens. It was
believed, Heiden concludes, that the strengthening of an ethnic bond between the two countries
destabilized the social, political, and economic positioning of American Jewry, jeopardized the
gains they had made over time in a predominantly Gentile nation, and stimulated domestic antiSemitism. Feelings of insecurity, therefore, contributed to the acceptance of draconian
immigration laws and requirements, supporting Arthur Morse’s contention that a substantial
percentage of Jews were as unconcerned with the fate of German and Austrian Jews as many of
their Gentile countrymen. 700
Joseph Billikopf, a social worker, contemporary arbitrator of labor disputes, and
philanthropist, informed immigrant activist Cecelia Razovsky of the National Refugee Service,
that Jews had approached the Departments of State and Labor to express their disapproval of the
Wagner-Rogers Bill. While he could comprehend the rationale of their objections, he regarded
their obstructiveness or “even opinion in influential Washington circles [as]
something…disgusting, to say the least.” 701 Evidently, he concluded, there were segments of the
Jewish population who assessed German Jews as a threat to their established position, and
relatively stable, but tenuous relationships with Gentile Americans. They regarded intensification
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of domestic anti-Semitism as a definite possibility and conducted their actions with an air of
irresoluteness.702
Journalist Arthur Morse, was the first to examine policies and actions of the U.S.
Government towards the Nazi enactment of the Final Solution. He declares the country could
have done more to save lives, but was limited by an unwillingness to liberalize a restrictive quota
system, refusal to participate in League of Nations immigration conferences, or to exert pressure
on Britain to open the door to Palestine. The advent of war led the government to adopt more
exclusionary barriers and ultimately, the active suppression of news reports of Nazi genocide. He
concludes that overt anti-Semitism influenced the State Department, particularly Undersecretary
of State Breckinridge Long, to obstruct entry of Jewish refugees. 703
University of Massachusetts History Professor David Wyman was the first scholar to ask
why America, its political leadership, and the public, failed to enact rescue efforts that reflected
its national strength and will? His first work, Paper Walls, deals with the crucial period of 19381941, and his second, Abandonment of the Jews, focuses upon the war years of 1941-1945. Both
volumes offer similar arguments, but the tenor and range of Wyman’s criticism mount in the
latter. He asserts that by 1938 it was clear that the situation of German Jewry had deteriorated to
a point that extrication was imperative for their survival. The Reich policy of forced emigration
accelerated during this period but effectively ended by October 1941. Significantly, public
sympathy towards Jews that had been widely expressed following Kristallnacht did not
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metamorphose into a willingness to accept stateless and impoverished refugees. Wyman
proposes three reasons for this discordance: rising anti-Semitism, “nativistic nationalism,” 704 and
widespread unemployment. Fear of spies, threat of a Fifth Column, and saboteurs enhanced this
equation with the entrance of the United States into World War II.
Roosevelt, according to the author, played an “ambiguous role” 705 in the search for a
workable solution to the refugee problem. Wyman recognizes that the United States had accepted
more refugees than any other country, but proportionately, the United Kingdom, France, The
Netherlands, and other European nations had admitted more. 706 The major factor constraining
immigration into America remained the strict interpretation and enforcement of the quota
system. Congressional resistance, State Department obstructionism, public antipathy, and
Presidential risk avoidance and increasing personal detachment eliminated any chance of
significantly modifying the National Origins Act. FDR’s incertitude towards Jewish immigrants,
his penchant for colonization schemes in remote and undeveloped regions, and his delegation of
admission policies to the State Department ensured that German Jewish refugees faced
increasing levels of resistance to entry. By June 1940, Wyman notes, the Department, citing
security concerns, had reduced the number of émigrés from Germany, Central and Eastern
Europe by half.
Importantly, the writer claims that the State Department and the British Foreign Office
were never going to carry out large-scale programs of mass rescue. Both nations feared that if
Germany and its allied nations freed thousands of Jews then they would be compelled to admit
704
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them into the United States or the Palestine Mandate. Consequently, each adopted policies of
obstructionism and diversion of popular opinion. The Presidential Advisory Committee for
Political Refugees, established by Roosevelt in 1938 to formulate rescue plans, was rendered
impotent from its inception: It did not receive government funding, but was dependent upon
$15,000 per year donated by the American Joint Distribution Committee, a Jewish organization,
and it deferred decision making to the Department of State. 707
Roosevelt, according to Wyman was reticent to intervene due to potential political costs,
and his general approach was driven by carefully contrived expediency. FDR was assured of
continued Jewish electoral loyalty, but he recognized that open support for German Jewish
immigration engendered unacceptable risks to his favored programs and goals. Emanuel Celler,
looking back years after the end of the war, observed the President failed to provide a “spark of
courageous leadership [while remaining] silent, indifferent, and insensitive” 708 to the dangers
confronting Jewry.
Wyman ended his works by assigning responsibility for collective inertia to a variety of
hosts. He indicts society as a whole for allowing U.S. refugee policy to institutionalize
indifference. If decision-making was interpreted in the context of its era, official policy towards
refugees during 1938-1941 was “essentially what the American people wanted.” 709 Roosevelt
remained laconic, focused on preparations for and the conduct of a global war. Wyman
concludes that the cataclysm that befell the Jews of Europe was a consequence of the unfortunate
occurrence of being neither American nor English, but rather aliens, who by happenstance were
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Jews.710 Jews, the writer argues, did not possess a “sense of unquenchable urgency,” 711 but it was
the Nazis who were guilty of genocide. He recognizes the limitations of American and Allied
power to effect large-scale rescue once the Continental war began. Nonetheless, he
controversially accuses the American people of being “passive accomplices,” 712 bystanders who
should have called upon the government to attempt some meaningful degree of salvation.
Wyman’s criticisms of the possibilities of the U.S. response set into motion the ongoing
rancorous and polar debate over the American response to Nazi persecution and the Final
Solution.
Saul S. Friedman, Professor of History at Youngstown State University, avers that
Roosevelt’s attitudes and policies towards German Jewish refugees were initially influenced by
economic and employment concerns, the increasing influence of nativists, Nazi sympathizers,
and later by the potential admission of Nazi espionage agents. Entry of the United States into
World War II, however, placed “military expediency”713 at the forefront of his goals and
policies. He asserts that Morse’s emphasis upon anti-Semitism as the driving force for
immigration restrictionism was an overly simplified explanation that was not based upon
sufficient study of primary source material. Friedman echoes Wyman in his claim that Roosevelt
balanced the political risks and gains and was determined to actively avoid meaningful
engagement with the unprecedented ill-treatment and murder of European Jewry during the years
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of the Third Reich. 714 He further alleges that American Jewry who “idolized” 715 the President
bore a degree of responsibility due to communal failure to speak out with one voice, and their
opposition to changes in the quota system. In the end, however, Friedman concludes that the
“blame for inaction lies with the faceless mass of American citizens.” 716
Professor of History Henry L. Feingold at Baruch College and the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York argues that Roosevelt confronted two opposing pressures: The
New Deal promises of compassionate change that would benefit the “forgotten man” 717 and the
need to admit refugees that, it was believed, potentially posed an internal threat to the security of
the nation. FDR was a polished politician who frequently kept his own counsel and could easily
move between these two paths. The dearth of a defined directive, Feingold alleges, was a
significant impediment to meaningful rescue efforts. The President remained aloof from the
problem, but if he did become involved his recommendations were marked by a “visionary
quality” 718 facilitated by “being nowhere anchored to the basic facts of the case.”719
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Consequently, the absence of an ardent committal to rescue and the resultant struggles between
competing authorities produced conflicting policies with little results.
The writer notes the unchanging nature of quota law presented an insurmountable barrier
to German Jewish refugees, but not for the British Christian children of the Hennings Bill. Thus,
FDR engaged in “motions of rescue”720 that posed little political risk.” The employment of the
term “political refugee”721 diminished the victimhood of Jews and the perception that rescue
schemes were primarily for the benefit of a specific refugee group. The American search for
havens, Feingold, asserts, was merely an empty gesture, but the restrictiveness of the quota and
visa system served “literally [as] an adjunct to Berlin’s murderous plan for the Jews.” 722
Feingold believes FDR was pleased to place the refugee issue entirely within the purview
of the Department of State. This stratagem allowed him to avoid any political discord generated
by the immigration problem while intermittently asking a question or offering a
recommendation. Thus, Foggy Bottom absorbed “much of the pressure and ire” 723 that otherwise
would have been directed against Roosevelt. Adoption of this approach enabled FDR to preserve
his magnanimous demeanor, especially among Jewish constituents. 724
The author posits that the American Jewish community was not indifferent to the fate of
his German and European co-religionists but lacked sufficient political influence to effect
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positive change, a position shared by New York University Professor of History Hasia R.
Diner.725 The processes of “secularization,” 726 “acculturation,”727 and an increasing inability to
act jointly over several generations had led to the erosion of communal leadership and
organization. Thus, many members of American Jewry had adopted, he avows, a comprehensive
world view in which there were other ethnic and religious groups experiencing persecution. It
took time for them to recognize that Nazism posed an existential threat, unique to their
collectivity. A variety of factors led to the fragmentation of the Jewish community and its
vulnerability, particularly awareness of a restrictive Congress and State Department, and the
growing threat of domestic anti-Semitism.728
Feingold concluded that the inability of Roosevelt and his administration to take action
on the refugee and rescue issues represented a “classic case of democracy at work” 729 at it
reflected broad Christian and to a lesser extent, Jewish, opposition to admitting stateless émigrés.
Resistance was so entrenched, he argues, that it would have necessitated an “act of extraordinary
political courage” to counter popular opinion. 730
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Proponents of the President and his Administration’s policies insisted that everything that
could be done was carried out within the context and constraints of the time. 731 Arthur
Hertzberg, Professor of Jewish Studies at New York University, offers a mixed analysis of the
response of Roosevelt, the State Department, and American Jewry to the persecution of German
Jewry and the immigration issue. Rising domestic and international anti-Semitism led many Jews
to adopt a time honored practice of supplication, seeking protection from “benevolent kings.” 732
Jews regarded FDR with an unprecedented sense of adoration; a “special protector” 733 for the
Jewish community, although in reality he did little. The acceptance of Jews into the inner
sanctums of government, the civil service, and the liberal programs of social and economic
reform represented by the policies of the New Deal, deepened this relationship and assured the
President of collective Jewish loyalty on election day. A Hebrew language newspaper hailed him
as the “savior of the country” 734 and the guardian of European Jewry.
Roosevelt liked to assume the role of the “benevolent monarch” 735 of the Jews, but the
realities of burgeoning anti-Semitism, politics, economics, and popular opinion placed
limitations on his actions. FDR and many Jews recognized the dangers of pushing for increased
immigration. Hertzberg observes that both parties, the President, and Jewish leadership sought
increased admission into Palestine. However, he fails to mention the secret arrangement made
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between the U.S. and British governments in the formulation of the Evian Conference to remove
the Mandate from consideration. The American Jewish Committee, the representative of German
Jewry in America, declared that Jews should speak in general terms about human rights and
avoid rhetoric regarding the persecution of Jews. Rabbi Stephen Wise of the American Jewish
Congress, on the other hand, who regarded himself as a close confidante and advisor to the
President, supported public protests against Nazi policies, but failed to sway Roosevelt as he
desired cordial American-German relations.
Hertzberg also notes that FDR was in a weaker position politically in 1936 after his failed
attempts to pack the Supreme Court and an upsurge in unemployment. He admits that following
Kristallnacht Roosevelt did little, except for the recall of the Ambassador and the granting of
extended visitors’ visas. He argues that FDR recognized the coming of war in late 1938 and was
unwilling to undertake any political risks that endangered necessary preparations for the conflict.
The saga of the S.S. St. Louis was, in Hertzberg’s opinion, the “most poignant proof” 736 of
presidential unwillingness to challenge immigration restrictionists. The author believes
Roosevelt was sympathetic towards the Jewish plight, but such sentiments had to be expressed
out of the public view. Hertzberg alleges that these feelings were reflected in the increase in
Jewish immigration between 1938-1941 as compared to 1933-1937. He ascribes this change to
the State Department recognizing FDR’s desire to minimize bureaucratic obstacles; a belief that
is not justified in view of the resistance of consuls to grant visas even if all bureaucratic
requirements had been met. Hertzberg concludes that Jews recognized after the President’s death
that it is “power that really counts”; a resource that collectively they lacked. Roosevelt courted
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Jews by providing opportunity in government and New Deal policies, but in the end, they were
impotent to “make the President and Congress feel…Jewish pain.” 737
American University historians Richard D. Breitman and Alan N. Kraut assert
that lower level State Department officials, such as Asst. Secretary of State Wilbur Carr, George
Messersmith, and Breckinridge Long, and others, formulated and enacted modifications of entry
requirements that decidedly impacted the possibility of immigration and rescue. Although some
officials were influenced by anti-Semitic and anti-alien prejudices, it was “bureaucratic
indifference to moral or humanitarian concerns” 738 and a constricted interpretation of
immigration law that created the principal impediment to a pro-active refugee policy. 739
Conflicting national priorities coupled with circumscribed latitudes of domestic political action
prohibited the administration from exceeding quota restrictions. They agree that attempts to
secure the rescue of Jews were inadequate, and admit that on a grander scale “American
inaction…represented a fundamental failure of western civilized values.” 740
The authors claim that Wyman’s use of the phrase, “passive accomplices” 741 in reference
to the Federal Government, the general public, and American Jewry, was drawn from the suicide
note left by Szmul Zygielbojm during the terminal phase of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of
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1943.742 They argue that this form of ex post facto ethical “absolutism” 743 could only be found
within a simplistic universe, and they accuse Wyman of ignoring examples of humanitarian
actions undertaken by various governments and officials. In general, political, social, and
economic conditions existing within the United States, shaped by the ideology and policies of
National Socialism, determined the range and nature of responses to the refugee issue. German
and European Jewry, when viewed through contemporary lenses, represented only one of a host
of global quagmires engulfing the 1930s and 1940s. The writers comment that the annual total
immigration was chronically under filled and never exceeded 54 percent. The German and
Austrian allotment was rarely met and in 1940 Roosevelt directed the State Department to further
abridge the number of visas provided to German and Austrian Jewry, based on security and
political concerns. 744
Breitman and Kraut conclude that FDR, behind the scenes, was supportive of more
liberal interpretations of immigration laws during the 1930s than the State Department
bureaucracy. However, with the advent of the 1940s he adopted their restrictionist approach due
to his determination to obtain victory in World War II, the long-held recognition of the inherent
political risks engendered by a liberal entry policy, and deference to the State Department that
was “largely unaccustomed to humanitarian initiatives.”745
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Doris Kearns Goodwin argued that contrary to Roper opinion polls that indicated a large
percentage of the American public rejected German anti-Jewish polices, a compelling number
remained opposed to their admission. Responding to a 1938 question, “What kind of people do
you object to?” Jews were identified by 35 percent, followed by “noisy, cheap, boisterous and
loud people” at 27 percent, and “uncultured, unrefined dumb people” at 14 percent. 746 A 1939
Roper poll determined that 53 percent of Americans perceived Jews as being too different from
the majority population and this dissimilarity mandated institution of “restrictions in business
and social life...”747 Goodwin also asserted that FDR’s unwillingness to expend political capital
in a move to promote Jewish refugee immigration markedly outweighed any feelings of
sympathy. Eleanor Roosevelt shared this view by commenting that while she “often felt strongly
on various subjects, Franklin frequently refrained from causes in which he believed, because of
political realities.”748
Attorney, investment banker and former Deputy U.S. Permanent Ambassador to the
United States, and founder and President of the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute,
William J. vanden Heuvel, declared that American Jews “knew that they never had a better
friend [or] a more sympathetic leader in the White House.” 749 However, the President had to
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contend with a divided, increasingly isolationist, and economically troubled nation, averse to any
involvement in European affairs following the Great War. FDR, he maintained, was compelled
to focus on the Hitlerian threat, while remaining cognizant that he lacked the power to order an
increase in the immigration quotas. Consequently, he supported a plethora of colonization
schemes.750
vanden Heuvel is deeply critical of Wyman and others who charged the nation and
Roosevelt with collusion in the Holocaust, particularly Wyman’s comment that “The Nazis were
the murderers,” but collectively the American people, “were the all too passive accomplices.”751
vanden Heuvel argues that in order to assess the validity of such a claim it is necessary to
comprehend the “events, values, [and] context” 752 of the pre-war and World War II eras.
However, review of some of his writings demonstrated a determined effort to divert any
censuring of Roosevelt for his marked inaction and his deference to the Department of State. He
offers a number of counterclaims that lack strong historical support or border upon the
imaginary. These assertions significantly weaken his critique of those who question FDR’s
policies and accomplishments regarding the immigration issue. 753
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The Franklin D. Roosevelt Museum, a component of the Presidential Library in Hyde
Park, New York, included in its 2005 core exhibit a highly controversial panel that summarized,
and attempted to expiate, the President’s response to the Holocaust:

During the 1930s, as many European Jews were looking for a safe haven from
official anti-Semitism, members of the State Department enforced the
bloodless immigration laws with cold rigidity. Yet even Roosevelt's bitterest
critics concede that nothing he could have done [that] would have saved
significant numbers from annihilation, let alone dissuaded the Nazis from
doing what they were so intent on doing. 754
David Wyman, Harvard University Professor Samantha Power, the author of ‘A Problem
from Hell’: America and the Age of Genocide and others, were among twenty-five Holocaust
historians who censure this statement as “misleading and inaccurate” 755 on the grounds that it
assigns the primary responsibility for under filling the annual combined German and Austrian
immigration quota to the State Department, essentially absolving the President of any personal
accountability.756 Dr. Rafael Medoff, the Director of the Wyman Institute of Holocaust studies,
declares the museum had significantly erred to “suggest that historians believe nothing could
have been done by FDR to rescue Jews.”757 Rather, he asserts, there was an “overwhelming
consensus”758 that Presidential action, would have enabled a degree of rescue. The actions of
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Varian Fry and his associates in France (rescued 2,000 Jews in Vichy, 1940-1941), Raoul
Wallenberg (Swedish diplomat who saved thousands in Hungary 1944), and the U.S. War
Refugee Board (primarily funded by Jews and established in January 1944 to attempt to end
deportation of Hungarian Jews from Budapest to Auschwitz) and others demonstrated that
interventions to save lives, both before and after the onset of hostilities, were potentially
actionable.759 Roosevelt’s detractors insist he could have bestowed temporary shelter in the U.S.
for the duration of the war or in Allied controlled territories, pressured Britain to alter their
policies regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine, or furnished greater funding to the IGCR
and the War Refugee Board. 760
Howard M. Sachar, Professor of History and International Affairs at George Washington
University, asserts that Roosevelt was sympathetic towards and covertly acting to aid persecuted
Germany Jewry. He believes that FDR, during the post-Evian Conference period, was receptive
to the entreaties of Jews and liberals. As a result, Roosevelt directed Undersecretary of State
Welles to identify, along with geographer Isaiah Bowman, any potential sites of resettlement
outside of the United States. The President’s “overriding objective” 761 was to avoid any
modification of the quota system. FDR was not, Sachar claims, dispassionate towards the
situation within Germany, but he always remained cognizant of political and popular opinion,
rising anti-Semitic and anti-nativist attitudes and groups, and domestic economic conditions.
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Groups, such as Billy James Hargis’ Christian Crusade, George Deatherage’s Patriotic
Defenders, and other had “poisoned the national atmosphere against Jews.” 762 Prior to 1932 only
4-5 anti-Jewish organizations existed, but dramatically increased to more than 1,000 between
1933-1940.763 “Populist”764 hatred of Jews, Sachar asserts, existed within Congress, particularly
among Representatives and Senators from southern and far western states, areas that were of
great political value to Roosevelt, his programs, and future goals. 765 Judge Samuel Rosenman, a
presidential speech writer and advisor, author of the term New Deal, and a member of the
American Jewish Committee, strongly warned Roosevelt to circumvent any involvement in the
debate calling for liberalizing the immigration laws due to its political liability. 766
Sachar argues that the failure of the United States to admit German Jewish refugees was
not due to presidential apathy or personal prejudice, but was the consequence of contemporary
immigration law and State Department attitudes. The Hoover Directive of 1932 altered key terms
of the Likely to Become Public Charge clause. The word “likelihood” was substituted by
“possibility” and this modification permitted consuls to more stringently control the issuance of
entry visas. Thus, a permanent under filling of the yearly quota became the norm. Congress and
the State Department would employ this alteration to block any changes by Roosevelt. 767 Sachar
blamed, like Breitman and Kraut, the Department for frustrating the Chief Executive’s attempts
to interject latitude of action into the immigration process. However, a cabinet division of the
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administration, comprised primarily of “Old American stock,” 768 tainted by anti-Semitism,
actively contrived to restrict Jewish immigration. Finally, he declares that a “horrified Roosevelt
reacted decisively in behalf of the refugees” by consolidating the annual German and Austrian
immigration quotas in the wake of Kristallnacht.769 However, this action, which had marginal
effect on the numbers of German Jews allowed admission, was enacted following the Anschluss
and was the sole American contribution to the Evian Conference.
Robert Rosen asserts that, given the realities of Congressional and domestic politics,
public opinion, the economic and social concerns of the Depression, and the prospect and reality
of a new European war, Roosevelt rescued “as many Jews as could be realistically be saved.” 770
He states that the United States had accepted more German Jewish refugees than other nations
but once war broke out, FDR was obligated to focus the nation’s attention and resources upon
victory. Restriction of immigration was necessary to protect the country from the importation of
spies and other external threats.771
Rosen, an attorney with an M.A. in history from Harvard, labels historians such as
Wyman, Feingold, and others who allege that the President could have done more to provide
sanctuary as “revisionists” whose “claims [could] be quickly dismissed.” 772 These opposing
scholars, Rosen insists, were “guilty of the worst kind of judgment by hindsight.”773 He insists
that anti-immigration fervor, the Great Depression, and the rise of radical foreign regimes and
768

Ibid.

769

Ibid.

770

Rosen, Saving the Jews, 437.

771

Ibid.

772

Ibid., 438.

773

Ibid., 439.

232

ideologies placed strict limits on Roosevelt’s freedom of action. The convocation of the
Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees was, according to this writer, a
humanitarian plan infused with political risk that FDR was willing to take. Rosen, however,
ignores the poor planning and intrinsic deficiencies of the conference that ensured its failure, and
the limited American contribution. 774
The proposal of the Wagner-Rogers Bill, as a one-time exception to the National Origins
Act, was proof, Rosen insists, of the inviolability of the quota system. He claims that German
and Austrian Jews profited from the combined annual quota of 27,370 per year, but significantly
ignores the consistent under filling of the approved allotment. The author also reports incorrectly
that Roosevelt was “vigorously pursu[ing] a ransom scheme, the Rublee plan,” 775 which tied
emigration with increased German foreign trade, but which never came to fruition. The
President’s ardent support for this deal arose, Rosen avers, from FDR’s prescience in
recognizing, unlike the global community and American Jewry, “what might lay ahead if the
Jews of Germany were not ransomed.” 776 If this were true then it was to be expected that
Roosevelt would employ his Executive powers to create other means of rescue than through the
quota process. His only act before involvement in the war was essentially limited to the granting
of visitors’ visas following Crystal Night. As noted, he was publicly silent throughout the debate
over the German Refugee Children’s Bill but did speak out on the Hennings Bill. Rosen ascribes
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the administration’s failure to attempt rescue following Pearl Harbor to fears of importing
“subversion, spies, and terrorists.” 777
Rosen attacks Rafael Medoff, a protégé of Wyman, for not acknowledging American
Jews were engaged in the struggle with the Axis powers. He alleges that Medoff had written
leaders of American Jewry were “on vacation”778 or “lunching at the regular hour at their
favorite restaurant” during the conflict 779 rather than speaking out for their imperiled coreligionists. These quotations were blatantly taken out of context and wrongly ascribed to
Medoff. An October 1942 message dispatched from the Jewish defenders of Warsaw, denigrated
“Jewish leaders abroad”780 who continued the routine of their daily lives while Jews were being
murdered by Nazis. Hungarian Jews asked why international Jewry was not pressuring the Allied
forces to bomb Auschwitz and its rail lines during this phase of the Final Solution and castigated
them for seemingly being on vacation. These criticisms, unlike those of Rosen’s, highlight the
apathy or limited efforts of Jewry’s leadership.
Rosen went on to claim that the President had spoken out “eloquently and forcefully” 781
against Nazi policies and persecution during the late 1930s with a particular emphasis upon
Jews. However, this defense was belied by the paucity of Roosevelt’s public comments and
references to Jews during multiple press conferences. He avows that Roosevelt endeavored to
provide the maximum amount of aid to refugees commensurate with immigration law, but the
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chronic under utilization of the quota contradicted this determination. 782 Rosen concluded that
the President, the American public, and the Jewish community were united in the belief that only
the destruction of Hitler and his regime could save European Jews from extermination. FDR’s
adherence to this goal, he maintained, never wavered.783
Gerhard Weinberg, Professor in American diplomatic and military history at the
University of North Carolina believes that FDR’s ability to act for refugees was circumscribed
by legalities, since the institution of the quota system under the Coolidge Administration. Unless
Congress interceded, Roosevelt, was obliged to comply with its tenets. Any assessments of
blame towards the Chief Executive needs to be viewed, Weinberg asserts, within the background
of the period. It is only through the lens of retrospection that the uniqueness of National Socialist
anti-Semitism and its adoption of genocidal policies can be understood. Neither Jews nor
Gentiles could anticipate or comprehend that a program of mass murder on a continental scale
was to be carried out. Weinberg emphasizes Roosevelt’s recall of the American Ambassador to
Berlin following Kristallnacht as a sign of presidential concern over German Jewry. He does not
acknowledge that diplomatic, financial, commercial, and cultural ties continued unimpeded
between the two nations. This act, although symbolic, did not influence any change in Nazi antiJewish policies, but like the words voiced at Evian, represented hollow rhetoric. Weinberg, in the
foreword to Rosen’s book, minimizes the pre-war narrative of the persecution of German Jewry,
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but focuses primarily on Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief and as the leader of a multinational
coalition against the Reich and its allies. 784
FDR was unconcerned about losing Jewish electoral support for his re-election as he was
assured of their ongoing political loyalty. Many Jews became unwavering supporters of
Roosevelt and the Democratic Party for a host of reasons: Jewish tradition of social conscience,
social work, and activism, manifested in Tikkun Olam, the repairing of the world embodied in the
programs of the New Deal; FDR’s appointment of an unprecedented number of Jewish
professionals into government positions, and Roosevelt’s antipathy towards Hitler and Nazism.
Jews also had a historical tradition of seeking the intervention of the U.S. Government in
significant foreign anti-Semitic events such as the Damascus Blood Libel (1840) and the
Kishinev Pogrom (1903). 785
Louis Rapoport, a Jerusalem Post writer, commentator, and author, later chastises Rabbi
Wise and other national leaders for not lobbying for passage of the Wagner-Rogers Bill. The
legislation’s formal name, he argues, deliberately avoided the word “Jewish” 786 owing to
apparent public antipathy towards Jewish immigration. He concludes that the reticence of
prominent American Jewry and dread of the divided loyalty accusation assured the measure’s
defeat when it came before Congress. Rapoport argues that Wise, confronted by the “fierce
opposition of the Jew-hating American right,”787 resolved to maintain an inconspicuous profile
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on the issue; a course he was intent on promoting to his fellow clerics. 788 The Rabbi’s status and
reputation as being the leader of American Jewry was, Rapoport insists, dependent upon the
perceived acquiescence he had long cultivated with the sitting President:
Roosevelt, who Wise called ‘Boss’ or ‘Chief,’ regarded the rabbi as pompous and
a pest, and once wrote to him, ‘…you care more for personal publicity than for
good government.’ FDR delighted in teasing ‘Stevey,’ who acted like an awed
courtier whenever he visited the White House. But the results of this absurd
relationship… compound[ed] the tragedy of the Jewish of Europe. Even his
admirers concede[d] that Wise’s loyalty to Roosevelt ‘blinded his judgment,’ and
his reliance on FDR would have terrible results.’’ 789
The relative ambivalence of the Jewish community in embracing a concerted stance, that
transcended social class, denomination, and political orientation, contributed to failure. 790
Recalling the timidity of international Jewry displayed at Evian, many American non-Jews
believed that the question of Jewish immigration lacked paramount importance, if it was unable
to garner necessary support from the population most affected. The dearth of a united Jewish
front was the harbinger of future communal defeats. Deborah Lipstadt attests that it was selfevident that the primary beneficiaries of the Wagner-Rogers Bill were Jewish children, despite
its supporter’s declaration that it was a non-sectarian project, encompassing German Catholics
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and Protestants. This recognition fueled the opposition’s resolve against the measure and helped
to ensure its demise. 791
Although an April 1939 Fortune magazine survey demonstrated that at least 85 percent
of the American public were resistant to any modification of the quota system, Lipstadt observes
there were exceptions to this animus: admission of British children under the Hennings Bill. 792
Thus, there was an overt ranking of who was considered worthy of rescue and who was not.
The Hennings Bill did not suffer from intra-communal disputes or the antipathy or
potential antagonisms and prejudices of the dominant religious group. Supporters of the WagnerRogers Bill and the amending of the Neutrality Act recognized the existential threats confronting
Jewish and Christian children. Backers of these measures regarded both groups as potential
assets to the nation. However, opponents of the German Refugee Children’s Bill constructed
Jewish and non-Aryan children as a multilevel danger to the security and interests of the nation.
They were seen as competitors for employment and social services that were envisaged as the
natural right of the native born or naturalized citizens. Many members of Congress were deeply
opposed to the Wagner-Rogers Bill and the State Department was complicit in employing an
irksome bureaucracy to impede passage and immigration. The Hennings Bill was not faced with
such encumbrances. Although some legislators expressed fears of American entanglement in the
European war they voted unanimously by voice vote for its passage. Concerns about job
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competition, diversion of care away from America’s needy children, religion, and ideology, were
non-issues in the public and political domains. Roosevelt articulated conditional support for the
bill, but it is likely, that he, as well as others in government and the public, recognized that the
mercy ship rescue plan could never be put into effect due to the absence of guarantees of safe
passage. The Hennings Bill did articulate one clear message: some refugee groups were valued
more than others and that the preservation of human life was conditional.
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Conclusion:
A Common Thread

The convening of the Evian Conference to seek a global solution to the problem of
German Jewish and non-Aryan refugees, the introduction of the Wagner-Rogers Bill to rescue
twenty thousand children outside of the annual quota, and the 1940 wartime Henning’s Bill to
permit an American evacuation of British Christian children, represent significant points in the
history of the Holocaust and the general question of immigration. Although regarded as
humanitarian acts these projects were internally and fatally flawed. Roosevelt’s hasty and illplanned Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees fell victim to a number of strategic,
and as argued previously, intentionally planned problems of design and execution. The Evian
invitation clearly indicated the limits of American action, power, and cooperation. No country
was expected to amend or liberalize its immigration laws or to expend public monies. The sole
contribution of the United States was the consolidation of the annual German and Austrian
quotas.
George E Warren, the former Director of the International Migration Service, member of
the P.A.C.P.R., and later advisor to Myron Taylor during the Evian Conference, believed that
FDR was motivated to call for the meeting as a means of responding to the Anschluss because
“he didn’t know what else to do.” 793 Faced with a potentially hostile and restrictionist Congress
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and the realities of the quota system, the President was deeply embarrassed for having convened
the meeting. Warren concluded that the project was a “futile effort…that failed completely.” 794
He offered a list of reasons for its lack of success that included economic depression and
widespread unemployment; Latin American population movements from rural to urban areas; the
insincerity of British offers for overseas territory for resettlement, and the collective decision that
Jews needed to engage in agriculture despite their middle class and urban backgrounds. AntiSemitism was not brought up as part of the explanation for the outcome of the Evian Conference.
Twenty-five official delegates spoke during the deliberations and, with few exceptions, each
articulated a common theme: all nations felt sympathetic to the plight of the refugees, but
domestic economic, cultural, racial, and ideological considerations constrained or prevented the
acceptance of forced emigrants. The message sent was clearly heard by the attendees and by
Nazi Germany itself. 795
The Kindertranport served as the model, albeit with important differences, for the
German Refugee Children’s Bill. This plan, promoted openly by Jews and Gentiles, was an act
of utilitarianism coupled with a modicum of humanitarianism. HMG employed the operation
primarily as a means of compensating the Jewish community for Britain’s barring entry of Jews
into Palestine and to dampen American criticism over failure to employ the Mandate as a
potential haven. The British government and Jewish leaders within and without the United
Kingdom mutually accepted a limit of ten thousand but, similar to the American quota, it was
markedly under filled. In addition, following the completion of the children’s education or
vocational training, the immigrants were expected to transmigrate to other lands, a concept
Richard D. McKinzie, “Oral History Interview with George L. Warren,” November 10, 1972 Harry S. Truman
Library; http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/warrengl.htm; Internet; accessed March 6, 2010.
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foreign to Americans. Likewise, it was hoped that a small number of German Jewish and nonAryan children would be accepted into the United States as a means of placating the government,
a fearful American Jewish community, and a doubtful and at times, hostile public. More lives
could have been saved in both projects, but political calculations trumped compassion.
The Wagner-Rogers Bill was hopelessly based upon the crucial but faulty assumption
that public and press criticism of German persecution of its Jewish and non-Aryan population
was translatable into a willingness to accept stateless and impoverished refugees. The NonSectarian Committee for the Rescue of German Children clearly misread the depth of support for
the measure as many witnesses indicated that they spoke as individuals and not as official
spokespersons for the organizations or the churches to which they belonged. Senator Wagner
emphasized, during his introductory comments, the support of leading Protestant and Catholic
clerics and the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. However, it readily became apparent that with few
exceptions, such as Dr. Samuel McCrea Cavert of the Federal Council of Churches in Christ in
America, local and influential church leaders articulated their personal backing and not that of
the official establishment. President William Green of the A.F.L. acknowledged his private
sympathies but noted that the union as a whole had not come out in favor of the bill, unlike the
position taken by John L. Lewis and the C.I.O.
The attempt to employ Christians as the primary face and voice of the bill did not negate
the political and popular perception that this was an attempt to aid German Jews. Presidential
silence, a biased Congress and State Department, the apparent failure of the Evian Conference,
domestic anti-Semitism, fears of foreign ideologies, aliens, and the breakdown of the quota
system, mounting radicalism, nativism, isolationism, economic depression and unemployment,
and widespread fears of involvement in a second European war, presented insurmountable
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obstacles, particularly when Jews were accused of attempting to ensnare the United States in a
conflict that reportedly would benefit themselves financially and politically. Congress fatally
amended the bill by deducting the refugee children from the annual quota; a step that was
morally unacceptable by the legislation’s sponsors. The Golden Gates remained barred to Jews
but would swing open for other groups; not refugees fleeing persecution but from the perils and
travails of modern war.
The amending of the Neutrality Act of 1939 facilitated the Hennings or Mercy Ship bill
to evacuate British children from a theater of conflict. It was marked by the transparency of its
racial and ethnic preferences but, unlike its predecessors, a maximum limit was not firmly
established, although one hundred thousand or less was regarded as the most practical figure,
given financial and shipping constraints. The proverbial poisoned pill was written into the
legislation: the absolute necessity of obtaining guaranteed safe passage for American flagged
mercy ships traversing war zones—an assurance that Germany was unwilling to provide. None
of the ships granted approval to sail ever left the dock. The sinking of the S.S. City of Benares
demonstrated the inherent naïveté of the program and terminated the project.
The American Chief Executive remained conspicuously silent during the course of these
schemes. After promoting the idea of an international refugee conclave FDR strictly limited his
public remarks to a few rhetorical generalities. He privately recommended that the designers of
the German Refugee Children’s Bill obtain the sponsorship of a Catholic and Protestant member
of Congress to advocate for the immigration bill, but cold and pragmatic political, domestic, and
national security calculations led him to avoid public endorsement for its enactment. The need to
preserve party unity and support in Washington superceded humanitarian concerns. His remarks
regarding the Henning Bill mercy ship enterprise were restricted to the necessity of safe passage.
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The President left little in terms of his personal thoughts or motivations regarding the refugee
issue. Thus, any attempt at discovering the real Roosevelt is fraught with difficulty, resulting in a
plethora of biographical descriptors employed by his critics and supporters alike: Machiavellian
politician; anti-Semite; indifference and savior. Most likely, FDR’s character and actions were
comprised of all of these qualities to varying degrees.
American Jewry and their leadership played an essential role in the refugee enigma
through their widespread support for FDR’s New Deal programs, his re-elections, and loyalty to
the Democratic Party. Roosevelt did not have to curry Jewish favor nor their votes. The
Americanization of immigrant Jews and their offspring led to the fragmentation of shared
cultural beliefs and values, loss of cohesiveness, and internecine secular and religious discord.
Fears of promoting domestic anti-Semitism, concerns over the financial burden of maintaining
and caring for large numbers of Jewish refugees, fallout from the Depression, ambivalence, and
the inability or unwillingness to exert pressure upon the White House dampened the collective
ethnic voice. Despite the prominence of young and professional Jews within the Roosevelt
administration and its New Deal programs, American Jews lacked sufficient influence “to mount
effective community action for the rescue of European Jews.” 796
The failure of the Evian Conference and the Wagner-Rogers Bill cannot be laid solely at
the feet of anti-Semitism, but rather it reflected an interplay of deeply interconnected and
disparate factors. The inefficacy of the Henning Bill was the result of advancements in deadly
military technology that facilitated the concept and practice of total war. It did demonstrate,
however, that greater value was placed on the lives of some children as compared to others. As
796
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such, the issues raised during this significant period regarding immigration, migration, and
refugees continue to haunt the 21 st century. The question remains: are solutions to these
problems attainable or do they remain subject to the same concerns and forces expressed so
many decades ago?
The democracies cannot be blamed for the Holocaust. However, it was readily apparent
that failure to accept refugees or to ardently oppose policies of forced emigration engendered
drastic consequences. The November 24, 1938 issue of Das Schwarze Korps, the official
publication of the SS, described how the progressive impoverishment of German Jews would
force them into a life of crime.
If things were to develop in this way we would be faced with the harsh necessity
of having to exterminate the Jewish underground in the same manner as we are
used to exterminating criminals in our Order State: with fire and sword. The result
would be the actual and definite end of Jewry in Germany—its complete
destruction.797
Similarly, Hitler declared during a January 1939 Reichstag speech that if the “international
Jewish financiers in and outside of Europe… plung[ed] the nation once more into a world war,
then the result [would] not be the bolshevization of the earth and thus the victory of Jewry, but
the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.” 798
While such warnings were clear, the rescue of Jews remained a low priority on the global
and American scene. In 1938, Myron C. Taylor asserted that involuntary migration was creating
“catastrophic human suffering” 799 that threatened widespread discord. None the less, the true
sentiments or apathy of many towards Nazi persecution of Jewish and non-Aryan minorities
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could, perhaps, be best expressed in the recollections of the Chief Concierge of the Hotel Royal,
the site of the conference in Evian:
Very important people were here, and all the delegates had a nice time. They took
pleasure cruises on the lake. They gambled at night at the casino. They took
mineral baths and massages at the Esablissement Thermal. Some of them took the
excursion to Chamonix to go summer skiing. Some went riding: we have, you
know, one of the finest stables in France. But, of course, it is difficult to sit
indoors hearing speeches when all the pleasures that Evian offers are outside. 800
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New York Times, July 7, 1938; “When the World Passed by on the Other Side,”; Manchester Guardian
Weekly, May 7, 1978.
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Appendix A: Admissions Permissible Under Three Variations of the Annual Quota
System801

TOTAL:
Asia:
Asia/Oceania
Europe

1921 Act
3% 1910

1924 Act
2% 1890

National Origins
Act

357,803

164,667

153,714

492
359
356,952

1,424
1,821
161,422

1,423
1,800
150,491

77,342
3,607
12,202
20,042
3,752

512
2,789
3,954
51,277
34,007
38,567
1,648
6,453
9,561
2,081

1,304
1,181
3,086
25,957
65,721
17,853
3,153
2,377
3,314
1,707

197,630

140,999

127,266

7,342
14,357
3,063
5,747
42,057
30,977
2,465
7,419
24,405
2,654
6,426

785
3,073
100
473
3,845
5,982
503
603
2,248
100
671

1,413
2,874
307
869
5,802
6,524
440
295
2,784
226
845

155,585

20,423

23,235

NORTHERN/WESTERN EUROPE:
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain/N.I./
Irish Free State
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
TOTAL:

1,563
5,619
5,729
67,607

SOUTHERN AND EASTERN EUROPE:
Austria
Czechoslovakia
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Poland
Portugal
Romania
USSR
Turkey
Yugoslavia
TOTAL:

801

Bernard. William S., ed. American Immigration Policy, (Harper and Brothers: 1950), 27.
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Appendix B: Total German Immigration into U.S. By Year 802
July 1, 1932-June 30, 1933: 1,919
July 1, 1933-June 30, 1934: 4,392
July 1, 1934-June 30, 1935: 5,201
July 1, 1935-June 30, 1936: 6,346
July 1, 1936-June 30, 1937: 10,895
July 1, 1937-June 30, 1938: 17,199
July 1, 1932-June 30, 1938: 45,952 from Greater Germany.
1919-1932 (pre-Hitler): 426,326 or average of 30,342/year.

802

Contemporary Jewish Record, May 1, 1939, 2,3;
http://media.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/media/ch/pao/doc/1064-1939-002-03000046/doc.pdf?cit%3Aauth=&cit%3Atitle=On+Admission+of+Refugee+Children+from+Editorial+in+%22Clevel
and+%28Ohio%29+Plain+Dealer%22&cit%3Apub=Contemporary+Jewish+Record&cit%3Avol=2&cit%3Aiss=3&
cit%3Apg=90&cit%3Adate=May+1%2C+1939&ic=true&cit%3Aprod=ProQuest&_a=ChgyMDE2MTEyNzIzMjE0
NTc3NDo5MTMwNDcSBTk1NDQ0GgpPTkVfU0VBUkNIIg0xMzEuMjQ3LjExMi4zKgcxODE2NjE2MgoxMjk
wMDc0MTQ1Og1Eb2N1bWVudEltYWdlQgEwUgZPbmxpbmVaAkZUYgNQRlRqCjE5MzkvMDUvMDFyAHo
AggEpUC0xMDA4NjkzLTE0NzQ1LUNVU1RPTUVSLTEwMDAwMTkxLTIxMzc3OTOSAQZPbmxpbmXKAX
dNb3ppbGxhLzUuMCAoTWFjaW50b3NoOyBJbnRlbCBNYWMgT1MgWCAxMF82XzgpIEFwcGxlV2ViS2l0Lz
UzNC41OS4xMCAoS0hUTUwsIGxpa2UgR2Vja28pIFZlcnNpb24vNS4xLjkgU2FmYXJpLzUzNC41OS4xMNIBE
lNjaG9sYXJseSBKb3VybmFsc5oCB1ByZVBhaWSqAihPUzpFTVMtUGRmRG9jVmlld0Jhc2UtZ2V0TWVkaWF
VcmxGb3JJdGVtsgImMjAxNjExMjcyMzIxNDU3NzQ6OTEzMDQ3OjE0ODAyODkxMjgyMzS6AilQLTEwMDg
2OTMtMTQ3NDUtQ1VTVE9NRVItMTAwMDAxOTEtMjEzNzc5M8oCD0ZlYXR1cmV8QXJ0aWNsZdICAVni
AgDyAgA%3D&_s=FVVipLqWizeGiDP23Mm%2FL9ZwDmo%3D; Internet; accessed November 25, 2016.
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Appendix C: Clerical Petition to President Roosevelt with List of Signatories 803
The petition said:
“The American people has made clear its reaction to the oppression of all minority groups,
religious and racial, throughout Germany. It has been especially moved by the plight of the
children. Every heart has been touched, and the nation has spoken out its sorrow and dismay
through the voices of its statesmen, teachers and religious leaders. Americans have felt that
protest, however vigorous and sympathy, however deep, are not enough; and that these must
translate themselves into such action as shall justify faith.
We have been stirred by the knowledge that Holland and England have opened their doors
and homes to many of these children. We conceive it to be our duty, in the name of the
American tradition and the religious spirit common to our nation to urge the people, by its
Congress and Executive, to express sympathy through special treatment of the young, robbed of
country, home and parents. A heartening token of the mood of America is to be found in the fact
that thousands of Americans of all faiths have made known their eagerness to take these young
children into their homes, without burden or obligation to the State.
Working within and under the laws of Congress, through special enactment if necessary, the
nation can offer sanctuary to a part of these children by united expression of its will to help.
To us it seems that the duty of Americans in dealing with the youthful victims of a regime
which punishes innocent and tender children as if they were offenders, is to remember the
monition of Him who said, ‘Suffer little children to come unto me.’ And in that spirit we call on
all Americans to join together without regard to race, religion or creed in offering refuge to
children as a token of our sympathy and as a symbol of our faith in the ideals of human
brotherhood.
“The statement was indorsed also by the following:
Dr. Martin Anderson, Central Presbyterian Church, Denver, Colo.
Dr. Albert William Beaven, president of Colgate Rochester Divinity School, Rochester, N.Y.
Dr. Walter Russell Bowie, Grace Church, New York City.
Dr. Samuel Calvert, Executive Secretary, Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America,
New York City.
Dr. Allen Knight Chalmers, Broadway Tabernacle, New York City.
Dr. Henry Sloane Coffin, Union Theological Seminary, New York City.
Dr. Henry Crane, Central Methodist Church, Detroit, Mich.
Bishop Ralph Cushman, Methodist Church, Denver, Colo.
The Rev. Graham Frank, First Christian Church, Dallas, Tex.
Dr. Robert Freeman, Presbyterian Church, Pasadena, Calif.
Dr. Louis Hartman, Editor, Zion’s Herald, Boston, Mass.
Bishop Ivan Lee Holt, St. Louis, Mo.
Right Rev. Edwin H. Hughes, Bishop of Washington Area, Methodist Episcopal Church.
Dr. Robert Scott Inglis, pastor emeritus of Third Presbyterian Church, Newark, N.J.
Dr. Edgar DeWitt Jones, Central Woodward Church, Detroit, Mich.
Dr. Meredith Ashby Jones, Atlanta, Ga.
Rev. McIlyar H. Lichiter, First Congregational Church, Columbus, Ohio.
Dr. Mark Alison Matthews, First Presbyterian Church, Seattle, Wash.
803

Washington Post, January 10, 1939, “Clerics Ask Roosevelt’s Aid to Bring Child Refugees Here,” 1.
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Most Rev. Charles Hubert Le Blond, Bishop of St. Joseph, St. Joseph, Mo.
Rev. Oscar E. Maurer, Moderator National Council of Congregational Christian Churches, New
Haven, Conn.
Bishop Charles Mead, Methodist Episcopal Church, Kansas City, Mo.
Dr. Julius Valdemar Moldenhawer, First Presbyterian Church, New York City.
Rev. Roger T. Nooe, president, International Convention of Disciples of Christ, Nashville, Tenn.
Right Rev. John O’Grady, secretary, National Conference of Catholic Charities.
Rev. Joseph D. Ostermann, executive director, Committee for the Catholic Refugees from
Germany.
Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, Methodist Church, Omaha, Nebr.
Dr. Albert Wentworth Palmer, Chicago Theological Seminary, president, Chicago, Ill.
Rev. Daniel Alfred Poling, editor, Christian Herald and Christian Endeavor World, Baptist
Temple, Philadelphia, Pa.
Dr. George W. Richards, President, Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church, Lancaster,
Pa.
The Most Rev. Joseph Francis Rummell, S.T.D., Archbishop of New Orleans, La.
The Most Rev. James H. Ryan, S.T.D., Bishop of Omaha, Nebr.
The Right William Scarlett, Bishop of Missouri Protestant Episcopal Church, St. Louis, Mo.
Dr. Avery A. Shaw, president, Denison University, Granville, Ohio.
The Rev. Maurice S. Sheey, head of department of religious education, Catholic University of
America.
The Most Rev. Bernard James Shell, Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, Ill.
Dr. Ralph W. Sockman, Christ’s Methodist Episcopal Church, New York City.
Dr. Robert Elliott Speer, president of the board of trustees, Princeton Seminary.
Dr. John Timothy Stone, president, Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill.
Dr. Howard Thurman, dean of chapel, Howard University.
Dr. Ezra Allen Van Nuys, Calvary Presbyterian Church, San Francisco, Calif.
Dr. John Anderson Vance, First Presbyterian Church, Detroit, Mich.
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Appendix D: Text of S.J. Res. 64 and H.J. Res. 165 and 168, 76th Congress, 1st Session:
JOINT RESOLUTION To authorize the admission into the United States of
a limited number of German refugee children. 804
Whereas there is now in progress a world-wide effort to facilitate the emigration from Germany
of men, women, and children of every race and creed suffering from conditions, which compel
them to seek refuge in other lands; and
Whereas the most pitiful and helpless sufferers are children of tender years; and
Whereas the admission into the United States of a limited number of these children can be
accomplished without any danger of their becoming public charges, or dislocating American
industry or displacing American labor; and
Whereas such action by the United States would constitute the most immediate and practical
contribution by our liberty-loving people to the cause of human freedom, to which we are
inseverably bound by our institutions, our history, and our profoundest sentiments: Now,
therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That not more than ten thousand immigration visas may be
issued during each of the calendar years 1939 and 1940, in addition to those authorized by
existing law and notwithstanding any provisions of law regarding priorities or preferences, for
the admission into the United States of children fourteen years of age or under, who reside, or at
any time since January 1, 1933, have resided, in any territory no incorporated in Germany, and
who are otherwise eligible: Provided, That satisfactory assurances are given that such children
will be supported and properly cared for through the voluntary action of responsible citizens or
responsible private organizations of the United States and consequently will not become public
charges. (4)

804

Joint Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration. U.S. Senate and a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, 76 th Congress, 1st Session on S.J. Res. 64
and H.J. Res. 168. Joint Resolutions to Authorize the Admission into the United States of a Limited Number of
German Refugee Children, April 20, 1939. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 4.
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Appendix E: List of Contributors to Plan for the Care of German Refugee Children 805
1. Paul T. Beisser, President, Child Welfare League of America.
2. Mary Boretz, Executive Director, Home Bureau, Hebrew Sheltering Guardian Society. (69)
3. C.C. Carstens, Executive Director, Child Welfare League of America.
4. Jessie P. Condit, Executive Secretary, Children’s Aid Society, Newark, N.J.
5. Gertrude M. Dubinsky, Executive Director, Juvenile Aid Society, Philadelphia.
6. Sybil Foster, Field Secretary, Child Welfare League of America.
7. Mary Godley, Executive Director, Catholic Home Bureau, New York.
8. Katherine e. Griffith, Director, Diocesan Bureau of Social Service, Hartford, Conn.
9. Byron T. Hacker, Executive Director, Children’s Center, New Haven, Conn.
10. Dr. Stephanie Herz, Committee for Catholic Refugees from Germany.
11. Sidney Hollander, Maryland Board of State Aid and Charities.
12. Dr. Marion E. Kenworthy, Director, Department of Mental Hygiene, New York School of
Social Work.
13. Jacob Kepecs, Superintendent, Jewish Children’s Bureau, Chicago.
14. Dr. Bertha Krauss, American Friends Service Committee, Philadelphia.
15. Edith L. Lauer, Executive Director, Jewish Family and Children’s Bureau, Baltimore.
16. Harry Lurie, Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds.
17. Lotte Marcuse, Director of Placements, German Jewish Children’s Aid.
18. Ruth Taylor, Commissioner of Public Welfare, Westchester County, N.Y
19. Sophie Van. S. Theis, Assistant Secretary, State Charities Aid Association, N.Y.
20. Alfred w. Whitman, Executive Secretary, Children’s Aid Association, Boston.

“Plan for the Care of German Refugee Children in the United States, Letter from Marion E. Kenworthy, MD,
to Clarence E. Pickett,” cited in April 20, 1939 Joint Hearings, 70.
805
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Appendix F: Composition of House and Senate Immigration Committees and
Subcommittees806
Composition of Committees:
United States Senate Committee on Immigration:
Richard B. Russell, GA, Chairman.
William H. King, Utah.
Francis T. Maloney, CT.
Rush B. Holt, WV.
Charles O. Andrews, Florida.
James H. Hughes, DE.
William H. Smathers, NJ
Clyde L. Herring, IA.
Tom Stewart, TN.
Hiram W. Johnson, CA.
Warren R. Austin, VT.
Rufus C. Holman, OR.
Joe B. Watson, Clerk
Subcommittee on S.J. Res. 64 and H.J. Res. 168.
William H. King, UT., Chairman.
William H. Smathers, NJ.
Arthur Capper, KS
House of Representatives Committee on Immigration and Naturalization:
Samuel Dickstein, NY, Chairman
William T. Schulte, IN.
Charles Kramer, CA.
John Lesinski, MI.
Caroline O’Day, NY.
Lex Green, FL.
W.R. Poage, TX.
Dan R. McGehee, MISS.
A. Leonard Allen, LA.
George M. Grant, AL.
John L. McMillan, SC.
Anton F. Maciejewski, IL.
E.C. Gathings, ARK.
J. Will Taylor, TN.
806

“Admission of German Refugee Children” Joint Hearings Before A Subcommittee of the Committee on
Immigration. United States Senate and a Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House
of Representatives. Seventy-Sixth Congress, 1st Session on S.J. Res. 64 and H.J. Res. 168. Joint Resolutions to
Authorize the Admission into the United States of a Limited Number of German Refugee Children. United States
Government Printing Office: 1939.
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Noah M. Mason, IL.
Edward H. Rees, KS.
Cliff Clevenger, OH.
John Z. Anderson, CA.
Henry O. Talle, IA.
Samuel W. King, HI.
John H. Kelly, Clerk.
Subcommittee on S.J. Res. 64 and H.J. Res. 168:
Charles Kramer, CA., Chairman.
John Lesinski, MI.
Caroline O’Day, NY.
Anton F. Maciejewski, IL.
Noah M. Mason, IL.

286

Appendix G: List of Senators for, Uncertain or Against Wagner-Rogers Bill Based on
March 24, 1939 Polling Data807

Favor:
Downey, CA.
Burke, NE.
Smathers, N.J.
Hatch, MN.
Wagner, N.Y.
King, Utah.
Thomas, Utah.
Probably Favor:
Pepper, FL.
Winton, IN.
Capper, KS.
Shipstead, MN.
Clark, MO.
Morris, NE.
Bulow, S.D.
Stewart, TN.
Gillette, IA.
Favor with Reservations:
Radcliffe, MD.
Mead, NY.
Neely, WV.
Opposes:
Miller, AR.
Hughes, DE.
Andres, FL.
Clark, ID.
Overton, LA.
Ellender, LA.
Lundeen, MN.
Murray, MT.
McCarran, NV.
Reynolds, N.C.
Smith, S.C.
Gurney, S.D.
Probably Oppose:
Russell, GA.
George, GA.
Herring, IA.

Brown, MI.
Truman, MO.
Bridges, N.H.
Tobey, N.H.
Chavez, NM.
Lee, OK.
Bone, WA.
Opposes with Reservations:
Taft, OH.
Schwellenbach, WA.
Uncertain:
Bankhead, AK.
Hill, AL.
Ashurst, AZ.
Hayden, AZ.
Caraway, AR.
Johnson, CA.
Adams, CO.
Johnson, CO.
Maloney, CT.
Danaher, CT.
Townsend, DE.
Borah, ID.
Lewis, IL.
Lucas, Il.
Van Nuys, IN.
Reed, KS.
Barkley, WY.
Logan, KY.
White, ME.
Tydings, MD.
Walsh, MA.
Lodge, MA.
Vandenburg, MI.
Harrison, MS.
Bilbo, MS.
Wheeler, MT.
Pittman, NV.
Barbour, NJ

807

Non-Sectarian Committee for German Refugee Children, Wagner-Rogers Bill, Congressional Poll (Box 2, Folder
33), 1-4.
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Bailey, N.C.
Frazier, N.D.
Nye, N.D.
Donahey, OH.
Thomas, OK.
McNary, OR.
Holman, Or.
Davis, PA.
Guffey, PA.
Gerry, RI.
Green, RI.
Byrnes, S.C.
McKellar, TN.
Sheppard, TX.
Connally, TX.
Austin, VT.
Glass, VA.
Byrd, VA.
LaFollette, WI.
Wiley, WI.
O’Mahoney, WY.
Absent:
Hale, ME.
Holt, WV.
“We have heard directly or indirectly from the following Senators and Representatives,
and the tenor of their replies is as indicated:”
Senators:
Non-Committal: Senators Warren R. Austin, Arthur Capper, Rush D. Holt, William H. King,
Francis Maloney, and Richard B. Russell, Jr.
Representatives:
Yes: Samuel Dickstein; Caroline O’Day.
No: Lewis K Rockefeller.
Non-Committal: William M. Colmer; Lex Green; John H. Kerr.
Delegate from Territory (not voting member):
Non-Committal: S.W. King
Summary of replies:
Senate: None favorable or unfavorable, six non-committal.
House: Two favorable, one opposed, four non-committal (including non-voting Hawaiian
delegate to House).
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Appendix H: List of Officers of Allied Patriotic Societies: 808
a. Dwight Braman, First President; John R. Voorhis, Honorary President; Mrs. Finley J.
Shepard, Vice President.
b. Officers: Francis H. Kinnicutt, President; Andrew B. Humphrey, Alexander L. Ward, Miss
Charlotte C. Aycrigg, Vice Presidents’ George M. Bodman, treasurer; Andrew B. Humphrey,
Chairman, Executive Committee; John M. Berry, Secretary, Care of Whitehouse & Co,
Sherry-Netherland Hotel, NYC.
c. Directors, 1939: Mrs. George Howard; Dr. Harry L. Bowlby; Dr. Thomas Darlington; John
T. Mills, Jr.; Laurens M. Hamilton; John B. Trevor, Jr.; Mrs. Edward B. Huling; Mrs.
Richard W. Meade; Mrs. Livingston Rowe Schuyler; Maj. William L. Rich; Col. Henry B.
Fairbanks; and Major Lee Hagood.
Member Organizations of the Allied Patriotic Societies:
a. American Defense Society.
b. American Legion (N.Y. County organization).
d. American Women Against Communism.
e. Dames of the Loyal Legion.
f. Daughters of America (national society).
g. Daughters of American Revolution (Chapters Knickerbocker, Jacobus Roosevelt).
h. Daughters of the Revolution (National Society).
i. Daughters of the Revolution (State of New York).
j. Daughters of the Defenders of the Republic.
k. Descendants of the Signers of the Declaration of Independence (N.Y. Society).
l. Founders and Patriots (N.Y. Society)
m. Lord’s Day Alliance of the United States.
n. Military Order Foreign Wars of the United States (N.Y. Commandery)
o. Military Order of the Loyal Legion (State of New York)
p. Military Order of the World War (New York)
q. National Society Colonial Descendants of America.
r. National Society of new England Women.
s. National Society Daughters of the Union, 1861-1865, Inc.
t. Naval Order of the United States.
u. Naval and Military Order Spanish American War, New York Commandery.
v. New England Women, New York City Colony.
w. Patriotic Order Sons of America.
x. St. Nichols Society.
y. Society of Mayflower Descendants.
z. Society of Tammany or Columbian Order.
aa. Sons of the American Revolution (Empire State)
bb. Sons of Confederate Veterans (New York)
cc. United Daughters of the Confederacy (New York Division).
dd. Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States.
808

Joint Hearings, 189.
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APPENDIX I: Committee on Immigration and Naturalization - Hennings Bill809
Committee:
Samuel Dickstein, NY, Chairman.
William T. Schulte, IN.
John Lesinski, MI.
Caroline O’Day, NY.
Lex Green, FL.
William R. Poage, TX.
Dan B. McGehee, MS.
A. Leonard Allen, LA.
George M. Grant, AL.
John L. McMillan, SC.
Anton F. Maciejewski, IL.
E.C. Gathings, AK.
David J. Ward, MD.
Noah M. Mason, IL.
Edward H. Rees, KS.
Lewis S. Rockefeller, NY.
Henry O. Talle, IA.
James E. Van Zandt, PA.
Carl T. Curtis, NE.
Albert E. Austin, CT.
Sub-Committee:
Bloom
Colmer
Robison
Fish
Wigglesworth
Luther Johnson
Beam
Mason
Keller
Taylor

809

Membership of House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization during hearings on Hennings Bill, ii.
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APPENDIX J: Text of Hennings Bill:810
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress, assembled, That section 4, as amended of the Neutrality Act of 1939 is amended by
inserting “(a)” after “Sec. 4,” and by adding at the end thereof of the following new subsection.
“(b) The provisions of section 2 (a) and 4 shall not prohibit a vessel, in ballast, unarmed,
and not under convoy, and transporting refugee children, under sixteen years of age, from war
zones, or combat areas, and shall not prohibit such vessel entering into such war zones or combat
areas for this purpose, together with such necessary America citizen adult personnel in charge as
may be approved by the Secretary of State, subject to the provisions of the immigration laws, if
such vessel is proceeding under safe conduct granted by all of the States named in the
proclamations issued under the authority of section 1 (a), and if such vessel has painted on a
large scale prominently, distinctly, and unmistakably on each side thereof and upon the
superstructure thereof plainly visible from the air an American flag and a statement to the effect
that such vessel is a refugee-child rescue ship of the United States or under United States
registry:
Provided, That every such child so brought into the United States shall, previous to departure
from the rot of embarkation, have been so sponsored by some responsible American person,
natural or corporate, that he will not become a public charge.
Approved, August 27, 1940.

810

Public Laws—CHS. 694, 866.
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